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The war on crime has been the dominant ideology of Ameri-
can criminal law for the past three decades. This paper exam-
ines the inner workings of this remarkably successful, yet still
little understood, strategy of social control. Particular attention
will be paid to the role of victimless crimes, and possession in
particular, as sweep offenses to incapacitate dangerous undesir-
ables. Easy to detect and to prove, yet far more potent and less
vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny, possession emerges as the
new and improved vagrancy, a modern policing tool for a mod-
ern police regime, the war on victimless crime.
I. INTRODUCTION
For some thirty years, American criminal law has waged a
war on crime. From Robert Kennedy's war on organized crimeI
and Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty, crime and disorder,2 to
Richard Nixon's war of "thePeace forces" against "the criminal
forces," "the enemy within," the war on crime evolved into an
extended comprehensive police action to exterminate crime by
incapacitating criminals.4  As wars go, the crime war has been
unusual, and unusually successful, in that its casualties have also
been its success stories; it has managed to incapacitate millions,
most through imprisonment, some through death, most tempo-
' See RONALD L. GOLDFARB, PERFEcr VuiLANs, LiW'ERFEcr HEROES: ROBERT
KENNEDY'S WARAGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME (1995).
2 See Richard Nixon, Toward Freedom From Fear (position paper on crime) (New
York, May 8, 1968), reprinted in 114 Cong. Rec. 12936, 12936 (May 13, 1968) ("The
war on poverty which I started-is a war against crime and a war against disorder."
(quoting LyndonJohnson, Oct. 16, 1964)); see also President Lyndon B.Johnson, An-
nual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 17, 1968) (federal gov-
ernment should "help the cities and the States in their war on crime to the full extent
of its resources and its constitutional authority").
I See Nixon, supra note 2, at 12936, 12937; see also Todd R. Clear, Societal Responses to
the President's Crime Commission: A Thin-Year Retrospectiv in RESEARCH FORmt, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIE IN A FREE SOCmY LOOKING BACK, LOOImNG FORWARD 131 (U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, Office ofJustice Programs 1997);James Vorenberg, The War on Crme:
The First Five Years, Anr. MONTHLY, May 1972, at 63.
' On the distinction between wars-which require an open "declaration" and are
bound by the law of war-and police actions-which are often carried out clandes-
tinely and arguably are beyond the constraints of the law of war--see Geoffrey S.
Corn, "To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question": Contemnporay Militaiy Operations and the
Status of Captured Personne4 1999 ARMY LAW. 1; Robert 0. Weiner & Fionnuala Ni Ao-
lain, Beyond the Laws of War Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework, 27 CoLnms.
Htum RTS L. REv. 293 (1996); Benedetto Conforti, Non-Coercive Sanctions in the United
Nations Charter Some Lessons from the Gulf War, 2 EULJ. IN'TLL 110 (1991).
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rarily, some permanently. In 1970, the American prison and jail
population stood at around 300,000. Today, it tops two million
with another four million or so under various forms of noncar-
ceral control, including parole and probation, adding up to
over six million people, or three percent of American adults,
under state penal control.5
The war on crime has been fought on many fronts, and with
many weapons. Most dramatically, it has brought us the resur-
gence of capital punishment as a measure for the permanent
incapacitation of violent predators. Less dramatically, but more
pervasively, Draconian laws combating the plague of violent re-
cidivism have pursued a similar strategy of incapacitation.
6
As a war on violent criminals, the crime war has attracted a
great deal of attention. Over decades, the media have eagerly
recorded its campaigns and initiatives, kicked off with great fan-
fare by generations of legislators (and would-be legislators) anx-
ious to incorporate the tough-on-crime plank into their political
platform. The crime war's failures have made for particularly
and persistently good news, as criminal violence continued even
in the face of an all-out campaign to eradicate it. These failures
led not to calls for the abandonment of the campaign, but for
its expansion and more rigorous prosecution.
To understand the war on crime, however, one must go be-
neath the sensational and well-covered surface of crimes of vio-
lence suffered by innocent citizens at the hands of murderers,
rapists, robbers, kidnappers, and other assorted miscreants.
There, in the murky depths of criminal law in action, one finds
the everyday business of the war on crime: the quiet and effi-
cient disposal of millions of dangerous undesirables for offenses
with no human victim whatsoever. To analyze this disposal re-
gime is one of the main goals of this article.
I U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office ofJustice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics 2000: At a Glance 19 (Aug. 2000, NCJ 183014), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bsagO.pdf; Fox Butterfield, Number in
Prison Grows Despite Crime Reduction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at A10; The Sentencing
Project, Facts About Prisons and Prisoners, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/facts-pp.pdf, Justice Policy Institute, The
Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail Estimates at the Millennium, available at
http://www.cjcj.org/punishingdecade/.
6 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BuFF. L.
REV. 689 (1995).
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The war on crime, though ostensibly waged on behalf of
crime victims, has been first and foremost a war on victimless
crime. The paradigmatic crime of the war on crime is not mur-
der, but possession; its sanction not punishment, but forfeiture;
its process not the jury trial, but plea bargaining; its mode of
disposition not conviction, but commitment; and its typical sen-
tencing factor not victim impact, but dangerousness as
"evinced" by a criminal record. Our prisons and jails (which we
persist in calling "correctional" institutions) are filled not with
two million murderers, nor are the additional four million pro-
bationers and parolees superpredators. No, our comprehensive
effort to control the dangerous by any means necessary reaches
"possessors" along with "distributors," "manufacturers," "im-
porters," and other transgressors caught in an ever wider and
ever finer web of state norms designed for one purpose: to po-
lice human threats.
Policing human threats is different from punishing persons.
A police regime doesn't punish. It seeks to eliminate threats if
possible, and to minimize them if necessary. Instead of punish-
ing, a police regime disposes. It resembles environmental regu-
lations of hazardous waste more than it does the criminal law of
punishment.
7
7 On this point, see infra notes 118-65 and accompanying text. Here, I'm invoking
police in the broad sense, as in "police power," rather than in the limited institutional
sense, as in "police department." The police power of the state is the power to order
its constituents so as to maximize the "public welfare" according to rules of expedi-
ency. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLC POLICY AND CONsTLrrONAL RIGHTS
4 (1904); see ADAM SltTH, Juris Prudence or Notes from the Lectures on Justice, Police, Rev'e-
nue, and Arms, in LECTuRES ONJURISPRUDENCE 396, 398 (RL Meed, D.D. Raphael, &
P.G. Stein eds., 1978). In Blackstone's oft-quoted definition, police is "the due regu-
lation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like
members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to
the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners: and to be decent,
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COwmETARES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (1769). Law, by contrast, is concerned
with the "maintenance of right and the redress of wrong" according to principles of
justice. FREUND, supra; see SNTH, supra. For more recent accounts of the distinction
between police and law, see CHRISTOPHER L TONMINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN
THE EARLYAMERICAN REPUBtJC (1993); WnjAhiJ. Nov,A. THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW
& REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY A ERICA (1996). Sce also Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVER .rALm' 87 (Graham
Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller eds., 1991); MAR NEOCLEOUS, THE
FABRICATION OF SOCIAL ORDE: A Cr ICAL THEORY OF POLICE POWER (2000).
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In a sense, the current regime of penal police marks the
end of criminal law as we know it. It's no more about crimes
than it is about law, as these concepts have come to be under-
stood. Crimes, as serious violations of another's rights, are of
incidental significance to a system of threat control. By the time
a crime has been committed, the system of threat identification
and elimination has failed. Law, as a state run system of inter-
personal conflict resolution, is likewise irrelevant. Persons mat-
ter neither as the source, nor as the target, of threats. Penal
police is a matter between the state and threats.8
A penal police regime may look like traditional criminal law.
But these looks are deceiving. A crime consists no longer in the
infliction of harm, but in the threat of harm. Harm itself turns
out to be the threat of harm. So to punish crime means to
eliminate-or at least minimize-the threat of the threat of
harm.
The effort to disguise itself as bread-and-butter criminal law
is an important component of a modern police regime.9 The
camouflage is crucial to its success because non-negligible pub-
lic resistance would interfere with the state's effort to eliminate
as many threats as efficiently and permanently as possible. It's
therefore in the interest of a police regime both to retain traces
of traditional criminal law and to infiltrate traditional criminal
law by manipulating its established doctrines, rather than to do
away with it altogether.
This article does two things. First, it sketches the outlines of
the police regime that has hollowed out American criminal law
in the name of the war on crime. Second, it illustrates how the
police regime has manipulated familiar doctrines-like actus
reus and mens rea-to reduce traditional criminal law to cere-
monial significance.
To illustrate the inner workings of the war on crime, I will
carefully analyze the theory and practice of possession offenses,
the new paradigm of criminal law as threat police. Possession
offenses have not attracted much attention." Yet they are eve-
'See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
Cf Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 IHAv. L. REv. 1429, 1432 (2001) (exploring "the wish to keep the
old criminal 'punishment' facade" in a prevention system).
" For suggestive remarks on the problem of punishing possession, see GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 197-205 (1978). See also MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT
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rywhere in modem American criminal law, on the books and in
action. They fill our statute books, our arrest statistics, and,
eventually, our prisons. By last count, New York law recognized
no fewer than 153 possession offenses; one in every five prison
or jail sentences handed out by New York courts in 1998 was
imposed for a possession offense." That same year, possession
offenses accounted for over 100,000 arrests in New York State,
while drugpossession offenses alone resulted in over 1.2 million
arrests nationwide.'
2
The dominant role of possession offenses in the war on
crime is also reflected in the criminal jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court. They are the common thread that connects
the Court's sprawling and discombobulated criminal procedure
jurisprudence of the past thirty years. As we will see, virtually
every major search and seizure case before the Court, from
1968's Terry v. Ohio13 (which relaxed Fourth Amendment re-
quirements for so-called Terry stops and frisks) to last term's Illi-
nois v. Wardlow14 (which relaxed Terry's relaxed requirements in
"high crime areas"), involved a possession offense of one kind
or another, in one way or another.
Possession offenses also figure prominently in scores of Su-
preme Court opinions on substantive criminal law. What do the
defendants in the following Supreme Court cases have in com-
mon: Pinkerton v. United States (which gave the infamous Pinker-
ton conspiracy rule its name) ,'1 United States v. Bass (the Court's
leading lenity case),16 Stone v. PoweU (one of the Court's key ha-
AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AcnON AND MS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRMW4NAL LAw 20-22
(1993); Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics
Cases: To Have and Have Not 58 VA. L. REv. 751 (1972); Cornelius Nestler, Recdsgter-
schutz und Strajbarkeit des Besitzes von Schufiwaffen und Betlubungsmitteln, in VO%1
UNM6GLICHEN ZUSTAND DES STRAFREcHs 65 (Institut ffir Kriminalwissenschaften ed.,
1995); Eberhard Struense, Besitzddikte, in FESTSCHRiFr FOR GERALD GRu ,%W.;.D 713
(Erich Samson et al. eds., 1999).
"' State of New York, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Possession Related Of.
fenses NewYork State (Feb. 4, 2000) (on file with author).
12 U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Estimated Number of Arrests.
by Type of Drug Law Violation, 1982-1999, avalable at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/tables/salespos.htm.
13 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'4528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Is Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (possession of liquor).




beas corpus cases), McMillan v. Pennsylvania (the case that laid
the foundation for one of the key doctrinal strategies of the war
on crime, the shifting of proof elements from the guilt phase to
the sentencing hearing, and therefore from the jury to the
judge), 5 Harmelin v. Michigan (one of the Court's leading cases
on the principle of proportionate punishment), 19 and Lopez v.
United States (the Court's unanticipated 1995 attack on federal
commerce clause jurisdiction) 20 ? They were all convicted of
possession offenses. And, last but not least, there's Apprendi v.
New Jersey, last year's big hate crimes case. Charles Apprendi
had fired several rifle shots into the home of a black family who
lived in his otherwise all-white neighborhood. What was Ap-
prendi sentenced for? Three counts of possession.
2 1
So broad is the reach of possession offenses, and so easy are
they to detect and then to prove, that possession has replaced
vagrancy as the sweep offense of choice. Unlike vagrancy, how-
ever, possession offenses promise more than a slap on the
wrist. 2 Backed by a wide range of penalties, they can remove
undesirables for extended periods of time, even for life. Also
unlike vagrancy, possession offenses so far have been insulated
against constitutional attack, even though they too break virtu-
ally every law in the book of cherished criminal law principles.
To better understand the workings of policing through pos-
session and of the crime war in general, this article develops a
kind of phenomenology of possession. We will come to appre-
ciate the many and complex uses of possession as a policing
tool, some direct, others indirect, some foundational, others
supplemental. And we will see how possession has managed to
escape the serious scrutiny of courts and commentators.
Like its prototypical policing tool, the war on crime has at-
tracted little scholarly attention, at least as the comprehensive
penal regime that it is. 23 Much has been written about the war
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (gun possession).
" McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (gun possession).
" Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (drug possession).
20 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (gun possession).
2, Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (gun & bomb possession).
22 This also distinguishes possession from minor offenses whose more vigorous,
though still far from universal, enforcement is often referred to as "zero tolerance."
' But see THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINALJUSTICE
COMMISSION (1996). See also BATMAN: THE WAR ON CRIME (1999); ROBERT M. CIPES,
THE CRIME WAR (1968). Though not explicitly about the war on crime as such, there
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on drugs. The drug war certainly has been an important part of
the war on crime, but it's a mistake to conflate the tvo. The war
on crime is a general strategy of state governance that uses vari-
ous tools to achieve its goal of eliminating threats, above all
threats to the state itself. The war on drugs is but one prong in
the war on crime's widespread assault on anyone and anything
the state perceives as a threat. To treat the war on crime as syn-
onymous with the war on drugs is to underestimate the signifi-
cance of the war on crime as a phenomenon of governance.
Only by widening one's focus of inquiry from the war on
drugs to the war on crime does a comprehensive strategy of
governance like possession emerge. While drug possession is a
popular and extremely powerful policing tool, other possession
offenses also make significant contributions to the crime war ef-
fort. Terry and Wardlow, for example, were gun possession cases;
so was Apprendi. The most recent national effort to incapacitate
human hazards, "Project Exile," likewise employs tough federal
statutes criminalizing the possession of guns by felons and dur-
ing a violent or drug-related crime. 24 And as we will see, other
possession offenses, such as possession of stolen property, come
in handy as well when it comes to neutralizing dangerous indi-
viduals.
We desperately need a detailed account of the war on
crime. Without understanding how it came about, how it works,
and what it has accomplished, we cannot hope to move beyond
it. But move beyond it we must, as the crisis of crime that trig-
gered the war on crime already has begun to subside.2 The
crime war will go the way of crime hysteria.
This article doesn't pretend to fill this gap. It does hope to
lay the foundation for future work on the war on crime by iden-
tifying it as a phenomenon, and an object of study, in the first
place. Given the enormous, and largely hidden, changes the
war on crime has made in American criminal law, it makes no
is an excellent, and growing, criminological literature on modem criminal law as so-
cial control. See, e.g., David Garland, The Culture of ControL" Crime and Social Order, in
CoN MPoRARY SOCIETY (2001); CRMMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY (David Garland &
Richard Sparks eds., 2000); Malcolm M. Feeley &Jonathan Simon, The New Penology:
Notes on the Emeriing Strategy of Corrections and Its Impliations. 30 CRn uNOLOGy 449
(1992).
24For more on Project Exile, see infra notes 66, 260-61 and accompanying texts.
" For years, crime rates have been on the decline. See Fox Butterfield, Number in
Prison CrowsDespite Crime Reduction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at A10.
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sense to go on with business as usual. Before we can go back to
discussing "American criminal law" and its principles, we need
to figure out what's left of it after decades of the war on crime.
Rebuilding American criminal law, however, isn't simply a
matter of undoing the damage caused by the war on crime. The
war on crime could not have succeeded as easily as it did, if it
hadn't found fertile soil in the reigning orthodoxy of American
criminal law: treatmentism. All the war on crime had to do was
flip over the treatmentist coin from its benign rehabilitative side
to its unsavory incapacitative side.26 It stands as a powerful re-
minder of the uncomfortable fact that treatmentism, once cele-
brated as the progressive reform of the atavistic practice of
punishment, always allowed for incapacitative "treatment" for
incorrigible criminal types.
The war on crime once and for all dashed the naive hope
that the incapacitative arm of treatmentism would simply
whither away as criminal policy became increasingly enlight-
ened. When push came to shove, it was the rehabilitative wing
of treatmentism that buckled and eventually broke under the
pressure of a crisis of crime, where it mattered not whether the
crisis was real, imagined, or even artificially generated for politi-
cal gain. For the victims of the war on crime, it was real enough.
What's needed therefore is a fundamental reassessment,
and recreation, of the basic principles of American criminal law.
Ultimately, it's to this larger enterprise that this article hopes to
make a contribution.
In Part II, I begin by laying out three of the basic character-
istics of the war on crime as a system of controlling threats,
rather than of punishing persons. The war on crime is preventive
in that it focuses on the threat, rather than the occurrence, or
harm. It's communitarian in that it seeks to eliminate threats not
to persons, but to communities of one sort or another. And it's
authoritarian insofar as the community it protects against outside
threats ultimately turns out to be the state.
Part III then presents the phenomenology of possession as
the crime war's penal policing tool of choice. Through the
analysis of statutes, doctrine, Supreme Courtjurisprudence, and
statistics, we see just how and why possession has proved
uniquely useful in the identification and incapacitation of
26 On the connection between rehabilitation and incapacitation, see HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 55 (1968).
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criminal threats, and has emerged as the new and improved va-
grancy.
In Part IV, this in-depth analysis of possession is placed
within the broader context of the war on crime as state nuisance
control. Here we see how the state depersonalizes criminal law
by turning to crimes (both victim- and offender-less) to main-
tain its authority in the name of conveniently vague concepts
such as "public welfare" or "social interests." The war on crime,
in the end, reveals itself not as an aberration from the princi-
pled path of Anglo-American criminal law, but as the culmina-
tion of the progressive project to reform the barbaric practice of
punishment in light of ill-considered social science. This proj-
ect can be traced back to the early decades of this century and
found its most influential manifestation in the Model Penal
Code.
The article concludes with a call for subjecting the doctrines
of American criminal law to systematic scrutiny in light of fun-
damental principles of legitimacy. To reconstruct American
criminal law after its decimation in the war on crime, we must
base its doctrines on firmer ground than the traditions of the
English common law or the disappointing discoveries of pe-
nological science. A principled system of criminal law can sur-
vive in the face of a social phenomenon as powerful and
destructive as a "war on crime" only if it is in fact principled, i.e.,
if it derives from-and can be shown to derive from-a set of
basic and universally recognized principles of legitimacy.
II. THE PoLicE REGIm OF TE WAR ON CRIE
Penal police is about the elimination, or at least the minimi-
zation, of threats. But threats to what, or whom? This question
is rarely posed, not to mention answered. In an important
sense, posing it already is to misunderstand the point of penal
police. If you need to ask, you don't need to know; if you don't
feel threatened by something or someone, you may well be a
threat yourself. The need to police threats requires no justifica-
tion. And threats are, by their very nature, vague. A threat is
the unfulfilled risk that something bad may happen. What that
something might be, or how likely it is that it will come about,
or that you may suffer from it, remains unclear. And that's a
good thing, for the vagueness of threats equips their eliminators
and minimizers-the state through its representatives in the
2001] 839
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field-with the necessary flexibility to make those split-second
decisions about what or who is or isn't a threat, that executive
discretion so crucial to effective law enforcement, or rather threat
police.
Still, to get at the structure of this deliberately unstructured
phenomenon of penal police, we need to ask this question,
however inappropriate it might seem: what or who is being
threatened, exactly, by the threats that penal police seeks to
eliminate? If nothing else, pondering this question is conven-
ient for our expository purposes. It turns out that the police re-
gime established during the war on crime has three general
functions, which roughly correspond to three objects of the
threat it seeks to eliminate-or, in other words, to three possible
answers to our question.
On the political surface, the war on crime aims to prevent
violent interpersonal crime. The relevant threat here is to po-
tential victims of interpersonal crime, i.e., every person. This is
the preventive function.
If we dig a little deeper-and turn to sociology for help-we
find another function, related to prevention, but distinct from
it. This one might be called the communitarian function.
27
What's threatened here is not injury to particular victims. In-
stead, the victim is the community itself. The identification and
incapacitation of dangerous deviants thus serves to maintain the
community's existence, not by preventing future offenses, but
by redefining the community in stark contradistinction to the
deviant.
At the very bottom, however, we find not the community,
but the state, as the ultimate object of the criminal threat. The
authoritarian function of the police regime is the enforcement of
obedience to state commands and the assertion of the state's
authority as the sole and proper guardian of the common good.
Unlike the previous two functions, authoritarianism has no in-
terest in interpersonal crime, at least not for its own sake.
Authoritarian policing pursues violations of state issued com-
mands as such. It prosecutes victimless crimes not for any indi-
rect effect on the suppression of the crimes that matter, i.e.,
victimful crimes, and crimes of interpersonal violence in par-
ticular. In fact, under authoritarian policing, what was victimful
27 This is not to say, of course, that Communitarians with a capital C have en-
dorsed, or even would endorse, this function of criminal law.
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is now victimless, and what was victimless is now victimful.
Authoritarian policing takes so-called victimless crimes person-
ally, very personally.
A. PREVENTION
The crime war wears crime prevention on its sleeve.28 By
"subject[ing] to public control persons whose conduct indicates
that they are disposed to commit crimes,"29 we also incapacitate
those predisposed to commit violent crimes. Here the war on
crime is fueled by images of the relatives of horrific crimes call-
ing for swift and harsh punishment of "their" offender. Apart
from living out vengeance fantasies borne of the powerlessness
inherent in victimhood, these measures are said to prevent fu-
ture violent crime by taking criminal predators off the street.
30
The preventive aspect of the war on crime is the one most
closely related to the rights of personal victims. In this preven-
tive light, the war on crime subjects the dangerous classes to po-
lice supervision in order to prevent murders. Gun possession is
criminalized to avoid "their potential harmful use" in crimes of
interpersonal violence. 31 Similarly, gun possession is declared
an inherently violent felony because of the "use or risk of vio-
lence" resulting from its "categorical nature."32 And mandatory
life imprisonment for simple drug possession is upheld because
"(1) [a] drug user may commit crime because of drug-induced
changes in physiological functions, cognitive ability, and mood;
(2) [a] drug user may commit crime in order to obtain money
to buy drugs; and (3) [a] violent crime may occur as part of the
drug business or culture."
33
The success of an incapacitationist regime in the name of
prevention will depend on how quickly it can intervene once
dangerous deviance is diagnosed. Eager to eradicate threats,
this regime will always feel the pressure to intervene at the earli-
I See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword, The Limits of the Preventive Stat 88 J. CRI, u. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998); Robinson, supra note 9.
29 MODELPENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (b) (1985).
" The crime war prevents by incapacitation, not deterrence. There can be no de-
terrence, general or special, of undeterrable predators.
" United v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602, 603 (1995) (Stevens.J., dissenting).
32 United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). But se United States v. Sin-
gleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (KennedyJ., concurring).
2001]
MARKUSDIRKDUBBER
est possible moment, without awaiting the manifestation of the
threat in the form of a criminal act. And the pressure will in-
crease with every failure to incapacitate, with every "false nega-
tive," in the words of incapacitationist criminology, which came
to prominence in the 1970s and 80s.34 The goal of nipping
every potential threat in the bud, combined with the impossibil-
ity of its achievement, sets in motion a continuing expansion of
preventive measures, an infinite regress along the causal chain
toward the origin of threats, the heart of darkness.
This expansion of the preventive police net proceeds along
two lines, one focused on the offense, the other on the of-
fender. On the abstract level of offense definitions and theories
of criminal liability, incapacitation in the name of prevention
will tend to expand the number and reach of offenses the
commission of which triggers a diagnosis of dangerousness, and
therefore police control. To return to the example of posses-
sion offenses, such a regime will find it expedient to criminalize
the mere possession of burglary tools or, more broadly, of "in-
struments of crime,"35 absent any evidence of use that would
amount to even a preparation, which traditionally has remained
beyond the reach of criminal law, never mind the more exten-
sive use, coupled with criminal purpose, ordinarily required for
conviction of attempt.
36
Alternatively, instead of criminalizing possession outright,
such a regime might establish a host of presumptions emanating
backwards and forwards in time from a finding of possession,
including a presumption of illegal manufacture or importation
(on the retrospective end of the spectrum), and of illegal use or
distribution (on the prospective end).37 In either case, posses-
sors would have displayed sufficient criminal deviance-that all-
important disposition to commit crimes-to warrant a conviction
(which remains the formal prerequisite for penal, if not civil,
' See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION
(1982); JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES (1981); JoAN PETERSILIA, PETER W. GREENWOOD & MARVIN LAVIN,
CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS (1978); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME
(1995); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique
of California's Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193 (1990).
"' See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 (Instruments of Crime; Weapons) (1985).
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985).
3' See infra notes 113-15, 262-69 and accompanying texts.
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incapacitation), provided they should prove unable to rebut the
presumption of criminality by giving a "satisfactory account" of
themselves.
38
Similarly, in such a system of preventive incapacitation ex-
plicit endangerment offenses of all shapes and sizes would soon
proliferate. Here one may find specific and abstract endanger-
ment offenses, criminalizing either threats to a particular per-
son or persons (specific) or criminalizing something that
generally poses such a threat, though needn't have posed it in
the particular case (abstract). Reckless endangerment is an ex-
ample of the former, speeding of the latter. Once again, the
point of these offenses is the identification and neutralization of
sources of danger, i.e., threats of threats.
The secret of preventive policing is not only the seamless-
ness, but also the flexibility and interconnectedness of its web.
So, the definition of offenses is intimately related to the diagno-
sis and treatment of offenders. Offenses simply lay the founda-
tion for an assessment of dangerousness. In their very
malleability lies their value. It's this malleability that makes
room for the discretionary dangerousness assessments at the
heart of the system.
A "speeder" may be neutralized as a source of danger by a
simple fine, or even a stem warning. Then again, he might take
a more intrusive incapacitative sanction, like confiscation of his
driver's license, and in some cases even imprisonment.39 A simi-
lar range of measures is available to treat an "assailant" (or, in
New York, a "menacer"40 ) who threatened, as opposed to
harmed, his victim. In both cases, and this is crucial, the state
official in question (the police officer, the prosecutor, the
judge, the warden) also always has the option of radically revis-
ing his dangerousness diagnosis upward. Once a potential
source of danger has been caught in the web of preventive po-
lice, for one reason or another, he has subjected himself to a
dangerousness analysis whose scope and intensity will depend
38 Cf ARTHUR P. SCOTt, CRmmqL LAw IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 54 (1930) (discussing
old law of vagrancy authorizing arrest of "such Persons as they have probable Cause to
suspect, as Idlers and Vagrants or suspicious Characters, and who can give no satisfac-
tory account of themselves").
39 See, e.g., N.Y. VE-L & TRAF. LAW § 1800(b) (McKinney 2001) (penalty for first
traffic infraction "fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for
not more than fifteen days or... both").
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-.15 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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entirely on the discretion of the state ("law enforcement") offi-
cial he happens to run across. As hundreds of thousands, per-
haps millions, of prisoners have learned over the past thirty
years, a simple traffic stop can soon balloon into a full cavity
search of person and car, and a simple speeding ticket can
mushroom into a lengthy term of imprisonment. 4'- The car is
pulled over for a defective tail light, the passenger looks "suspi-
cious" (not necessarily in that order), the driver has no driver's
license, a consensual search of the car reveals drugs in the glove
compartment, a search incident to arrest turns up an unregis-
tered gun in the passenger's pants pocket, and within ten min-
utes another source of danger has been temporarily, or perhaps
42even permanently, extinguished.
As we have seen, the definition of offenses under a preven-
tive regime of incapacitation is simply a means of giving state of-
ficials the opportunity for a dangerousness assessment. At the
level of offenders, rather than of offenses, a preventive police
regime dedicated to the elimination of crime will -be forced to
act on ever less concrete evidence of dangerousness, resulting in
the control of ever more sources of threats and potential threats.
As the pressure to identify human hazards mounts with every
undiagnosed danger who slipped through the police net, the
system will come to rely increasingly on the discretionary diag-
noses of ever more and ever less well trained state officials.
Given the current mass of regulations of every aspect of modern
life, only a minuscule portion of which can be enforced, the
most important diagnostician of criminal predisposition is not
the expert forensic psychiatrist but the police officer on the
beat, aided by a network of informers, anonymous or not, who
supply him with indicia of dangerousness.
4 3
With such a vast area of discretion enjoyed by such a vast
number of often poorly trained state officials often working un-
der conditions of extreme stress and fear, the factors influenc-
ing police discretion are as crucial as they are unknown and
"I See infra notes 171-212 and accompanying text.
42 For similar, real-life, scenarios, as reported in U.S. Supreme Court opinions, see
infra notes 171-212 and accompanying text.
41 Cf Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (anonymous informer's tip regarding il-
legal gun possession); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (anonymous informer's
tip regarding drug possession; drugs found during consensual car search); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (known informer's tip regarding illegal gun and drug
possession; drugs found during search incident to gun possession arrest).
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unreviewed. They lie even further beyond the reach of analysis
and supervision than the notoriously unspecifiable "hunch"
leading a police officer to suspect that a given person has com-
mitted a specific offense. Consciously and unconsciously shap-
ing a police officer's discretion, these factors never enter the
record for one reason or another, though they occasionally
emerge-like a sudden break in the clouds-from enforcement
statistics or transcripts of intrapolice communications."
These occasional insights into an otherwise hazy world, of-
ten intentionally obscured, suggest that police officers' discre-
tion operates in much the same, unreflected way as that of the
public at large. Police officers' discretion simply brings into
sharp relief the unreflected judgments all of us make. Police of-
ficers, after all, have the power-and the obligation-to act
upon their discretion, whereas the rest of us can sit idly by as we
(pre)judge this person or that. And whatever conscious or un-
conscious communal identifications guide our judgment, they
are magnified a thousand fold in the case of police officers who
actually fight the war on crime that we simply observe with vary-
ing degrees of attention. To a police officer, the "enemies of
society"45 that we, fully aware of our powerlessness, vilify in mind
and word, are not mere chimeras: they are his personal enemies
in the war on crime.
B. COMMUNTARIANISM
The communal aspect of the war on crime is undeniable.46
To focus on the preventive aspect of the war on crime at the ex-
pense of its communal significance fails to capture its essence.
In fact, as we shall see, these two components mutually reinforce
each other. In the end, those who are incapacitated for the
purpose of preventing violent interpersonal crime are often
those who attract communal hatred as deviant outsiders, and
vice versa.
" See, e.g., David Barstow & David Kocieniewski, Records Show New Jersey Police Knew
of Racial Profiling in '96, N.Y. TiMEs, OCL 12, 2000, at A1;John Kifner, Van Shooting Re.
vives Charges of Racial 'Profiling'by NewJersey State Police, N.Y. TMEs, May 10, 1998, at 33;
see also KmATH K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME (1998) ("driving while black").
I Max Radin, Enemies of Society, 27J. CRit. L. & Ca~mNOLO-y 308 (1936).
4C Cf. EMILE DURxHIM, THE DWIVSION OF LABOR n' SocXIv (George Simpson trans.,
1933); George Herbert Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 An. J. SOCIOLOGY




There they stand, side-by-side united in common hatred,
the murder victim's father and the prosecutor. And their com-
munal experience is replicated vicariously by many others, even
millions, thanks to the miracle of modem media. In a society
uncertain about its commonalities, divided on many constitutive
issues, the common and deeply felt differentiation from sources
of danger or evil is a welcome opportunity to feel as one, to be
part of something bigger.47 And after the collapse of continu-
ously publicized external threats, all of which were traceable to
the ultimate source of danger and uncertainty, the Evil Empire
itself, the criminal predator suggests itself as a convenient focus
for the maintenance of an otherwise disparate community.
The fact of this prolonged orgy of communal feeling is as
troubling as it is plain. It is troubling because it subjugates the
designated scapegoat to serve the "community's" need for self-
preservation. To serve his proper community-enhancing func-
tion, the object of communal hatred must first be excluded
from the community. In theory, this exclusion occurs at the
moment of conviction. In fact, it happens much earlier. Al-
ready the "suspect" and certainly the "defendant" finds himself
differentiated from the community, and therefore the target of
exclusionary, and consolidating, communal sentiment.
And the moment of exclusion can be moved back even fur-
ther. The offender excluded himself from the community
through his deviant act. That self-exclusion only finds formal or
informal recognition later on, through suspicion, arrest, in-
dictment, and conviction, or in the more forthright days of An-
glo-Saxon law, the act of outlawry.
48
But that is not all. So far, we have assumed that the exclu-
sion from the political community oiccurred through an act of
some kind. In fact, so far we have assumed that the offender's
deviant status derived from an "exclusion," which presupposed
that he had been a member of the community at some point in
the past. Deviant status, however, need not result from a devi-
ant act. Deviance instead may be just that, deviance.
In this case, the act triggering exclusion is merely sympto-
matic of a preexisting condition of deviance. There's no need
47 See Mead, supra note 46.
4' HEINRIcH BRUNNER, Abspaltungen der Friedlosigheit, in FORSCHUNGEN ZUR
GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN UND FRANZ6sisCEN REHTES 444, 458 (Stuttgart, J.G.
Cotta 1894).
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to exclude the offender, i.e., the deviant, from the community
because he didn't belong in the first place. Depending on the
nature and origin of his deviance, the offender may never have
belonged to the community at all, he may have been an outsider
by birth. Then again, perhaps deviants have acquired their
condition only later on, perhaps as a result of losing or failing to
develop their empathic capacity "through," in the words ofJohn
Rawls, "no fault of their own: through illness or accident, or
from experiencing such a deprivation of affection in their
childhood that their capacity for the natural attitudes has not
developed properly."
4 9
Most troubling of course is the case where a person is sub-
jected to exclusionary sentiments merely on account of her
status, especially if that criminogenic status is for one reason or
another permanent. According to the essentialist tendencies
underlying the current incapacitative police regime, offenders
must be incapacitated because they are presumptively incorrigi-
ble. They are presumptively incorrigible because they are essen-
tially dangerous. They are essentially dangerous because they
are genetically predisposed to commit crimes, because they are
by nature evil, because they are black, because they are hispanic,
because they are poor, because they have a low IQ or all of
these at once. The particular nature of their essential
dangerousness is of no interest. Unlike the rehabilitationist pe-
nologists before them, who prided themselves in their complex
nosology of criminal pathology and insisted on careful and pro-
longed scientific study of the particular symptoms of a specific
individual deviant, the modem incapacitationists have no pa-
tience for subtleties of this sort. What matters is that there is
danger and evil out there that needs to be eliminated, or at least
minimized.
In the communitarian approach to the question of police
control, the battle lines are clearly drawn. On the one hand is
the community of potential victims, the insiders. On the other
hand is the community of potential offenders, the outsiders.
The boundaries of these communities are not fluid. One either
belongs to one community or the other. And it is the duty of
the community of potential victims to identify those aliens who
have infiltrated its borders, so that they may be expelled and
controlled, and their essential threat thereby neutralized.
49John Rauis, The Sense ofJustic; 72 PHIL REV. 281, 302 (1963).
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This clear demarcation is very convenient. It eliminates the
need to disassociate oneself from the object of hatred. What-
ever inclination one might have had to identify oneself with the
offender is overcome by the realization that, from the begin-
ning, the offender had merely passed as "one of us." There is
also no need to question oneself, in particular whether I myself
might be "disposed to commit crimes."50 As a member of a
community defined by its absence of criminal tendencies,
doubts of this nature are entirely misplaced. There is no need
to blame oneself, either. Responsibility for the offender's act is
out of the question since, as a deviant, criminal behavior lay in-
corrigibly in his nature. And finally, distancing oneself from the
offender enormously simplifies the process of disposal. Since
moral judgments are inappropriate in the case of a predatory
animal, an efficiency analysis will do. There is no need to un-
derstand why and how this could have happened. The only
question is why it hadn't happened sooner.
The current police regime put in place during the war on
crime combines preventive and communitarian elements. On
the surface it seeks to protect potential victims of violent crime
by incapacitating dangerous criminals. A closer look, however,
reveals that the potential victims who enjoy the protection are
predominantly middle-class whites with political power and that
the potential offenders who suffer the incapacitation are pre-
dominantly poor blacks with no political power whatever.5 This
is so despite the facts that most victims of violent crime are poor
blacks and that middle-class whites face not crime, but the
threat of crime, and that they, perhaps driven by a bourgeois
obsession with the wondrous and hyperanalyzed complexities of
their inner lives, seek not freedom from crime, but freedom
from the fear of crime, or as Richard Nixon put it in 1968, "free-
dom from fear," period.52
'0 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (b) (1985).
" See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994).
52 Nixon, supra note 2, at 12936; see also U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Bureau ofJustice Sta-
tistics, Crime and Neighborhoods (june 1994, NCJ 147005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/can.txt; U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Bureau ofJus-
tice Statistics, Young Black Male Victims: National Crime Victimization Survey (June
1994, NCJ 147004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ygbkml.pdf.
Nixon, of course, didn't invent freedom from fear as a political concept; Roosevelt
did, in 1941. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMRICAN PEOPLE IN
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And this last point is crucial: the war on crime, to the ex-
tent it is fought on behalf of white middle-class victims of violent
crime, is purely a symbolic matter, for two reasons. First, there
are relatively few middle-class victims of violent crime, and, sec-
ond, the fear of violent crime is best met with symbolic action:
adopt a victims' rights amendment here, pass a law solemnly
granting victims the right to make victim impact statements at
sentencing there, and most importantly, express great concern
about the high levels of crime, while at the same time express-
ing satisfaction at the success of the war on crime in the face of
steadily falling crime rates.
53
C. AUTHORITARIANISM
The war on crime, though ostensibly fought on behalf of
victims, has very little to do with victims, and everything to do
with the state. What's more, it has very little to do with persons
of any kind. It treats offenders as mere sources of danger, to be
policed along with other threats, animate and inanimate alike,
from rabid dogs to noxious fumes. And it treats victims as mere
nuisances themselves, annoying sources of inefficiency in a sys-
tem built to incapacitate the greatest number of source indi-
viduals for the longest possible time with the least effort. In the
end, crime victims got their wish. All they wanted was "to be
treated like criminals."" And that they were. In the war on
crime, offenders and victims alike are irrelevant nuisances,
grains of sand in the great machine of state risk management.
The true victim in the war on crime is not a person, not
even "the community," but simply the state itself. Surrounded
by pesky nuisances in the form of hordes of persons, be they of-
fenders or victims, it maintains its authority and enforces that
obedience which is due its commands. Victimless crimes thus
are not victimless after all. They're only victimless in the sense
that they're missing a personal victim. Any violation of the state's
missives, any disruption of its administrative scheme, perhaps
even of its very foundation-the unquestioning obedience of its
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999). Nixon, however, turned the ideal inmrd, by
locating the threat within. And so freedom from fear was transformed from a goal of
foreign policy, and war, into one of domestic policy, and police.
' See Dubber, supra note 6 (three-strikes laws as symbolic policy).
' Thad H. Westbrook, Note, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals: South Carolina Re-
sponds to Vzctims'Plas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L REV. 575 (1998).
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carefully calibrated rules and regulations formulated by expert
bureaucrats guided exclusively by the concern for the common
good-victimizes the state. Contumacious conduct of this sort
challenges not only the state's authority, but also inflicts palpa-
ble emotional harm on its officials who feel unappreciated and
inconvenienced by the persistent and perplexing unwillingness
of the commoners to comply with the very rules promulgated
for their common well-being, their commonwealth.
The war on crime as a police action by the state against its
objects easily makes room for the preventive and the communi-
tarian police regimes outlined above. As the preventive model
turns out to be driven by the same differentiating impulse that
motivates the communitarian model, so the authoritarian, state-
based, model in turn accommodates the goals of prevention
and of communitarianism. On the connection between preven-
tive incapacitation and the enforcement of obedience to state
commands, Roscoe Pound remarked as early as 1927 that mod-
ern "penal treatment" is best understood as "interference to
prevent disobedience," rather than as punishment.55  Other
than to prevent disobedience against the state, criminal law had
for its province, not the protection of individual rights against
interference, but on the contrary "the securing of social inter-
ests regarded directly as such, that is, disassociated from any
immediate individual interests with which they may be identi-
fied., 56 And the objects of this preventive interference in the
form of penal treatment were "well recognized types of anti-
social individuals and of anti-social conduct.
5 7
In one sense, the preventive-communitarian-authoritarian
police regime of the war on crime is simply the full scale adop-
tion of Pound's approach, an approach that removes the person
from the criminal law in every respect, as offender and as victim.
The offender becomes the manifestation of a "type" of "anti-
social individual." This disappearance of the person from pun-
ishment in the name of scientific penology has often been re-
55 Roscoe Pound, Introduction, in FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECION OF CASES ON
CRiNAL LAW xxix, xxxv (1927). For an excellent extended discussion of Pound's
views on criminal administration, see Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Respon-
sibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on CriminalJustice, 93 MICHi. L. REV. 1915 (1995).
56 Pound, supra note 55, at xxxii.
"T Id. at xxxiv.
850 [Vol. 91
POLICING POSSESSION
marked upon, so often in fact that it contributed significantly to
the demise of rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment.
5 8
What does need emphasis, however, is that the person of
the victim, and not merely that of the offender, disappears en-
tirely and emphatically. It is replaced with a new, amorphous,
victim, "society," whose "social interests" are protected against
that "anti-social conduct" one expects from "anti-social indi-
viduals." The victim's "individual interests" are of no interest to
the criminal law. In fact, the criminal law is defined in terms of
its exclusive focus not on individuals, but on social interests.
A few years later, in an article that continues to be cited as
the authoritative study of the rise and scope of so-called "public
welfare offenses," Francis Sayre followed and developed Pound's
lead when he commented on "the trend . .. away from nine-
teenth century individualism toward a new sense of the impor-
tance of collective interests," and again on "the shift of emphasis
from the protection of individual interests which marked nine-
teenth century criminal administration to the protection of pub-
lic and social interests .... 59
The victim as a person is so irrelevant to this new system of
"criminal administration" designed to protect social interests
"from those with dangerous and peculiar idiosyncracies" 0 that
the "individual interests" said to have found such extensive pro-
tection in nineteenth century criminal law are the interests of
the offender (or rather the defendant), not the victim. The fol-
lowing passage is worth quoting at greater length for its remark-
able, even astonishing, clarity and foresight:
During the nineteenth century it was the individual interest which
held the stage; the criminal law machinery was overburdened with innumerable
checks to prevent possible injustice to individual defendants. The scales were
weighted in his favor, and, as we have found to our sorrow, the public
welfare often suffered. In the twentieth century came reaction. We are
thinking today more of the protection of social and public interests; and
coincident with the swinging of the pendulum in the field of legal ad-
ministration in this direction modem criminologists are teaching that
the objective underlying correctional treatment should change from the
58 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL. POuC AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment 53 THE Mo\'ST, No.
4, at 475 (1968); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its De-
mise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 L & HIsT. REV. 113 (1998).
5
9 Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Wefare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L REv. 55, 67 (1933).
o Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L RE . 974, 1018 (1932).
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barren sjim of punishing human beings to the fruitful one of protecting social in-
terests.
In other words, criminal law does not concern itself with in-
terpersonal crimes, and so it neither punishes nor protects hu-
man beings, but instead protects social interests against
whatever threat they may face. The paradigmatic offense of this
modem criminal law is Sayre's "public welfare offense." In this
regulatory scheme of danger police, the offender is stripped of
his personhood and reduced to a threat, a source of danger. As
an apersonal threat whose personhood is immaterial, his "guilt"
is immaterial as well: "the modern conception of criminality...
seems to be shifting from a basis of individual guilt to one of so-
cial danger."62 How can a threat be guilty, and even if it could,
what difference would that make? The distinguishing feature of
Sayre's public welfare offenses is, after all, that they do away with
the requirement of mens rea of any kind. All that matters is
that, one way or another, through an act or a failure to act, in-
tentionally or not, some social interest or other (the "public wel-
fare") has been threatened. So important are social interests
that they require the utmost protection, regardless of against
whom or what. Under these circumstances, the police regime
of course cannot await the actual interference with these para-
mount interests! No, early interference is called for-the mere
risk of interference, the mere threat, is more than enough.
Naturally, the efficient policing of dangers of this sort requires
the abandonment of all "defenses based upon lack of a blame-
worthy mind, such as insanity, infancy, compulsion and the
like." 6 Since guilt is irrelevant, guiltlessness is irrelevant as well.
At the same time, the victim as a person also has no place in
this regulatory scheme. It's the public welfare that needs protec-
tion against all threats, not the individual's. And it's the vague
concept of public welfare, or rather the social interests that the
state in its wisdom might fit under that concept, that must be
safeguarded at all costs, not the person's concrete rights to life,
liberty, and property.
Sayre's article, in the end, is a veritable blueprint for the
twentieth century depersonalization of American criminal law
6, Sayre, supra note 59, at 68 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 55.
61 Id. at 78.
852 [Vol. 9 1
POLICING POSSESSION
and its transformation into a state regulatory scheme, which
culminated and found its most perverse manifestation in the
war on crime of the last quarter of that century. Here we find
all the ingredients for a streamlined "criminal administration"
in substance and procedure. The central concept is flexibility.
It is this flexibility that gives state officials--experts all-the
necessary discretion to determine not only which social interests
require protection, but also how they are best protected, in
general as well as in particular instances.
Once these interests are identified, the state determines the
most efficient means of protecting them. Here, convenience is
key. Substance is driven by enforcement. So, offenses are de-
fined to minimize inconvenient proof requirements, most im-
portant mens rea, thus relieving prosecutors of the
inconvenient burden of establishing each and every offender's
mental state. Similarly, the requirement of blameworthiness, or
guilt, isjettisoned, thus eliminating the time wasted on defenses
such as mistake, ignorance, insanity, infancy, duress, and en-
trapment. Then, the process itself is streamlined. The jury is
abandoned and the decision is turned over to a professional
judge, either after a bench trial or, preferably and far more fre-
quently, after a plea agreement. Whenever possible, the matter
is to be turned over to "some form of administrative control
which will prove quick, objective and comprehensive.
" 64
The precise definition of offenses is of secondary impor-
tance. All offenses spring from a single source, the state's duty
to guard the public welfare against social dangers. All specific
public welfare offenses, therefore, are nothing more than speci-
fications of a single, all encompassing offense, or rather com-
mand, which instructs everyone (and everything) not to
interfere with the public welfare. The details and particular ap-
plications of this general injunction are to be worked out by ex-
pert state officials at all levels of government. So, Sayre's list of
categories of public welfare offenses (not a list of the offenses
themselves, mind you) is not meant to be exhaustive, but subject
to continuous revision (meaning expansion), the only limits to
which are set by the regulatory zeal of state officials. Still,
Sayre's list is worth reproducing since it, though framed as a
mere snapshot in the history of American criminal administra-




the course of what was to come in the decades ahead, while at
the same placing recent developments-including the war on
crime-in a broader historical context:
(1) Illegal sales of intoxicating liquor;
(2) Sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs;
(3) Sales of misbranded articles;
(4) Violations of anti-narcotic acts;
(5) Criminal nuisances;
(6) Violations of traffic regulations;
(7) Violations of motor-vehicle laws; and
(8) Violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety,
health or well-being of the community.
Offenses falling under these categories today account for
the vast majority of matters of "criminal administration." Of-
fenses in categories (4), (6), and (7) alone easily account for
most offenses committed, prosecuted, and sanctioned.
Certainly, things have changed since Sayre's 1933 article.
The state has shown considerable imagination in making use of
the flexibility it needed to discharge its duty to safeguard the
"public welfare." The scope of public welfare offenses has been
expanded, the sanctions for their commission enhanced, and
their enforcement simplified and accelerated. This general de-
velopment culminated in and was dramatically accelerated by
the war on crime. Regulatory offenses provided the ideal means
for incapacitating large numbers of undesirables quickly and,
eventually, for long periods of time. Among the offenses on
Sayre's list, violations of anti-narcotics law (no. 4) proved to be a
particularly popular weapon in the police campaign against
crime. The penalties for drug violations today include every
punishment short of death, including life imprisonment without
parole. In 1993, the number of drug offenders in American
prisons reached 350,000, almost twice the total number of prison
inmates in the early 1960s. The tripling of the federal prison
population since the 1970s is largely attributable to the expan-
sion and harshening of federal drug criminal law, with the
number of federal drug offenders increasing eighteen-fold from
three thousand to over fifty thousand, or sixty percent of federal
prisoners.
65 Id. at 78.
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But other offense categories have proved useful as well.
Weapons offenses, which qualify as violations of "general police
regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the
community" (no. 8), also allow police officers to take dangerous
elements off the streets in large numbers, and with little effort.
And thanks to unprecedented cooperation between state and
federal law enforcement agencies, weapons offenders can now
be incapacitated for extended periods of time. "Project Exile"
makes use of the harsh federal weapons laws, literally, to "exile"
offenders from their local communities by committing them to
far away federal prisons. In a typical case, a Philadelphia police
officer, while "frisking [a] suspect near a drug area," happened
to find a loaded gun in the suspect's waistband. Instead of the
probationary sentence the man might have gotten in city court,
he was sentenced to five and a half years in a federal prison,
without the possibility of early release. As the officer explained
in an interview, "[a]nd that's notjust local jail where the family
can come visit him, or come see him and visit him. They're sent
anywhere in the country, so they're separated from their fami-
lies and there's no probation or parole under the federal guide-
lines, so they're doing their complete sentence."
66
III. POLICING POSSESSION
In general, the offense of possession-whether of drugs, of
guns, or anything else-has emerged as the policing device of
choice in the war on crime. Most straightforwardly, and now
also most commonly, possession operates directly as possession
qua possession, an offense in and of itself. Or it functions indi-
rectly, through some other offense, either as a springboard to
another offense, through retrospective and prospective pre-
sumptions, or as an upgrade for another offense, through sen-
tence enhancements. Since possession has achieved the status
of the crime war's paradigmatic police offense, it deserves a
closer look. By focusing on possession, we will also get a sense
of the marvelously integrated operation of the regulatory ma-
chine that is the war on crime. Possession, after all, achieved its
6 Eric Westervelt, Philadelphias Cradcdoun on Criminals W'ao Possess illegal Guns.
Morning Edition, NAT'L PUB. RADIo, Mar. 23, 2000; see also William Clauss &Jay S. Ov-
siovitch, "Phoject Exile" Effort on Gun Crimes Increases Need for Attornys to Give Car Advice
on Possible Sentences, N.Y.B.J.,June 2000, at 35.
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favored status partly because it is flexible yet durable enough to
fit so nicely into the policing process as a whole.
A. SIMPLY POSSESSION
Operating below the radars of policy pundits and academic
commentators, as well as under the Constitution, possession of-
fenses do the crime war's dirty work. Possession has replaced
vagrancy as the most convenient gateway into the criminal jus-
tice system. Possession shares the central advantages of va-
grancy as a policing tool: flexibility and convenience. Yet, as we
shall see, it is in the end a far more formidable weapon in the
war on crime: it expands the scope of policing into the home, it
results in far harsher penalties and therefore has a far greater
incapacitative potential, and it is far less vulnerable to legal chal-
lenges.
Millions of people commit one of its variants every day,
from possessing firearms and all sorts of other weapons, dan-
gerous weapons, instruments, appliances, or substances, 67 in-
cluding toy guns, 68 air pistols and rifles, 69 tear gas,'
ammunition, 7 1 body vests, 72 and anti-security items, 73 to burglary
tools74 or stolen property,75 and of course drugs,76 and everr7
thing associated with them, including drug paraphernalia,
drug precursors,78 not to mention instruments of crime,7 9 graf-
fiti instruments, computer related material, 1  counterfeit
6 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01-.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001); MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 5.06 (Instruments of Crime; Weapons), 5.07 (offensive weapons) (1985).
61 NEwYORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-13 1 (g) (2001).
6' Id. § 10-131(e).
7
. Id. § 10-131 (h).
71 Id. § 10-131 (i).
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 270.20, 400.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
71 Id. § 170.47.
-4 Id. § 140.35.
7' Id. §§ 165.40-.65; see also 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/4-103(a) (1) (1976) (posses-
sion of stolen vehicle).
76 N.Y. PENAL LAW arts. 220, 221 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
- Id. § 220.50.
7. Id. § 220.60.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 ("Instruments of Crime; Weapons"); Com. v. Donton,
654 A.2d 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
'0 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.65 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
"Id. § 156.35.
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trademarks,8 2 unauthorized recordings of a performance,8 3 pub-
lic benefit cards,8 forged instruments, foriery devices, em-
bossing machines (to forge credit cards), slugs,88 vehicle
identification numbers,8 9 vehicle titles without complete as-
signment,90 -ambling devices,91  rambling records,92 usurious
loan records, prison contraband, obscene material, obscene
sexual performances by a child,96 "premises which [one] knows
are being used for prostitution purposes, "0 7 eavesdropping de-
vices,9 8 fireworks,99 noxious materials,100 and taximeter acceler-
ating devices (in New York),' 0' spearfishing equipment (in
Florida), 0 2 or undersized catfish (in Louisiana), 1' and the list
could go on and on.
And that's the first prerequisite for a sweeping offense.
Lots of people must be guilty of it. Thanks to the erosion of
constitutional constraints on police behavior in the state de-
clared emergency of the war on crime, possession is easy to de-
tect. Every physical or merely visual search, every frisk, every
patdown, is also always a search for possession. Like vagrancy





State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986).
-N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 170.55-.60 (McKinney 2000).
89 Id. § 170.70.
9" 625 ILL. CoNip. STAT. § 5/4-104(a) (2) (1976).
91 N.Y. PENALLAw §§ 225.30-.35 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
Id. §§ 225.00-.35, 415.00.
Id. § 190.45
Id. § 205.25.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.05-.07 (McKin-
ney 2000).





101 Id. § 145.70.
"'Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1963).
'9' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:326(A) (7) (b) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (State v. Win-
gate, 668 So. 2d 1324 (La. Ct. App. 1996)).
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(and pornography), then, police officers know possession when
they see it. Unlike vagrancy, they also know it when they feel it.
Police officers have become experts at detecting "bulges" in
various articles of clothing, each of which signal an item that
may be illegally possessed. Similarly, police officers and the
judges who occasionally review their actions have long been par-
ticularly imaginative in their interpretation of the particular na-
ture of these bulges, when the time has come to confirm one's
visual suspicion with a physical frisk. Here the search for one il-
legally possessed item-say a concealed weapon-may actually
bear fruit in the form of the discovery of another illegally pos-
sessed item-say a bag of cocaine. Possession offenses in this
way manage to bootstrap themselves, each giving the other a
helping hand.
Moreover, the case for a possession offense begins and ends
with a search, no matter whether it was a search for a possession
offense or for some other crime. If it's a search in connection
with some other crime, the police officer may well stumble upon
evidence of illegal possession. This may come in handy if no
evidence of the other crime is found or if that evidence doesn't
stick for one reason or another, say because it's not sufficiently
corroborated by other evidence or because some defense or
other applies (like self-defense, perhaps). If it is a search for a
possession offense, however, the scope of the search is virtually
unlimited, given that items possessed come in all shapes and
sizes (especially drugs) and can be hidden in the smallest cavity,
bodily or not.
Thanks to an expansive reading of possession statutes-
which includes the inapplicability of many defenses-possession
is easy to prove. In fact, there won't be any need to prove any-
thing, to anyone, judge or jury. Virtually all defendants in a
possession case see the writing on the wall and plead guilty.
And, thanks to penalty enhancements for prior convictions
and-most recently-the innovative collaboration of federal
and state law enforcement, possession once proved can send a
possessor to prison for a long time, even for life without the pos-
sibility of parole.
So, in a recent New York case, a defendant was relieved to
find himself acquitted of several serious burglary charges on
what we now like to call a "technicality." Unfortunately for him,
he was convicted of possessing stolen property-the loot of the
very burglary of which he had been acquitted. What's more, the
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judge sentenced him to twenty-five years to life on the posses-
sion count alone. As a professional burglar he was a "scourge to
the community. " 104
In 1998, possession offenses accounted for 106,565, or
17.9%, of all arrests made in New York State.'05 Of these cases,
295 (or 0.27%) resulted in a verdict (by a judge or a jury), a
whopping 129 (0.12%) in an acquittal. Of those originally ar-
rested for possession, 33,219 (31.2%) went to prison or jail.
New York boasts no fewer than 115 felony possession offenses,
all of which require a minimum of one year in prison; eleven of
them provide for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Possession has become the paradigmatic offense in the cur-
rent campaign to stamp out crime by incapacitating as many
criminals as we can get our hands on. Every minute of every
day, police pull over cars and sweep neighborhoods looking for,
or just happening upon, "possessors" of one thing or another.
Prosecutors throw in a possession count for good measure or, if
nothing else sticks, make do with possession itself. Why, as one
Michigan prosecutor remarked before the U.S. Supreme Court,
why bother charging more involved offenses if you can get life
imprisonment without parole for a possession conviction?" 6
In many cases, possession statutes also save prosecutors the
trouble of proving that other major ingredient of criminal liabil-
ity in American criminal law, mens rea, or a guilty mind. This
means that many possession statutes, particularly in the drug
area-where some of the harshest campaigns in the war on
crime have been prosecuted-are so-called strict liability crimes.
In other words, you can be convicted of them if you don't know
that you are "possessing" a drug of any kind, what drug you are
"possessing," how much of it you've got, or-in some states-
even that you are possessing anything at all, drug or no drug.1
0 7
This much we might have expected from Sayre's theory of
"public welfare offenses." Possession, however, also does away
with the traditional requirement that criminal liability must be
People v. Young, 94 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y. 1999).
' State of New York, Division of Criminal Justice Services, supra note 11; State of
New York, Division of Criminal Justice Services, CriminalJustice Indicators New York
State: 1994-1998 (Dec. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
11 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1022, 1024 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31).
" State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1981).
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predicated on an actus reus, an affirmative act or at least a failure
to act (rather than a status, like being in possession of some-
thing). So even if some sort of intent (or at least negligence) is
required for conviction, there is no need to worry about the ac-
tus reus.
Plus, it turns out that other defenses also don't apply to pos-
session offenses. We've already seen that, in Sayre's scheme,
culpability and responsibility defenses have no place in a posses-
sion case. But what about other defenses, such as self-defense or
necessity?
Say you're riding in the back seat of your friend's car as a
couple of men try to jack the car, guns drawn. You notice a gun
under the driver seat, bend down and grab it, and then shoot
one of the men in the leg. You're cleared of the assault on
grounds of self-defense. Still, since you weren't licensed to carry
the gun, you're liable for possessing it illegally. This is so be-
cause the defense of self-defense applies only to the use, but not
to the possession of the gun.
108
As a final example, consider the so-called "agency" defense.
It turns out that this defense aplies to the sale, but not to the
simple possession, of narcotics. 19 To understand why, we need
to take a closer look at the menu of possession offenses available
to the modern legislator. We can distinguish between two types
of possession offenses, simple possession and possession with in-
tent, or compound possession. Simple possession itself can, but
need not, require proof of actual or constructive awareness-
that you knew or should have known that you possessed the
object in question. If it doesn't, it's called a strict liability
offense (see above). Possession with intent is by definition not a
strict liability offense, since it requires proof of intent.
It may be helpful to view the varieties of possession along a
continuum from dangerousness at one end to its manifestation
at the other. At the end of pure dangerousness is simple posses-
sion. Here we are farthest removed from the harm that the use
of the object may cause. And in the strict liability variety of sim-
ple possession, the inference from the dangerousness of the
item possessed to its possessor is most tenuous-since he by
definition is not even aware of his possession. Next is com-
08 People v. Almodovar, 62 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1984). For more on the "act" of pos-
session, see infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
'0 People v. Sierra, 45 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1978).
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pound possession, which still inflicts no harm since the posses-
sion itself is harmless, but at least we have the intent to use the
item possessed in a way that may or may not be harmful. Mov-
ing further along the continuum we encounter the preparation
to use the item possessed in some particular way. This prepara-
tion, as distinct from an attempt, is not criminalized.
Next comes the attempt to use the object possessed, which is
a preparation that has almost, but not quite, borne fruit. And
eventually, there is the use of the possessed item. In the case of
drugs, that use may come in the form of a sale, as in the popular
and often severely punished offense of "possession with intent"
(to distribute). Of course, the distribution itself is also entirely
harmless. It's another kind of use, which may or may not follow
the distribution, that renders drugs harmful, namely their con-
sumption. But the harmfulness of the use is not an element of a
compound possession offense criminalizing possession with in-
tent to distribute. There is no offense of possession with intent
to consume. In fact, some jurisdictions recognize possession
with intent to consume as a mitigating rather than an aggravat-
ing factor, especially when the drug possessed is marijuana
(possession of quantities for personal use).110
Now courts have held that the agency defense does not
reach the simple possession of drugs because someone who
merely possesses drugs, without the intent to sell, does not-and
in fact cannot-act as the "agent" of the ultimate buyer, and his
possession therefore cannot be merely incidental to the pur-
chase.' For one thing, he doesn't act at all, he merely pos-
sesses. The mere fact of possession is enough for conviction, no
matter what the reason or who the eventual beneficiary. This
arrangement, once again, has the convenient effect-for the
prosecutor-of ensuring him a conviction of simple possession,
in cases where the agency defense would block convictions of
possession with intent to sell, or even the sale itself.
By now, you may not be surprised to learn that you didn't
even have to pick up the gun to be guilty of possessing it ille-
gally. Again in New York-but in many other jurisdictions as
well-you may well have "constructively" possessed the weapon
simply by having been in the car at the same time. So to possess
11 See, e.g., N.Y. PNAl. LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) (unlavful, as
opposed to criminal, possession of marihuana).
"' SeePeople v. Sierra, 45 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1978).
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something in the eye of the criminal law doesn't mean you
owned it, nor does it mean you physically possessed it. It's gen-
erally enough that you could have brought it within your physical
possession or at least kept others from bringing it within theirs.
(Technically, you constructively possessed the gun if you "exer-
cise[d] dominion or control over" it.112 )
And, as though proving possession isn't easy enough, the
law of possession also teems with evidentiary presumptions. Not
only can you constructively possess something you don't have in
your hands or on your person, you can also be presumed to con-
structively possess it. In our example, this means that it will be
up to you to prove to the jury-should you be among the min-
uscule percentage of possession defendants who make it to a
jury trial-that you did not in fact possess the gun, construc-
tively, which is a tough row to hoe, given what we just learned
about how little it takes to establish possession.
The most popular choice among legislatures anxious to fur-
ther reduce prosecutorial inconvenience associated with the en-
forcement of possession offenses is to establish the rule that
mere presence constitutes presumptive possession. The more
eager the state is to get certain possessors off the street, and the
more dangerous these possessors have revealed themselves to be
through their possession, the more dangerous the item pos-
sessed, the greater the temptation will be to do away with evi-
dentiary requirements, and thereby to accelerate the
incapacitation process. Small wonder that these presumptions
from Presence to possession pop up in gun and drug possession
cases.
In the New York Penal Law, for example, merely being
around drugs not only amounts to presumptively possessing
them. It further simplifies the prosecutor's incapacitative task
by also establishing a presumption of "knowing" possession.'1
4
So, from evidence of being in the same car or room with a con-
trolled substance, the prosecutor gets, without additional evi-
dence, to jump to the conclusion that you possessed the drugs,
and knew that you did. And, as we just saw, this conclusion will
stand, unless you convince the fact finder otherwise. And that
fact finder is, in virtually every possession case, none other than
112 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(8) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
Id. §§ 220.25 (drugs; "knowing"), 265.15 (guns; "unlawful").
"* Id. § 220.25.
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the prosecutor himself, who offers you a reduced sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea.
The use of mere presence as a foundation of criminal liabil-
ity has an additional benefit. Presence not only simplifies the
prosecutorial task of connecting a given object with a particular
possessor. Presence can with one fell swoop ensnare not just
one, but several, persons in the web of possession liability ema-
nating from a piece of contraband at its center. Presence-to-
possession has this useful feature thanks to a generous interpre-
tation of possession that makes room for non-exclusive posses-
sion of chattels, notwithstanding that "real" is supposed to differ
from "movable" property precisely in that non-exclusive posses-
sion was possible in the former, but impossible in the latter: "if
we concede possession to the one, we must almost of necessity
deny it to the other.""
15
Presence-based liability of this sort points up another fea-
ture of possession offenses: the irrelevance of traditional dis-
tinctions among principals and accomplices. Non-exclusive
possession combined with a presumption of possession based on
mere presence brings anyone somehow "involved" with a dan-
gerous object within the scope of police control. Careful doc-
trinal, i.e. abstract, distinctions among different levels of
"involvement" in the crime of possession would inconvenience
state officials-mostly police officers-to whose discretion the
diagnosis of dangerousness in particular cases is entrusted. And
it makes sense that complicity analysis would be entirely inap-
propriate; since possession is not an act, the central question of
complicity-can A's act be imputed to B-simply does not arise.
What's at stake is not liability for an act, carefully calibrated by
individual culpability, but the ascription of the label "possessor"
(or, functionally, "dangerous individual") for the purpose of
permitting police interference with possible punitive conse-
quences.
Still, the complicity model turns out to be surprisingly use-
ful in an analysis of possession offenses, as long as one frees
oneself of the notion that complicity-or any other form of
group criminality-requires at least two persons. Possession of-
fenses, in a sense, treat anyone "involved" with the dangerous
object as an accomplice. The interesting thing about possession
1 2 FREDEmcK PoLLOCK & FRE ERIC WnINI MAn AND, THE HISORY OF ELGu H
LAW BFyORTE TIME OFEDWARDI 152 (2d ed. 1898, reissued 1968).
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offenses is that the principal is not a person, but an inanimate
object. In theory, if not in function, the source of criminal li-
ability is the object, not the possessor. Hence, criminal liability
results from contact, however slight, with the object. The in-
volvement with the object need only be substantial enough to al-
low its taint, its dangerousness, to come into contact with its
possessor. By failing to disassociate himself from the dangerous
object, the possessor has placed himself in a position where the
object's dangerousness can be ascribed to him. He has revealed
himself as sharing the object's dangerousness. He will be
deemed its "possessor," as "exercising dominion or control over
it," if he "was aware of his physical possession or control thereof
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it."
116
This imputation of an object's characteristics onto its pos-
sessor is familiar from medieval law. There, each head of
household was presumptively liable for damage caused by his
possessions, animate and inanimate alike, unless he surren-
dered them to the victim's household immediately upon becom-
ing aware of the damage they had done. If he didn't
disassociate himself from the tainted piece of property in this
way, and instead continued to feed the offending slave or dog,
or handled the blood-stained axe, he had to pay wergeld to the
victim's household. 17 The only prerequisite for liability was
causation of harm and possession. On the householder's part,
no act was required.
While medieval law thus knew of transferring an object's
taint onto its possessor and holding the possessor liable simply
as possessor, it differed from contemporary possession liability
in one important respect: it required harm. Modem possession
liability transfers the danger from an object to its possessor and
holds him liable as a source of danger, without the object's dan-
ger ever having manifested itself.
The fundamental difference between the two instances of
ascribing characteristics from an object to its possessor is that
the medieval example is centered on the possessor, whereas the
contemporary one focuses on the object possessed. The medie-
val householder is liable for the harm caused by his possessions
116 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(8), 15.00(2) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
" HEINRIcH BRUNNER, Ueber absichtslose Missethat im altdeutschen Strafrechte, in
FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GEscmCMTE DES DEUTSCHEN UND FRANZOSISCHEN RECHTTS 487, 507,
522 (Stuttgart,J.G. Cotta 1894).
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because they are his possessions. Today's non-exclusive con-
structive gun possessor is incapacitated because of his spatial as-
sociation with the dangerous object. The medieval model
extracts damages for the victim from the most obvious source,
either in the form of the offending possession that the victim
could use-or not use-at his discretion or of the householder's
wergeK, traveling up the ladder of property relations from pos-
sessed to possessor. The modem model turns possession itself
into the offense, without harm, to subject a presumptively dan-
gerous individual to police investigation and control. In the
medieval model, responsibility travels from the possessor to the
possessed. In the modem model, with no harm and therefore
no responsibility to be ascribed, dangerousness travels from the
possessed to the possessor for its own sake, to label the possessor
as dangerous.
The idea of complicity among objects and their human pos-
sessors, and of a transfer of characteristics from one to the other
and back again, may appear odd. But it makes perfect sense in
a police regime of threat elimination and minimization. In
such a regime, characteristics apparently limited to persons-
such as mens rea, or culpability-turn out to bd nothing more
than general, though cryptic, references to dangerousness. So a
person acting with mens rea, or "malice," reveals himself to be
abnormally dangerous. The "higher" the mens rea, the higher
the level of dangerousness. So the purposeful actor is most dan-
gerous (because of his evil disposition and his likelihood of suc-
cess), followed by the actor acting with knowledge that he will
cause harm, rather than the intent to do so, followed by the
merely reckless actor, who knows that his conduct may cause
harm but goes ahead with it anyway, followed by the negligent ac-
tor, who is simply dangerously clueless.
The connection between dangerousness and mens rea is so
natural that courts slide back and forth between the two even in
the analysis of the dangerousness of objects. So an object's "in-
herent dangerousness" can quickly become its "inherent vice," as
happened in a fairly recent opinion which had the New York
Court of Appeals struggling with the question whether rubber
boots qualified as a "dangerous instrument" (they do: though
themselves free of "inherent vice," they were used in a danger-
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ous way, by stomping someone on the pavement).118 In the end,
not only can persons be noxious, but objects can be evil as well.
From the perspective of threat management, no qualitative
difference separates possessor from possessed. They simply are
more or less serious threats, source individuals and danger car-
riers, allowing evil taints to pass back and forth between them.
It only makes sense, then, that possessors and possessed, in fact
dangers of all shapes and sizes, be processed by a general hazard
control system that begins with the identification of possible
threats, proceeds to their diagnosis, and ends with their dis-
posal.
The general contours of such an apersonal hazard control
regime emerge if we superimpose various of its manifestations
upon each other. The identification and disposal of dangerous
objects occurs in many contexts. In general, every object or
animal, the possession of which is criminal, is subject to a paral-
lel system of hazard control. This makes sense: even after the
possessor is punished for possessing, and deprived of his posses-
sion, the item possessed still needs to be disposed of.
The mere possession of certain highly hazardous (or
"toxic") waste is prohibited.11 9 And so environmental law deals
with, among others things, the "management," i.e., the identifi-
cation and disposal, of "hazardous waste," or more broadly,
"substances hazardous or acutely hazardous to public health,
safety or the environment.
120
Possessing dangerous dogs, at least without a license, also is
a crime.1 21 Supplementing this prohibition, animal laws (often
awkwardly classified under laws dealing with agriculture )
handle the "control," i.e., the identification and disposal,
,' People v. Carter, 53 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1981) (emphasis added). For an interest-
ing discussion of the differentiated analysis of dangerousness in tort law, see EDWARD
J. Lev, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-27 (1949) (distinguishing between
"inherently dangerous," "imminently dangerous," "eminently dangerous," and
"latently dangerous").
"' See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp.
1999).
110 N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw art. 37 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2001).
.2, See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.08.080 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
122 See, e.g., N.Y. AGRic. & MKTs. LAW art. 7 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
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through "seizure," "confiscation, " 123 and "destruction," of "dan-
gerous dogs" or "mischievous animals."
24
Then, of course, there are the laws tracking the criminal
proscription of gun and drug possession. These "administrative
provisions" 125 deal with the "[d]isposition of weapons and dan-
gerous instruments, appliances and substances," 6 and the "sei-
zure," "forfeiture," and "disposition" of "controlled substances
[and] imitation controlled substances." 127 And of course, the
entire law of in rem forfeiture which has made such enormous
strides in the war on crime is based on the identification and
disposal of objects (rei) that are dangerous in and of them-
selves.
128
The general law of nuisances can be seen as the archetypal
hazard control regime. (Many, but not all, of the more specific
schemes make their connection to nuisance disposal explicit. 129)
Modem nuisance statutes are all about the identification and
disposal of hazardous or otherwise "offending" objects, "declar-
ing," "enjoining," "condemning," and "abating" nuisances.
130
There we also find the distinction between nuisances per se-in-
herently dangerous objects-and other nuisances--objects that
are merely put to "noxious" use. Abatement of the former re-
quires destruction (without compensation) .131 Abatement of
the latter doesn't; putting the object to non-noxious use is
enough.
Hazard control schemes generally begin with a "declara-
tion." Before an item can be subjected to the proper kind of
control, it must first be determined whether it is a hazard at all,
"3 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.08.070-.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
124 N.Y. PENAL CODE OF 1829, ti. 2, art. 1, § 14 (third degree manslaughter); N.Y.
PENAL CODE OF 1881, § 196 (second degree manslaughter).
"' See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 40, pt. 4 ("administrative provisions") (McKinney
2000 & Supp. 2001).
11 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
' N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3387 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2001).
"- See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994 & Supp. 2001); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442
(1996).
"' See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) (declaring il-
legally possessed guns public nuisances); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3387 (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 2001) (declaring illegally possessed drugs public nuisances).
"3 Se, e.g., MIcH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 600.3801 (West 2000), the statute at issue in
Bennis.
,'3 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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and, if so, what kind of hazard it is. Only items "declared" to be
a "nuisance" (or "dangerous") fall within the jurisdiction of a
system of hazard administration or management.
13 2
Among nuisances, a system of hazard management will then
roughly distinguish between two types of threats, one incidental
and curable, the other inherent and incurable. Depending on
the type of hazard, its source is either forfeited and turned to
good use, or destroyed as a nuisance per se. Objects not inher-
ently dangerous, i.e., objects for which there is hope, are first
subjected to a diagnosis that determines whether they in fact
have been tainted through association with a dangerous person.
These objects may include, for example, "vehicles, vessels and
aircraft used to transport or conceal gambling records," 133 fam-
ily cars used to solicit prostitutes, 134 and anything somehow as-
sociated with a drug offense, from cars, to houses, to yachts, and
even exercise equipment.
135
If the objects have been tainted, and it is upon the possessor
to rebut the presumption that they have, then they are forfeited.
This means that they are temporarily or permanently brought
under state control-and thereby also taken out of the control
of their tainted possessor, thus removing the taint. State offi-
cials decide in their discretion the duration of the period of
control. In cases of temporary control, an object is eventually
released to the general public by public sale. 136 Alternatively,
state officials may decide to subject the objects to permanent
control. They may "retain such seized roperty for the official
use of their office or department. 13 (This provision has
132 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 3387 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2001) (drugs;
public nuisances); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 400.05 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) (guns;
public nuisances); N.Y. AGRic. & MKrS. LAW § 121 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001)
(dogs; dangerous); WASH. REV. CODE § 16.08.090 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (dogs;
dangerous).
"I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 415.00 (McKinney 2000).
114 MtH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.3801 (West 2000) ("[a]ny building, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or
gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons").
135 21 U.S.C. § 881(4) (1994 & Supp. 1999) ("[aill conveyances, including aircraft,
vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
[controlled substances]").
136 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 415.00(7) (McKinney 2000); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1994 &
Supp. 1999).
137 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 415.00(7) (McKinney 2000).
868 (Vol. 9 1
POLTCING POSSESSION
brought substantial income to police departments throughout
the country, and has provided an important incentive to pursue
the war on crime with great vigor.)
Inherently dangerous objects, the incurably vicious, such as
guns and drugs, are permanently incapacitated. Weapons, for
instance, are "destroyed" or otherwise "rendered ineffective and
useless for [their] intended purpose and harmless to human
life."138 Dangerous dogs similarly are "euthanized immediately"
or "confine [d] securely [and] permanently."
139
Interestingly, the New York weapons disposal statute pro-
vides for two exceptions to this general rule of permanent inca-
pacitation. One is within the discretion of a judge or a
prosecutor: "a judge or justice of a court of record, or a district
attorney, shall file with the official a certificate that the non-
destruction thereof is necessary or proper to serve the ends ofjus-
tice." The other is up to the designated disposal official himself:
"the official directs that the same be retained in any laboratory
conducted by any police or sheriff's department for the purpose of
research, comparison, identification or other endeavor toward
the prevention and detection of crime."
140
The parallels between this fairly complex scheme for the
identification and disposal of non-human threats, animate or
inanimate, and modem criminal administration are apparent.
As we saw earlier, these hazard control schemes apply to objects
the possession of which is criminal, i.e., they apply to contra-
band. But not only is the possession of noxious objects crimi-
nal, the possessors themselves are noxious objects. In a
comprehensive hazard control regime the distinction between
possessor and possessed, and between person and property, is as
insignificant as the distinction among hazards generaU1 speak-
ing. A person is "declared an enemy of the state,"' 1 while
property is "declared a public nuisance."
42
Possessor and possessed are lumped together into a hazard
cluster that must be neutralized. That one is a person, and the
other isn't, makes no difference. In the face of such danger,
"I' Id. § 400.05(2); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (destruction of
drugs); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3387 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2001) (same).
1"' N.Y. AGRiC. & MKs. LAw § 121(4) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
'4 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(3) (emphasis added) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
'41 1934 NJ. Laws ch. 155, NJ. REv. STAT. § 2:136(1) (1937).
142 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(1) (guns) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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very personal considerations of mens rea are out of place. The
possessor's mens rea matters as much as the possessed's: the
fact of dangerousness is the mens rea, the viciousness, that re-
quires state interference. To say that the possession of hazard-
ous objects is a typical strict liability offense therefore is only
half right.143 It's the connection to a hazard that substitutes for
mens rea. The liability isn't strict; it's grounded in
dangerousness.
In the end, possessors are punished not only for possessing
nuisances, but for being nuisances themselves. A "dangerous
dog" is "any dog which (a) without justification attacks a person
and causes physical injury or death, or (b) poses a serious and
unjustified imminent threat of harm to one or more persons."
144
Similarly, offenders are persons who (a) engage in "conduct
that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substan-
tial harm to individual or public interests" 145 or (b) "whose con-
duct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes."
146
Dangerous dogs are identified and controlled. 47  Dangerous
humans are identified and then subjected to "public control."
148
The control of human hazards can be temporary or perma-
nent, depending on their classification as incidental or inherent
dangers. Corrigible human threats are subjected to rehabilita-
tive treatment, a cleansing process in social control institutions
(i.e. prisons). Incorrigible ones suffer incapacitative treatment,
either through permanent warehousing under a life sentence,
with an additional element of enlisting inmates in the service of
the state. Consider here the use of inmates in prison industries.
Note also that the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting slavery,
explicitly excludes prisoners149 and that even enlightened re-
formers like Cesare Beccaria viewed (and advocated) impris-
onment as a form of state slavery.1
50
143 See State v. Bash, 925 P.2d 978, 984 (Wash. 1996) (possession of dangerous dog;
citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617 (1994)).
'" N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 108(24) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
,41 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (a) (1985).
1- Id. § 1.02(1) (b).
147 N.Y. AGRIC. & MmTS. LAW § 106 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
,48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1) (b) (1985).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. xiii, sec. 1.
CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS §§ 16, 30 (1764).
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Alternatively, incorrigible human threats are destroyed
through execution. It's no accident that the modern method
for eliminating human hazards closely resembles that for the
elimination of dangerous dogs. Conversely, the New York dan-
gerous dog law provides that "'[e]uthanize' means to bring
about death by a humane[I] method.":"
Even the exceptional retention of inherently dangerous ob-
jects marked for neutralization finds a parallel in the realm of
human hazards. Consider, for instance, the frequent retention
of otherwise dispensable offenders as witnesses in the disposal
processes of other human hazards, and, more generally, the
practice of granting leniency in exchange for testimony. In ei-
ther case, "non-destruction" of the human hazard can be
deemed "necessary or proper to serve the ends of justice." To-
day, prisoners are no longer forced to subject themselves to sci-
entific experiments, though they may submit to them
voluntarily, or as voluntarily as one can submit to them under
the conditions in many prisons.
1 52
What's more, some non-human hazard control regimes
provide not only a definition of offenses familiar from criminal
codes. They even lay out defenses to an allegation of
dangerousness analogous to the defenses recognized in criminal
law. For instance, New York's statute governing the "Licensing,
Identification and Control of Dogs is dedicated to "the pro-
tection of persons, property, domestic animals and deer from
dog attack and damage." 5 4 A dog reveals itself as dangerous if
it "attack[s] any person who is peaceably conducting himself in
any place where he may lawfully be"155 or if it "attack[s],
chase [s] or worr[ies] any domestic animal... while such animal
is in any place where it may lawfully be." 156 So the actual inflic-
tion of harm isn't a prerequisite. When the victim is a domestic
animal, "chasing" will do.
So much for the special part of this dangerous dog code.
But what about defenses? Several are available:
' N.Y. AGRIC. & Mirs. LAW § 108(8) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
152 See, e.g., Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 220-21 (D. Md. 1979)
"' N.Y. AGRIC. & Mcrs. LAw art. 7 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
"AId. § 106.
15-1 Id. § 121 (1).
" Id. § 121(2); cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 16.08.070(l), (2) (West 1992 & Supp.
2001) (defining "potentially dangerous dog" and "dangerous dog").
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A dog shall not be declared dangerous if the court determines the con-
duct of the dog (a) was justified because the threat, injury or damage was
sustained by a person who at the time was committing a crime or offense
upon the owner or custodian or upon the property of the owner or cus-
todian of the dog, or (b) was justified because the injured person was
tormenting, abusing or assaulting the dog or has in the past tormented,
abused or assaulted the dog; or (c) was respondng to pain or injury, or
was protecting itself, its kennels 
or its offspring.
The facially dangerous dog thus has at least four defenses at
its disposal. All of these defenses qualify as 'justifications." Re-
call that already in the definition of "dangerous dog," we find a
limitation to attacks "without justification" and "unjustified"
threats. First, and more general, the dog can raise a general jus-
tification defense by claiming that its victim, in the case of a per-
son, was not "peaceably conducting himself' or was not "in [a]
place where he may lawfully be,"158 or, in the case of a domestic
animal, was not "in [a] place where it may lawfully be."' 59 This
first line of defense finds a rough analogue in the Model Penal
Code's general justification defense (choice of evils), which
provides that "[c] onduct that the actor believes to be necessary
to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable,
provided that... the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged .... ,160 Here it would seem that
the New York legislature has determined that the balance of
evils weighs against the victim of a dog attack if he (or it) wasn't
engaging in lawful conduct at the time of the attack, either by
not peaceably conducting himself or by not being where he (or
it) may lawfully be.
Alternatively, this implicit, general, justification defense is
simply fleshed out by the three defenses laid out in the passage
quoted above. Again, these defenses are familiar from the
Model Penal Code-and traditional criminal law. Defense (a) is
analogous to the Code provisions on "use of force for the pro-
tection of other persons" (defense of others)1 61 and "use of
force for the protection of property" (defense of property).
162
117 N.Y. AGRuc. & Mmcrs. LAW § 121(5) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
, Id. § 121 (1).
"
9 Id. § 121(2) (emphasis added).
'60 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (a) (1985).
161 Id. § 3.05.
162 Id. § 3.06.
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Defenses (b) and (c) parallel the Code defenses "use of force in
self-protection" (self-defense) '163 "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance" (provocation), and once again defense of oth-
ers.1  If anything, the canine statute is more generous than the
human statute. The Code-and traditional criminal law-
limits the defense of provocation to homicide cases.
By encompassing and connecting human and non-human
threats as possessors and possessed, the concept of possession
helps to make this apersonal system of hazard control, where
hazards are identified and eliminated regardless of who or what
they might be, possible. By providing state officials with a flexi-
ble doctrinal framework for their discretionary analyses of
dangerousness, possession offenses quietly supplement a grow-
ing system for the explicit assessment of human dangerousness,
which includes pre-trial detention hearings, sentencing hear-
ings, and, most recently, sexual predator ratings, as well as pa-
role hearings.1 66 They introduce dangerousness considerations
into an area of criminal law that, on its face, follows the tradi-
tional approach of matching behavior to definitions of pro-
scribed conduct in criminal statutes. Dressed up like an
ordinary criminal statute replete with conduct element ("pos-
sesses"), attendant circumstances ("three kilos of powder co-
caine"), perhaps even mens rea ("with intent to distribute"), a
possession offense in reality is a carte blanche for police control
of undesirables, through initial investigation and eventual inca-
pacitation.
Given the flexibility of its conception and the convenience
of its enforcement, possession offenses alone can quickly and
easily incapacitate large numbers of undesirables for long peri-
ods of time. Possession, however, unfolds its full potential as a
threat elimination device when used in conjunction with other
broad-sweeping police offenses.
' Id. § 3.04.
1- Id. § 210.3(1) (b).
165 See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 16.08.070(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (defin-
ing "dangerous dog" as "any dog that.., has inflicted severe injury on a human being
without provocation").
'65 See alsoJulia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimennon
to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L REv. 729 (1994); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as
a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND M4ENITAL DISORDER 360,
372 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996).
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The most potent combination of modem policing is the
traffic offense and possession. Every day, millions of cars are
stopped for one of the myriad of regulations governing our use
of public streets. As soon as you get into your car, even before
you turn the ignition key, you have subjected yourself to intense
police scrutiny. So dense is the modem web of motor vehicle
regulations that every motorist is likely to get caught in it every
time he drives to the grocery store. The good news is that the
gap between regulation and enforcement of the traffic laws is
enormous. Unfortunately, that's also the bad news. It is by the
good graces, or the inattention, of a police officer that you es-
cape a traffic stop and a ticket, or worse.
Penalties for traffic violations are often astonishingly high,
including short term incarceration even for a first offense, but
they are irrelevant in the large, incapacitative, scheme of
things.' 67 The war on crime uses traffic stops not to hand out
tickets, or even ten day jail sentences. In the war on crime, traf-
fic stops are a convenient opportunity to identify and eliminate
threats. The identification begins with general observation,
continues with a glance inside the car, and ends with a full
fledged search of the car and its occupants. The elimination
takes the form of the one-two punch of traffic violation and pos-
session offense. Untold times each and every day, traffic stops
reveal evidence of possession at some stage of the identification
process, be it the gun protruding from under the passenger
seat, the rounds of ammunition rolling around on the floor, the
marijuana paraphernalia sticking out from under a blanket on
the back seat, or the vial of crack cocaine found during the
search incident to arrest for driving without a registration. One
moment the driver of the "late model sedan" was cruising down
1-95. The next moment he finds himself charged with a posses-
sion felony of one kind or another, or both, as in the "variety of
narcotics and weapons offenses" familiar from Supreme Court
opinions.
168
In the end, it really makes little difference exactly why a par-
ticular person attracted the attention of a police officer. What
matters is that, once he has been identified as a potential threat,
67 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAm. LAW § 1800(b) (McKinney 2001) (penalty for first
traffic infraction "fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for
not more than fifteen days or... both").
"6 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
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possession offenses are a convenient way to get him off the
streets, either in conjunction with another offense, or increas-
ingly all by themselves. The connection between evidence of
possession and possession is instantaneous, and evidence of pos-
session is easily found.
To see just how easy, let's take a closer look at some of the
ways in which police can happen upon "contraband," in the
specific sense of "the very things the possession of which was the
crime charged. " 169 We needn't look far for illustrations of the
convenience of possession policing. The Supreme Court's
criminal procedure opinions are filled with them. Given that
only successful possession searches make it before any court,
that only a small portion of these cases then make it before an
appellate court, only a minuscule fraction of which in turn
make it to the Supreme Court, we can only guess how often the
policing practices considered by the Court are used "in the
field."
B. POSSESSION IN THE SUPREME COURT
A glance at the Supreme Court's possession related opin-
ions reveals the significance of possession police in all its mar-
velous variety. We will also see how willing the Court has been
to accommodate the needs of law enforcement in its effort to
incapacitate undesirables by connecting them to one, or more,
of the offenses in their possession grab bag. In fact, it will turn
out that much of the Supreme Court's recent criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence has been made with possession cases. From
Carroll to Tery to Wardlow, possession offenses have inspired the
Court to loosen constitutional protections in the service of more
effective policing, and most recently of the war on crime.
Police officers are liable to stumble upon possession evi-
dence anytime they make an arrest. This makes sense. Early
on, police were entitled to search any area in an arrestee's pos-
session. So evidence of possession was found within the arres-
tee's possession. For instance, in United States v. RabinowitzY1
0
the search incident to Rabinowitz's arrest revealed a plate "from
which a similitude of a United States obligation had been
printed," and possession of which was illegal.




This connection between possession and possession was
muddled when the Court overruled Rabinowitz some twenty
years later, in Chimel v. Caliornia.1 71 Since Chimel, the scope of
the search incident to an arrest is defined by the arrestee's
"armspan."172 That way, police are not supposed to be able to
search areas that are within the arrestee's possession, but not
within his reach. This doesn't mean of course, that police no
longer find evidence of (illegal) possession during a search in-
cident. On the contrary. For one thing, the armspan area is
merely a subset of the area within the arrestee's possession. For
another, since the 1990 decision in Maryland v. Buie,173 police
can do a much broader "protective sweep-as opposed to a
search-of surrounding areas far beyond the arrestee's arm-
span, as well as beyond the area within his actual possession. As
Justice Brennan explained in his Buie dissent, "a protective
sweep would bring within police purview virtually all personal
possessions within the house not hidden from view in a small
enclosed space."'174 He's right, of course, and from the perspec-
tive of possession police, that's a good thing. "Personal posses-
sions" obviously-and conveniently--include not only evidence
of the crime underlying the arrest, but evidence of the standard
possession offenses as well.
As one might expect, the combination of search incident to
arrest and traffic stops has been a fruitful one for the detection
of items illegally possessed, and the incapacitation of those who
possess them. The Supreme Court expanded a passenger's
"armspan" to the interior of a car in New York v. Belton.1" Belton
had been a passenger in a car whose driver had been pulled
over for speeding. He ended up convicted of cocaine posses-
sion. The trooper had smelled and then found marijuana in the
car, which led him to put everyone in the car, including Belton,
under arrest for marijuana possession. Incident to that arrest
for possession offense number 1, the trooper then searched the
entire car. It was then and there that he found cocaine in a
zipped pocket of Belton's jacket on the backseat. Hence Bel-
171 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
,n Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
494 U.S. 325 (1990).
,7' Id. at 342 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
175 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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ton's connection to the second, and far more serious, posses-
sion offense.
It doesn't take a full blown arrest, however, to generate pos-
session evidence-and therefore possession convictions. Mini-
arrests called Terry "stops" will do. In 1968, the Supreme Court
permitted police officers to detain suspects, however briefly,
without probable cause-never mind a warrant. 76 That case
was Terry v. Ohio. Terry was a possession case, though a quaint
one compared with today's possession proliferation. Terry and
two others had been "stopped and frisked"-to use the Court's
technical description of their mini-arrest and search-by a po-
lice officer on the beat who suspected they were casing a store
for a burglary. The "frisk" turned up guns on Terry and an-
other of the men. They were convicted, not of attempted bur-
glary, but of carrying a concealed weapon, "and sentenced to
the statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in the peni-
tentiary." Such a convenient method of incapacitation was sure
to catch on in the war on crime.
And it did. Soon officers en masse were discovering suspi-
cious bulges in the "outergarments" of Terry friskees. In Terry,
police detective Martin McFadden at least had found what he
was looking for, a gun. But once a frisking officer is patting
down a suspect, there's no telling what contraband he might
come across. So the exploration of bulges in search of "weapon-
like objects" soon began turning up not only weapons but a
panoply of other illegally possessed items, including drugs (of
course) 177 and lottery slips, in NewJersey175
And just like full fledged arrests, Terry mini-arrests work well
with traffic stops that don't blossom into a "custodial arrest," as
they did in Belton. The seminal case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms
nicely illustrates the familiar chain of events leading from traffic
, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
People v. Atmore, 13 Cal. App. 3d 244 (Ct. App. 1970) (marijuana cigarette);
People v. Watson, 12 Cal. App. 3d 130 (Ct. App. 1970) (bag of marijuana cigarettes);
Taylor v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1969) (cigarette lighter con-
taining hashish).
" State v. Campbell, 250 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1969) (lottery slips); see also United States v.
Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974); CHARLES H. W%'TEBR.AD & CHRISTOPHER




stop to bulge to frisk to gun possession to a prison sentence.
179
The Supreme Court's rendition is too full of the standard tech-
nical lingo to pass up:
While on routine patrol, two Philadelphia police officers observed re-
spondent Harry Mimms driving an automobile with an expired license
plate. The officers stopped the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a traffic
summons. One of the officers approached and asked respondent to step
out of the car and produce his owner's card and operator's license. Re-
spondent alighted, whereupon the officer noticed a large bulge under
respondent's sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon,
the officer frisked respondent and discovered in his waistband a .38-
caliber revolver loaded with five rounds of ammunition. The other oc-
cupant of the car was carrying a .32-caliber revolver. Respondent was
immediately arrested and subsequently indicted for carrying a %concealed
deadly weapon and for unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license.
"Armspans" play a role in frisks incident to stops as they do
in searches incident to arrests. And once again, the Court has
found a way to extend that span to include the interior of cars
in traffic stops. In Michigan v. Long, 18 decided six years after
Mimms, the Court applied Teny to the following connection be-
tween possession-in this case of drugs-and a routine traffic
violation-in this case speeding. Once again in the vernacular
of law enforcement, here is the Court's account of the chain of
events, culminating in Long's conviction of marijuana posses-
sion:
Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one evening
when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling erratically
and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a
side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped
to investigate.
After another repeated request [to produce his registration],
Long, who Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of
something," turned from the officers and began walking toward the
open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed
a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car.
The officers then stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry
protective patdown, which revealed no weapons.
179 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Commonwealth v. Mimms, 232 A.2d 486 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975).
,80 434 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added).
I 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while
Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but
did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action was "to search
for other weapons." The officer noticed that something was protruding
from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and
lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon
flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what ap-
peared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its
contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana.
A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox,
revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The offi-
cers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk,
which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75
pounds of marihuana. 2
Long got away with a sentence of two years probation, a fine
of $750, and court costs of $300183 That was in 1978, in a
Michigan state court. In today's coordinated federal-state police
regime, possession offenses carry a much heavier incapacitative
stick. In federal court, possession of seventy-five pounds of
marijuana would get him between thirty-one and forty-one
months of real prison time, without parole, assuming he had a
clean record.1 84 But federal intervention wouldn't have been
necessary. In Michigan state court today, he would face "im-
prisonment for not more than 7 years or a fine of not more than
$500,000.00, or both."'8 5 Michigan, after all, is the land of Har-
melin, the case in which the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for simple drug possession.1
6
Police understand the connection between traffic violations,
Terry, and possession offenses very well. Long before Terry, the
Supreme Court aided another war on possession-of liquor-by
carving out the automobile exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirement. In the 1925 case of Carroll v.
United States,18 7 the Court was so impressed with the mobility of
the "automobile" that it did away with the requirement that a
- Id. at 1035-36 (emphasis added).
Ku People v. Long, 288 N.W.2d 629 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
4 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2000) (offense level 20 (18 for
75 pounds, plus 2 for possession of a dangerous weapon, the knife)).
"I MICs. STAT. ANN. § 333.7401(d)(ii) (West 2001) (possessing with intent to de-
liver controlled substance).
18 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
"8 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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police officer get a warrant to search a car he thought might
contain contraband, to wit liquor; by the time he showed up
with the warrant, the car-unlike the more familiar, and sta-
tionary, houses-might be long gone. Carroll was suspected,
and convicted, of "transportation or possession of liquor."
Seventy-five years later, police are not limited to pulling
over and searching cars they suspect contain evidence of illegal
possession. Instead, they are just as likely to pull over cars for
something entirely different and then bootstrap themselves into
a search of the car for that all-important possession evidence.
The officer in Carroll, after all, still needed probable cause to
search the car for liquor. The automobile exception is an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, not to the Fourth Amend-
ment altogether.
As a result, the car search-possession jurisprudence of the
war on crime often has been about everything but possession. It
has been about broken tail lights, expired registration stickers,
touched divider lines, rolled-through-stop signs, improperly sig-
naled turns, and, of course, speeding. There are many posses-
sion offenses. And there are many who commit possession
offenses every day. But there are even more traffic offenses, and
millions of them are committed every minute.
Nothing's easier than cruising down the street, or staking
out a highway, and developing probable cause that someone has
committed a traffic infraction. And armed with that probable
cause, a police officer can stop a car, and eventually search its
occupants, and the car itself, happening upon possession of-
fense evidence along the way.
But that's not all. Since 1968, the police don't need prob-
able cause that an offense-including a traffic infraction-has
been committed. Since Tery, "reasonable suspicion" will do.
And once stopped, cars and their occupants have a tendency of
being searched, and yielding possession evidence.
More recently, the Supreme Court has made the leap from
car stop to possession evidence even easier. In 1976, the Court
began authorizing police officers to stop cars without any suspi-
cion of any kind, not reasonable suspicion, not probable cause,
as long as the stop qualified as a "roadblock" for routine checks
[Vol. 9 1
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of this and that-illegal aliens,1 8 8 driver's license, 8 9 registra-
tion,190 and DWI.' 9g
No matter how the initial stop (or arrest) occurs, the so-
called plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment comes in
handy in order to transform this encounter between police and
citizen into an instance of possession police. If a police officer
has a right to be where he is, he has a right to see what he sees-
and feel what he feels- 192 hear what he hears, 193 or smell what
he smells. 194 In the case of a traffic stop, what he sees often
enough is evidence of illegal possession. The "plain view" ex-
ception was first recognized in 1971, in a murder case.' 95 But it
was significantly expanded for use in the crime war in 1983, in
yet another possession case. In Texas v. Brown,196 the Court did
away with the requirement that the criminal nature of the item
seized in plain view be immediately apparent. Since Brown, the
police merely need probable cause to believe that the item is
contraband. Brown had been stopped at "a routine driver's li-
cense checkpoint" in Fort Worth, "[s]hortly before midnight."'7
When the officer shone the ever present flashlight' into
Brown's car, he noticed "between the two middle fingers of the
hand... an opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one-
half inch from the tip," which turned out to contain heroin.
Brown pled nolo contendere to heroin possession and received
four years in prison "pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain." 99
It makes no difference whether the police officer used the
traffic violation as a mere pretext to finding evidence of some
other offense, possession offenses in particular. The police offi-
- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
'9 Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983). But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1985).
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
'Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
'Cf United States v. Kahn, 41 U.S. 143 (1974).
'Cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (dog sniff); United States v. Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
19 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
'460 U.S. 730 (1983) (drug possession).
7Id at 733.
1' Id.; see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) ("[The] use of a
searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohib-
ited by the Constitution.").
199 Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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cer's subjective intent is irrelevant. In 1996, the Supreme Court
removed any doubt on this issue in another possession case,
Whren v. United States.200 There plain-clothes members of a drug
task force developed a serious interest in traffic enforcement
when they noticed that a car whose occupants they suspected of
possessing drugs was driving off at an "unreasonable speed."
Their hunch turned out to be correct-it always does in court
opinions-and the driver and passenger were convicted of drug
possession.
Terry has proved enormously useful to the war on crime as a
war on possession. It authorizes police officers to put their
hands on suspects without probable cause. And this laying on
of hands is enough to provide conclusive evidence of posses-
sion, even if nothing else sticks. Without Teny, possession
wouldn't be the universal velcro charge it is today, which sticks
when nothing else will.
As a final example, take the recent case of Illinois v. Ward-
low.20 1 There, the Supreme Court decided that behavior in a
"high crime area" may give rise to the reasonable suspicion re-
quired for a Teny stop even if the same behavior wouldn't have
been suspicious elsewhere. This decision was warmly welcomed
by police organizations and heavily criticized by civil rights
groups. In the melee, the fact that Wardlow was convicted of a
possession offense received scant attention. It didn't help that
the Supreme Court reported that Wardlow had been convicted
of using a weapon. The Illinois statute in question, though enti-
tled "unlawful use or possession weapons by felons... ," actually
criminalizes the mere possession of a weapon, without more.
202
Wardlow nicely illustrates the potential of possession as a
sweep offense, as the favored incapacitation broom of the war
on crime. Police officers descend on "high crime areas," either
in coordinated raids or in casual cruise-throughs, in the hope of
finding evidence of possession offenses. In the case of a raid,
that evidence emerges in the course of the execution of a search
warrant or an arrest warrant, with the inevitable search incident.
In the case of a regular patrol, it reveals itself through personal
observation ("bulges"), informer tips, or through frisks incident
to Terry stops. The items illegally possessed tend to be drugs or
200 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
201 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
202 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.1 (West 1976).
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guns (as in Wardlow), or both; drug and gun possession offenses
pack the greatest incapacitative punch. And in a "high crime
area," they aren't hard to come by. In New York City alone, the
number of illegal guns is estimated to be between one and two
million.
203
Still, for searches incident to arrests and frisks incident to
stops, police officers need to be able to articulate some (legiti-
mate) reason for focusing their investigative attention on a par-
ticular person: probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
respectively-except, of course, if their initial stop is part of a
"roadblock." There's no need for this type of rationalization in
another common source of possession evidence: consensual
searches. The Supreme Court approved suspicionless consent
searches in 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, and held that offi-
cers asking for consent didn't have to tell suspects that they had
the right to say no.204 Schneckloth was another possession case,
and the possession evidence was found after another "routine"
traffic stop, this time for a burned out headlight and license
plate light. Only the type of possession offense differed from
the run-of-the-mill drug-cum-gun possession case. What the po-
lice found "[w]added up under the left rear seat" were three
checks. And what Bustamonte was convicted of was "possessing a
check with intent to defraud."
Needless to say, in the decades since Schneckloth, police offi-
cers have been finding more than stolen checks during their
consent searches. In Supreme Court cases, as well as presuma-
bly in real life, they tended to find drugs and guns, and espe-
cially drugs.20 5 That's not to say, however, that only illegally
possessed drugs and guns turned up. The variety of possession
offenses available to the modem police officer insured that,
even among the small sample of Supreme Court cases, there was
also a case of illegal possession of stolen maiL
20 6
That possession case from 1976, United States v. Watson,
made its own significant contribution to the war on crime.
2m DONALD B. KATES, WHY HANDGUN BANS CAN'T WORK 43 (1982).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
20 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (possession of a controlled substance);
Florida v.Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (possession with intent to distribute cocaine);
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (possession of a controlled substance vAth
intent to deliver); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (possession with
intent to distribute heroin).
- United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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There, the Supreme Court for the first time declared that the
Fourth Amendment didn't stand in the way of public arrests
without a warrant. In and of itself, that authority is a convenient
weapon in the hands of police officers ferreting out crime. As
we've seen, however, it also has the indirect advantage ofjustify-
ing searches incident to warrantless street arrests: every arrest is
also an armspan search-plus a "protective sweep." And
"searches incident" have a tendency to reveal evidence of pos-
session offenses, especially since the Court has taken an expan-
sive view of what an arrestee's arm might reach.
After Watson, police officers once again were more likely to
stumble upon drugs than stolen mall in their searches incident
to warrantless public arrests. In United States v. Santana,20 7 for
example, the police arrested a suspect on the "curtilage" of her
home without a warrant. The search incident produced, among
other things, "two bundles of glazed paper packets with a white
powder." Santana was convicted of possession of heroin with in-
tent to distribute.
But possession evidence doesn't just happen to crop up in-
cident to arrests or stops for other offenses, traffic or not. Al-
though it's very effective as a piggyback offense, possession is
much more than that. It can itself be the offense that justifies
the initial police intervention. The myriad of possession of-
fenses therefore also means that police officers have a myriad of
justifications for approaching, stopping, or arresting a suspect.
That's what happened in Watson, for example. An informer
had told a postal inspector that Watson, a mailman, was in the
midst of committing a possession offense, specifically that he
"cwas in possession of a stolen credit card." That's also what
happened in the recent case of Forida v. J. L., where an anony-
mous informer called the Miami police department to report
that "a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." J. L. was Teny
stopped-and-frisked, and charged with "carrying a concealed
firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under
the age of 18. "2°8
No Supreme Court case, however, better illustrates the ini-
tial justificatory, and the indirect piggyback, function of posses-
sion offenses in the war on crime, as well as the interplay
207 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
200 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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between different possession offenses, than 1972's Adams v. Wil-
liams. An informer-there tend to be lots of informers in vic-
timless possession cases-had told a police officer on patrol that
"an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics
and had a gun at his waist," i.e., that he wvas engaging in two
possession offenses at the same time, drug possession and gun
possession. Here's what happened next:
After calling for assistance on his car radio, Sgt. Connolly ap-
proached the vehide to investigate the informant's report. Connolly
tapped on the car window and asked the occupant, Robert Wrlliams, to
open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the ser-
geant reached into the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from Wil-
liams' waistband. The gun had not been visible to Connolly from outside
the car, but it was in precisely the place indicated by the informant. Wil-
liams was then arrested by Connolly for unlawful possession of the pistol.
A search incident to that arrest was conducted after other officers ar-
rived. They found substantial quantities of heroin on Williams' person
and in the car, anj0yhey found a machete and a second revolver hidden
in the automobile.
After a bench trial (possession offenses are very rarely tried
before a jury), Williams was convicted of one drug and two gun
possession offenses: "having narcotic drugs in his control," "car-
rying a pistol on his person without a permit," and "knowingly
having a weapon in a vehicle owned, operated or occupied by
him."- ° The evidence for the gun possession counts stemmed
from the initial Teny stop-and-frisk. And the evidence for the
drug possession count turned up during the search incident to
arrest based on the results of that frisk.
Searches resulting from investigations into ongoing posses-
sion offenses of course can produce evidence not only of other
possession offenses, but of any other offense. Finding evidence
of possession offenses is simply more convenient. It's self-
evident, whereas other evidence is merely circumstantial. And
the chances of finding other possession evidence are so much
greater than the chance of finding evidence of other crimes. As
the courts, including the Supreme Court, are fond of pointing
out, drug and gun possession tend to go hand in hand. Who-
ever has drugs is likely to have a gun, and-at least in so-called
- 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
.,0State v. Williams, 249 A.2d 245, 246 (Conn. 1968).
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high crime areas-vice versa. As the Court explained in Ward-
low, "it [is] common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity
of narcotics transactions." That's why the officers in Wardlow
found a gun, even though they were ostensibly looking for
drugs, or rather "converging on an area known for heavy nar-
cotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions.
' 'z I
Either way, as the boot or the strap, possession offenses are
particularly convenient policing instruments because they are
continuous, across space and time. As we'll see in greater detail
below, possession offenses are continuous across space in that
they can be committed in public or in private. As a result, they
have always justified state intrusion into the private sanctuary of
the home-castle. But they're also continuous across time. The
whole point of carrying a gun, for instance, or keeping it at
home or in the car is to have it around when the need might
arise. Gun possession therefore can continue for hours, days,
even weeks, months, years, or decades, depending on how inse-
cure the possessor is without his possession. And at any time
during this period, the illegal possessor exposes himself to po-
lice intervention of various levels of intrusiveness, culminating
in an arrest, with its inevitably incident search. He is a constant
policing target, subject to incapacitation at any moment, day or
night.
As we can see from our brief survey of possession police in
the Supreme Court, the Court's criminal procedure jurispru-
dence since Terry represents an increasingly explicit effort to tap
the full potential of possession as a general policing tool. With
remarkable frequency, the Court has found ways to legitimize
possession searches and seizures in an ever increasing variety of
circumstances.
But not only the recurrence of possession offenses among
decisions loosening constitutional safeguards in the interest of
crime control is remarkable, so is the sheer number of posses-
sion cases that have found their way before the Court, hinting at
the frequency of possession cases in criminal courts throughout
the land. In the thirty-odd years since Terry, the Supreme Court
has written opinions in give or take 150 cases that involved one
possession offense or another, in one way or another. Among
these opinions are not only most of the Court's important
Fourth Amendment opinions, but also several significant opin-
211 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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ions in other doctrinal areas, not only in criminal procedure but
elsewhere as well.
As the investigatory tool par excellence, possession has left
its greatest mark on the constitutional law of police investiga-
tion. The list of Fourth Amendment/possession cases since
Tery reads like a who's-who of search and seizure law:
CASE IUST NO. 1
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Sibron v. NewYork, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973)
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1978)
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977)
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977)
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)
Ybarrav. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982)
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United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983)
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983)
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)
NewYork v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984)
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)
NewJersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
United States v.Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985)
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)
NewYork v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1988)
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990)
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993)
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)
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Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)
Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1997)
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)
Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
Florida v.J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000)
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)
The list of possession related Fourth Amendment classics is
complete once we look past Terry and back to Carroll, the 1925
opinion that established the automobile exception in a liquor
possession case. Although the fifty-plus years between Carroll
and Terry produced "only" fifty-plus Supreme Court opinions in
possession related cases, foundational opinions like Mapp (ap-
plying the exclusionary rule to the states) and Aguilar (the first
half of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, to be undone some twenty years
later in Gates, another possession case), remind us that the war
on crime didn't invent possession offenses; it just used them to
greater effect. Here are some of the Fourth Amendment chest-
nuts of the pre-Terry era:
212
CASE LIST NO. 2
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925)
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925)
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927)
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927)
212 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 175 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Appendix: Analysis of Decisions Involving Searches and Seizures, from Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), up to Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)).
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Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927)
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931)
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931)
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932)
Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932)
Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932)
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933)
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938)
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956)
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957)
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958)
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 27 (1960)
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965)
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965)
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965)
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
Although possession offenses were most likely to crop up in
Fourth Amendment cases, their ubiquity ensured that they also
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appeared in other constitutional-and non-constitutional---con-
texts. Non-Fourth Amendment cases involving possession in-
cluded:
CASE LIST NO. 3
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (presumptions;
drug possession)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (vagueness; gun pos-
session)
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspiracy- pos-
session of liquor)
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (presumptions; drug
possession)
Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959) (double jeopardy; drug
possession)
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (1st am. (mens rea); pos-
session of obscene matter)
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (5th & 6th am.; drug
possession)
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumptions; drug pos-
session)
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (presumptions; drug
possession).
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (lenity, gun possession)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (evidence (confrontation);
gun possession)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus; gun posses-
sion)
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (pre-
sumption (due process); gun possession)
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (sentence enhance-
ment; gun possession)
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (habeas corpus; gun
possession)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (confession; gun pos-
session)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (8th am.; drug posses-
sion)
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) (sentencing; gun
possession)
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (habeas corpus; possession of
stolen property as presumptive evidence of larceny)
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Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (habeas corpus; gun pos-
session)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (sentencing guide-
lines; gun possession)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (statutory construction;
gun possession)
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994) (confession;
possession of counterfeit currency)
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (sentencing; gun pos-
session)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (mens rea; gun pos-
session)
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994) (insanity; gun pos-
session)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (commerce clause;
gun possession)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (statutory intrepreta-
tion ("uses"); gun possession)
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (sentencing guidelines;
drug possession)
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (sentencing guidelines;
drug & gun possession)
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (concurrent state-
federal sentence; drug & gun possession)
United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) (sentencing guide-
lines; drug possession)
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (suspension; drug posses-
sion)
Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998) (mens rea; gun pos-
session)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (parole conditions; drug &
gun possession)
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (statutory inter-
pretation ("carries"); gun possession)
Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (statutory interpreta-
tion (felon-in-possession); gun possession)
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (double jeopardy; drug
possession)
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (sentencing enhance-
ment vs. offense element; gun possession)
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (jury selec-
tion; drug possession)




Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (prosecutorial argument;
gun possession)
Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (sentencing enhancement vs.
offense element; gun & bomb possession)
In roughly chronological order, possession offenses thus
appeared in opinions dealing with, in addition to the never end-
ing issues raised by the Fourth Amendment, evidentiary pre-
sumptions (due process), vagueness (due process), conspiracy
(substantive criminal law), First Amendment (constitutional
law), burden of proof (due process), right to a jury trial (Sixth
Amendment), statutory interpretation (substantive criminal
law), habeas corpus (federal courts), Fifth Amendment (due
process & self-incrimination), Sixth Amendment (right to coun-
sel), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment),
mens rea (substantive criminal law), insanity (substantive crimi-
nal law), Commerce Clause (constitutional law), sentencing
guidelines (substantive criminal law), lenity (constitutional law),
parole conditions (law of punishment), double jeopardy (con-
stitutional law), ex post facto (constitutional law), and prosecu-
torial argument (law of evidence).
That a possession offense appears in an opinion, no matter
what its official subject matter, is significant for two reasons. De
facto, it illustrates the ubiquity of possession offenses and their
frequent and varied use. Dejure, it may tell us something about
why this is so, why there are so many possession offenses, and
why they are so popular as policing tools.
Not only the number, but also the variety, of possession re-
lated cases is impressive. As one might expect, most cases in-
volved the possession of drugs and related "paraphernalia" (or
of liquor, during Prohibition), followed by gun possession. But
other cases provided glimpses at other offenses in the posses-
sion grab bag available to American police at a particular time






"' Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
214 E.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pic-
tures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Pa9ty of Texas, and the operations of the Communist
Party in Texas2
foodstamps;2 20 and 221
counterfeit currency.
When we look more closely at the Court's possession opin-
ions, we can detect the function and impact of possession of-
fenses for various policing efforts throughout the twentieth
century, culminating in their extensive use during the war on
crime. The 1939 Lanzetta case, for instance, reveals the useful-
ness of possession offenses as a device for identifying and inca-
pacitating undesirables.2 2 2  The statute at issue in this classic
vagueness case was very explicit about its incapacitative aim:
223
1. A gangster is hereby declared to be an enemy of the State.
2. Any person in whose possession is found a machine gun or a sub-
machine gun is declared to be a gangster: provided, however, that nothing
in this section contained shall be construed to apply to any member of
the military of naval forces of this State, or to any police officer of the
State or of any country or municipality thereof, while engaged in his of-
ficial duties.
3. Any person, having no lawful occupation, who is apprehended
while carrying a deadly weapon, without a permit so to do, and who has
been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who
has been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared
to be a gangster.
4. Any person, not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to
be a gangster; provided, however, that nothing in this section contained
215 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
216 E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
217 E.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
218 E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
29 E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
221 E.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
" E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994).
222 Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
11 1934 N.J. Laws ch. 155, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:136 (1937) (emphasis added).
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shall in any wise be construed to include any participant or sympathizer
in any labor dispute.
5. Any person convicted of being a gangster under the provisions of
this act shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or by imprison-
ment not exceeding twenty years, or both.
The Lanzetta statute was a classic instrument for the mass
neutralization of perceived threats, "enemies of the state." And
possession offenses, coupled with classic vagrancy (of the "dis-
orderly persons" variety) ,224 fit the bill. Quickly detected, easily
proved, and harshly punished, gun possession was the ideal
weapon against those "declared to be a gangster."
Pinkerton illustrates the sort of disrespect for the constraints
of legality that was to characterize the crime extermination
campaign of the war on crime.225 In this infamous conspiracy
case from 1946, the Court turned a blind eye to the sweeping
use of conspiracy law for the purpose of destroying criminal en-
terprises. By holding every "member" of a conspiracy liable for
the substantive crimes of any other member, the Court
equipped law enforcement officials combating underground
criminal conspiracies with a powerful weapon to strike at the
very heart of their enemy. Minor players could now be held vi-
cariously liable for the acts of major ones. Facing serious pun-
ishment for acts they hadn't committed, the former could be
turned against the latter, thus cracking the group.
Possession offenses spring from the same attitude of crime
suppression by any means necessary, borne of a perception of
criminal law as the struggle against an alien threat. Possession
provides state officials with a flexible policing tool, and flaunts
almost every principle of criminal law along the way, including
the act requirement, the prohibition of status offenses, the gen-
eral resistance to omission liability, the mens rea requirement
and the principle of personal-as opposed to group--liability22
Combining conspiracy and possession, as in Pinkerton, pro-
duces a formidable policing tool. Conspiracy is an inchoate
crime, i.e., a crime that inflicts no harm. So is possession. A
224 Se, e.g., JACKSONVILE, F.A., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57, quoted in Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972) ("... disorderly persons... shall be
deemed vagrants").
2" Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
22 See infra notes 287-328 and accompanying text.
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conspiracy to possess, thus, is an inchoate inchoate crime. Spe-
cifically, it is a plan to engage in a nonharmful nonact, or to
share in a state, that of possessing something that may be used
in a harmful way.
Like conspiracy, possession offenses also have been used to
impose liability on entire groups of people. Whereas the law of
complicity has long been careful to remind itself that mere
presence does not an accomplice make, the law of possession
has had no difficulty imposing liability on that very basis. We've
already noted that being in the presence of contraband is
enough to establish a presumption of possession. 227 Possession,
therefore, often becomes a group affair, with everyone in a
room, or everyone in a car, being found in possession of a gun,
or a baggie of marijuana.
Lanzetta and Pinkerton illustrate the use of possession of-
fenses to police groups perceived as threatening to the state,
gangsters, and "conspiracies," respectively. The 1965 case of
Stanford v. Texas shows how possession offenses can be employed
against a particular type of group, a political party. By criminal-
izing the possession of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, re-
ceipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas, and the-- • ,- ,,228 -,
operations of the Communist Party in Texas, 8 Texas author-
ized state officials to rummage through the homes of suspected
sympathizers, so as to nip the Communist threat in the bud.
The mere possession of this explosive literature represented the
first step along a continuum that was sure to lead from distribu-
tion to agitation and, eventually, to revolution.
It's no surprise, then, that so-called profiles should play
such an important role in policing possession. Possession of-
fenses are committed by certain people who fit a certain image.
An item that is perfectly harmless in the hands of a decent
member of society becomes a threat to the survival of that soci-
ety in the hands of an outsider. In this respect, it's the possessor
who makes the possession criminal. And possession merely pro-
vides the formal justification, the pretext, for the harassment of
persons who are suspicious because of their membership in
some group that remains ill-defined precisely because its distin-
guishing characteristic is its difference from the ingroup, the
227 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
228 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
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society whose safety the state is charged with protecting against
outside threats. Profiles are post hoc attempts to justify an ad
hoc suspicion whose true basis remains hidden, often even to
the person harboring it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
not stood in the way of the widespread use of profiles in the
crime war effort.
229
The war on crime would have been impossible without a
dramatic expansion of federal criminal law. Conceived as a
presidential police action, the war on crime became a national
crime suppression campaign through a remarkable expansion
of federal criminal law and the close coordination of federal
and state criminal law. The possession cases before the Su-
preme Court bear witness to both phenomena. On the subject
of expanding federal criminal law, the Court has proved re-
markably reticent. For instance, much of its (non-
constitutional) jurisprudence on mens rea (and ignorance of
law) can be found in opinions narrowly construing federal pos-
session statutes, and gun possession statutes in particular.3
0
Again and again, the Court was surprisingly receptive to the ar-
gument that a statute criminalizing "knowing" possession of a
weapon required the prosecution to prove not only that the
possessor knew he was possessing a certain gun (a mens rea is-
sue), but also that he knew that knowingly possessing that par-
ticular gun was illegal (an ignorance of law issue). In the face of
the age old common law maxim that ignorance of the law is no
excuse, this receptivity may well reflect a general uneasiness with
the federal government's assumption of criminal lawmaking
powers traditionally reserved for the states. In its uneasiness,
the Court even found itself invoking the principle of lenity,
which provides that ambiguous criminal statutes are to be inter-
preted in favor of the defendant, a principle it had no difficulty
ignoring on other occasions.231  Quiet discomfort recently
turned into open obstruction, when the Court dusted off the
commerce clause to strike down a federal statute criminalizing
gun possession, in this case gun possession near a school.
3 2
' United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
23' Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998) (guns); Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600 (1994) (guns); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (food
stamps); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (guns).
231 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
232 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Still, the Court's occasional resistance to the expansion of
federal criminal law, and of federal criminal possession law in
particular, should not be mistaken for unwillingness to further
the crime war effort in general. The war on crime, after all, is
not being fought with federal law alone, and even the federal
arsenal of possession offenses is hardly depleted by the loss of
an offense as inconsequential as the prohibition of gun posses-
sion near a school. Who needs a federal offense like that if a
state offense of simple drug possession, anywhere and anytime,
calls for a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of pa-
role?
233
And if the state sentence is not enough, the coordination of
state and federal crime suppression, combined with the inappli-
cability of double jeopardy to punishment by separate sover-
eigns, allows for the extension of incapacitation, if necessary.
The Court has done its share to facilitate this coordination, as
illustrated by the recent case of United States v. Gonzales.23 4 A
popular federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), provides that "any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm ... shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime ... be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment of not less than 5 years .... The statute further
specifies that "no term of imprisonment imposed on a person
under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person."
Gonzales and two others had been sentenced in state court
to prison terms from thirteen to seventeen years for drug of-
fenses and having pulled guns on undercover officers during a
"drug sting operation." While in state prison, they were indicted in
federal court for the same conduct and convicted, once more, of drug
offenses-including possession-and of "using firearms during and
in relation" to those crimes in violation of section 924(c). There, they
"received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months in prison, of
which 60 months reflected the mandatory sentence required for their
firearms convictions." The Tenth Circuit held that the sixty
months for the firearms offenses could run concurrently, rather
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
23 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (emphasis added).
, s 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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than consecutively, to the defendants' state and federal sen-
tences for the drug offenses.
236
The Supreme Court reversed, however, deciding that Con-
gress meant what it said when it provided that a 924(c) sentence
shall not run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,
whether imposed by a state or a federal court. As a result, the
federal-state collaboration in this case resulted in an additional
five-year period of incapacitation for three "drug offenders" who
had threatened federal officers.
Gonzales and his partners in crime, however, got off easy.
In its current form, section 924(c) mandates not only a five-year
minimum sentence for gun possession during a drug or violent
crime, but also a twenty-five year minimum sentence for "a second
or subsequent conviction under this subsection."27 That sec-
ond conviction, however, can result from the same plea agree-
ment (or trial, should there be one). Enterprising Assistant U.S.
Attorneys fighting the war on crime therefore can dramatically
expand 924(c)'s incapacitative potential-six-fold, from five to
thirty years-by tying the possession of a single weapon to dif-
ferent counts arising out of a single drug transaction, such as
distribution and possession. The first five years would be for
possessing a gun in connection with the drug offense of distribu-
tion, and the second twenty-five for possessing the same gun in
connection with the drug offense of possession. And that manda-
tory thirty-year sentence would be tacked onto whatever other
sentence the court imposed for the two drug offenses (distribu-
tion and possession), on top of any state sentence imposed for the
same offenses, as Gonzales found out. In a recent case out of
Rochester, New York, this multiple possession bootstrapping
strategy (from drug possession to gun possession to second gun
possession (of the same gun)) netted the prosecutor a sentence
of 477 months, or roughly forty years.23 8
When the Supreme Court does resolve an issue in a way that
might be perceived as interfering with the executive flexibility
required for an effective anti-crime campaign, Congress steps in
to iron out the wrinkles. In Gonzales, the drug offenders were
charged with "using" a gun. In an earlier case, Bailey v. United
States, the Supreme Court had decided, quite sensibly but
United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 1 (1997).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (C) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
238 See Clauss & Ovsiovitch, supra note 66, at 38.
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against several circuits, that "mere" possession didn't amount to
"use" for purposes of section 924(c).239 Congress quickly cor-
rected this misunderstanding by amending section 924(c) ex-
plicitly to include "any person who, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... , in further-
ance of any such crime, possesses afirearr," thus at the same time
re-elevating possession to its proper status in the war on crime
and rendering the old "uses or carries" clause superfluous.
240
The declaration that "possession" wasn't "use" under section
924(c) didn't mean that possession alone wouldn't result in a
higher sentence. This two-track approach to the significance of
gun possession in drug offenses, denying it on the one hand
while affirming it on the other, was made possible by another
important prong of the war on crime, the federal sentencing
guidelines, which helped coordinate the crime war, both within
the federal system and without, and gave its incapacitative
measures the necessary bite. For already at the time of Bailey,
the relevant sentencing guideline provided for a two-level en-
hancement for drug offenses, including possession with intent
and simple possession, "Ji]f a dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was possessed.,
2
The mandatory federal sentencing guidelines made a com-
prehensive federal war on crime possible by keeping federal
judges in line, some of whom might have been tempted to blunt
the incapacitative blow of particular provisions. And the Su-
preme Court significantly enhanced the guidelines' coordinat-
ing potential, by first upholding the guidelines against a host of
constitutional attacks and then declaring their every word, from
guidelines to policy statements to commentary, to constitute
binding authority on the federal courts.242
The federal guidelines, however, also contributed to the war
effort beyond the borders of federal criminal law. They helped
initiate, and backed by federal grants significantly shaped, a na-
tional move toward determinate sentencing. Even if the federal
23 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences for Firearms Violations, 105-386, 112
Stat. 3469 (1998) (emphasis added).
241 U.S. SENTENciNG GuiDEUN S MANuAL §§ 2D1.1 (b) (1), 2D2.1 (b) (1) (2000).
242 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (commentary); Williams v.
United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992) (policy statement); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989).
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guidelines themselves could not be exported to the states for
the simple reason that federal law differed from state law, their
concept of controlling judicial sentencing authority could be,
and was. As a result, not only the federal government, but also
state governments, could implement their crime war initiatives
without undue interference from the judiciary, no matter how
timid and sporadic.
The federal guidelines, however, were not only mandatory.
They also were Draconian. The elimination of parole alone-
under the heading of "honesty in sentencing"--dramatically ex-
panded the incapacitative potential of existing criminal law.
The guidelines created a criminal law behind, or rather be-
neath, the criminal law, a system of punishment that operated
beyond constitutional constraints. They reflected a general shift
from the law of crimes to the law of punishments, from convic-
tion to sentencing. In this system, the precise nature of the of-
fense of conviction mattered less and less, and sentence
enhancements mattered more and more. What a defendant was
convicted of became less important than the fact that he was
convicted of something, which then marked him for incapacita-
tion to the greatest extent possible. That extent in turn was de-
termined by sentence enhancements, chief among them
enhancements for gun possession.
C. POSSESSION PLUS
Section 924(c), the federal sentence premium for gun pos-
session in furtherance of a "drug trafficking crime" (including
possession) as well as of "any crime of violence," merely illus-
trates a more general incapacitative strategy of using possession
indirectly to increase the incapacitative potential of a given con-
viction. In this indirect use, gun possession in particular en-
sures that dangerous offenders stay off the street longer than
they otherwise would have.
As we have seen, the versatility of possession as an instru-
ment of threat suppression is remarkable. So far we have fo-
cused on one application of possession offenses, their direct use
as the offense of arrest and conviction, even if it is only as the
fall back velcro charge that always sticks, for the simple reason
that possession is as easy to detect as it is to prove. Possession,




The most obvious indirect use of possession is as an aggravat-
ing or predicate element in another offense or as a sentence
premium, which amounts to the same thing: the fact of posses-
sion increases the incapacitative potential of the underlying of-
fense. This technique is particularly popular in the case of gun
possession. Our modern statute books overflow with offenses
whose severity is enhanced by the addition of proof-either at
trial or at sentencing--of gun possession. For instance, the
original federal carjacking statute was defined in terms of gun
possession: "Whoever, possessing a firearm . ., takes a motor
vehicle .... ,,243 In New York, one variety of first degree trespass
requires that the offender "[p]ossesses, or knows that another
participant in the crime possesses, an explosive or a deadly
weapon."244 "Felon in Possession of a Firearm," a federal felony,
is among the predicate offenses that can add up to a RICO vio-
lation.24  And the federal sentencing guidelines provide for
harsher sentences in cases of minor assault ("if a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed and its use was
threatened"246) and stalking ("possession, or threatened use, of
a dangerous weapon"247).
In general, legislatures prefer to use gun possession as a
sentence enhancement, rather than as an offense element.
That way, the prosecutor can make full use of the incapacitative
potential of possession without having to establish it under the
burden of proof at trial (beyond a reasonable doubt), should
there be a trial. Instead, the judge can enhance the sentence af-
ter conviction, or more likely a guilty plea, upon a showing of
possession by a mere preponderance of the evidence. In 1986,
the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this circumvention of
constitutional constraints on criminal lawmaking, in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,248 showing remarkable deference to the legisla-
23 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999) (quoting old 18 U.S.C. § 2119
(1988 & Supp. V)).
244 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.17(1) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
141 People v. Cantarella, 606 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
'6 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUINES MANUAL § 2A2.3(a) (1) (2000).
247 Id. § 2A6.2(b) (1) (C).
248 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (sentence enhancement for "visi-
ble possession of a firearm").
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ture's classification of gun possession as a sentencing factor,
rather than as an offense element, in the process.
Possession offenses serve to extend--or replenish-the in-
capacitative potential of convictions (which of course may be for
possession offenses themselves, as in the case of drug possession
under section 924(c)) not only at sentencing, but also at later
points in the life of a person who has been marked as a threat to
society. Most immediately, possession offenses are used to po-
lice-and if possible, to further incapacitate-persons under
supervised release (parole and probation), four million by last
count. Federal law, for instance, mandates the revocation of
supervised release if a "defendant... possesses a controlled sub-
stance ... [or] possesses a firearm... in violation of Federal
law, or otherwise violates a condition of supervised release pro-
hibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm ... .249
Next and most intrusively, possession offenses play an im-
portant role in the policing of the-roughly two million-peo-
ple under supervised nonrelease, prison inmates. In prison, the
prohibition of possession-as a matter of prison discipline-
helps complete the incapacitation of human threats during
their period of incarceration and, if necessary, allows the
extension of that period-as a matter of criminal law. Prisoners
are considered so dangerous that they are presumptively
prohibited from possessing anything. In the hands of a prison
inmate, anything is a dangerous weapon. A prison inmate
cannot be trusted to possess the most innocuous items,
including toothbrushes, coat hangers, and radio antennas.
(Possessing telescoping radio antennas, for example, is
forbidden "because they might be turned into 'zip guns.' By
inserting a bullet into the base of an extended antenna and
then quickly compressing it, an inmate could fire the inaccurate
but still potentially deadly gun.")2 0 Anything in the possession
of a prison inmate, through mere association with this human
threat, becomes tainted. That taint can only be removed by an
affirmative license granted by the administrator of the prison,
the prison police.
Prison management is threat management. And the first
line of defense against prisoner-threats is the prohibition of pos-
-9 18 U.S.C. § 358 3 (g) (1994 & Supp. 1999); see also Spencer v. Kernna, 523 U.S. 1
(1998).
20 TED CONOVER, NEWJAcx: GUARDING SING SING 97 (2000).
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session, except as permitted by the prison police. As Ted
Conover reports, prisoners at Sing Sing:
[T]hey couldn't possess clothing in any of the colors reserved for offi-
cers: gray, black, blue, and orange. They couldn't possess cash, cassette
players with a record function, toiletries containing alcohol, sneakers
worth more than fifty dollars, or more than fourteen newspapers. The
list was very long--so long, in fact, that the authors of Standards of Inmate
Behavior found it easier to define what was permitted than what wasn't.
Contraband was sirnly "any article that is not authorized by the Superinten-
dent or [his] designee." I
As with their analogues in the outside world, however, these
prison possession prohibitions are violated every minute of
every day. In fact, the more categorical a possession prohibition
gets-and it can't get any more categorical than that applied to
prisoners-the less categorical its enforcement tends to be-
come. In Sing Sing, for example, where Conover worked as a
prison guard, guards were as likely to violate the possession
prohibitions applying to them as prisoners were to violate their
own. In prison, guards were barred from possessing "glass con-
tainers, chewing gum, pocket knives with blades longer than two
inches, newspapers, magazines, beepers, cell phones, or... our
own pistols or other weapons." 252 The reason for this prohibi-
tion was, once again, the constant threat personified by the pris-
oners, rather than by the guards themselves: "A glass container,
such as a bottle ofjuice, might be salvaged from the trash by an
inmate and turned into shards for weapons."25 3 Plus, smoking
was prohibited indoors, whether by inmates or guards. But, ac-
cording to Conover, officers didn't pay much attention to these
rules: "[P]Ilenty of officers smoked indoors. Many chewed gum.
The trash cans of wall towers were stuffed with newspapers and
magazines."
254
Needless to say, prisoners found it even more difficult, if not
downright impossible, to comply with the far stricter possession
rules that applied to them. Again, Conover learned that con-
traband, in "its most obvious forms-weapons, drugs, and alco-
hol-could all be found fairly readily inside prison. 255  As a
2I Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added).








result, enforcing the possession prohibition against inmates be-
came a matter of discretion. Guards knew that they could write
up any prisoner for illegal possession of one item or another
any time they decided to "look[] for contraband during pat-
frisks of inmates and during random cell searches."2 6 Posses-
sion violations thus became a convenient and flexible way of en-
forcing discipline, a trump card that could be drawn when
needed to recommend to the "adjustment committee"257 that an
obstreperous inmate receive more intensive incapacitative
treatment, perhaps by transferring him to the "special housing
unit."
If necessary or convenient, possession violations could blos-
som into possession offenses. Possession of certain items by a
prisoner is, after all, not merely a matter of prison discipline,
but a matter of criminal law, an issue not only for the adjust-
ment committee, but for a criminal court. Possession of a dan-
gerous weapon by a prisoner is a serious offense; so is drug
possession-as one might expect, prisoners are not among the
privileged or licensed few who are exempted from the general
prohibition of possessing such dangerous items. Some prison
guards are. 25  Possession of weapons or drugs, therefore, can
land a prisoner not only in solitary. It can also extend his stay in
prison.259
The possession police, however, doesn't end with the period
of penal supervision, carceral or not. Certain possession of-
fenders, in particular those labeled "felons," will find themselves
back in prison even after their supervised release or nonrelease
has ended. These felon-in-possession offenses have proved par-
ticularly powerful and popular police possession devices. They
extend the period of possession police far beyond the period of
punishment. Once a person has been marked a danger, a felon,
he will be subject to police through possession no matter where
he might be, and no matter how unsupervised he might be in
theory.
We saw earlier how the federal-state war on crime, under
the codename "Project Exile," uses the Draconian federal felon-
2-6Id. at 105.
2 Id. at 106.
258 N.Y. PENA, LAW § 265.20(2) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
219 See U.S. SENTnCING GuInEuINEs MANUAL § 2P1.2 (2000) (Providing or Possess-
ing Contraband in Prison); 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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in-possession statute to take released felons back off the
streets. 26  With the right felony priors, mere possession of a
firearm will land a "felon" (as opposed to an "ex-felon") in
prison for at least fifteen years.26 1 And, thanks to "honesty in
sentencing," a fifteen-year sentence in federal prison means
what it says. Finding felons in possession, however, can be as
easy as pulling someone over for rolling through a stop sign.
The felon-in-possession statute gives the police terrific incapaci-
tative bang for their investigative buck.
2. Presumption
But possession, indirectly employed, does more than aggra-
vate the incapacitative treatment of those marked as "convicts";
it also facilitates the marking itself. We've already seen how pos-
session can be established with the help of evidentiary presump-
tions, which shift the burden of proof onto the alleged
possessor. So presence quickly transforms itself into possession,
unless the person present comes forward with a satisfactory ex-
planation of his presence that blocks the transformation.
262
But possession itself may function as presumptive evidence
of another offense: it can be the source, as well as the target, of
a presumptive inference. This presumption can either be ex-
plicit or implicit, and either backward- or forward-looking.
Among the explicit variety are-retrospective-presump-
tions of illegal acquisition, including importation, manufacture,
transfer, even larceny.2 63 Moving ah4ead in time, possession may
be taken-concurrently-as presumptive evidence of knowing
possession (knowing that and knowing what) ,264 and then-pro-
spectively-as presumptive evidence of possession with intent to
2" See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
261 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 1999); id. § 924(e)(1) (15 year minimum);
U.S. SENTENCING GtiDE uEs MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2000).
262 See, e.g., County Court of Ulster Co. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
263 See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (possession of stolen property as
presumptive evidence of larceny); see also Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 10, at 754
(possession of stolen property as presumptive evidence of larceny); RichardJ. Bonnie
& Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry
Into the Legal Histoiy of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1086 (1970).
24 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.55, 170.71, 225.35 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001);
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (possession of stolen property as pre-
sumptive evidence of knowledge that property was stolen); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §
265.15(5) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) (defacement).
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use, where the nature of the use may or may not be further
specified,265 and in some cases both at the same time.266 Pre-
sumptions of this sort are underhanded attempts to reduce sim-
ple possession offenses to strict liability offenses and compound
possession offenses to simple possession offenses, or both.
Possession presumptions have become less significant since
legislatures figured out that they can get away with criminalizing
possession outright, and attach severe penalties to its "commis-
sion." In that case, there is no reason to have the prosecutor
waste time establishing both possession and some ultimate fact
which may be presumed from the possession, especially when
the Supreme Court has scrutinized possession-based presump-
tions, but not the outright proscription of possession.
26
The more interesting case of possession as presumption, as
opposed to possession as presumed, is that of an implicit pre-
sumption. This phenomenon goes to the heart of the posses-
sion offense for two reasons. First, it brings out the inchoate
nature of possession. One way of thinking of possession of-
fenses is to view them as criminalized presumptions of some
other offense. In criminalizing possession, the legislature really
criminalizes import, manufacture, purchase. Or forward-
looking, the legislature really criminalizes use, sale, or export. In
the latter variety, the prospective presumption resembles an im-
plicit inchoate offense. So possession really is an attempt to use,
sell, or export, or more precisely, possession is an attempt to at-
tempt to use, sell, or export, that is, an inchoate inchoate of-
fense. Some courts have even recognized the offenses of
attempted possession26 8 and conspiracy to possess,269 which adds
an explicit inchoacy layer to the two implicit ones inherent in
26 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 158.00 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) (possession
of five or more public benefit cards presumptive evidence of intent to use them for
fraudulent purposes); id. § 265.15(4) (unlawful use of explosive substance); id. §
270.00(2) (c) (sale of fireworks); id. § 270.05(3) (use of noxious material)); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.06 (1985) ("purpose to employ [weapon] criminally").
265 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 170.27, 235.10 (McKinney 2000).
- Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.63 (1969).
2 People v. Saunders, 648 N.E.2d 1331 (N.Y. 1995) (attempted weapon posses-
sion).
26 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (1938) (Hand, J.) (conspiracy to possess
counterfeit money); see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspir-
acy to possess liquor).
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the concept of possession, resulting in an inchoate inchoate in-
choate offense, a triple inchoacy.
Second, the implicit presumption inherent in the concept
of a possession offense reveals the modus operandi of possession,
the secret of its success as a policing tool beyond legal scrutiny.
Possession succeeds because it removes all potentially trouble-
some features to the level of legislative or executive discretion,
an area that is notoriously difficult to scrutinize. In its design
and its application, possession is, in doctrinal terms, a doubly
inchoate offense, one step farther from the actual infliction of
personal harm than ordinary inchoate offenses like attempt. In
practical terms, it is an offense designed and applied to remove
dangerous individuals even before they have had an opportunity
to manifest their dangerousness in an ordinary inchoate of-
fense. On its face, however, it does not look like an inchoate of-
fense, nor does it look like a threat reduction measure targeting
particular types of individuals.
D. THE NEW VAGRANCY
It is this sub rosa quality of possession that helps set it apart
from its predecessor, vagrancy. Prior to the advent of possession
police, vagrancy laws fulfilled a similar sweeping function. Yet,
in comparison to possession, vagrancy laws are the blunt tools of
oppression wielded by a state unsophisticated in the science of
police control as public hygiene. Blessed with all the defini-
tional flexibility and executory convenience of vagrancy, posses-
sion is superior to vagrancy in at least three respects.
1. Reach: Privacy! What Privacy?
Possession's first advantage is that it is not a public offense;
unlike vagrancy, it can be committed in private as well as in pub-
lic. This means that the state, through a suspicion of possession,
gains entry into the home of suspected danger sources or, while
there, can detect evidence of possession. As we have seen, po-
lice officers are very good at finding illegally possessed items "in
plain view" whenever they enter a residence or get a look inside
a car for one reason or another.
This is the beauty of possession as a police instrument: any-
one can possess anything anywhere anytime and does possess
something anywhere anytime. Especially if one expansively de-
fines possession to include constructive possession, the crimi-
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nalization of possession presumptively criminalizes everyone
everywhere. The ideal police environment therefore is the
prison, where the possession of anything is presumptively for-
bidden and, not by accident, the private sphere no longer ex-
ists.270
So far, the first amendment appears to be the only constitu-
tional barrier to a comprehensive possession police crossing the
traditional-and traditionally impenetrable-border between
public and private, the wall surrounding the proverbial home
that is also my castle. In 1969, the Supreme Court declared
categorically that the "private possession of obscene material
may not be punished. " 27 But, as the Court made very clear, that
doesn't mean that there is anything wrong with "mak[ing] the
[private or public] possession of other itemg, such as narcotics,
firearms, or stolen goods, a crime," because "[n]o First
Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere
possession criminal." So, when in 1986 the Supreme Court up-
held Georgia's criminal sodomy statute, it made no difference
that the statute proscribed private as well as public conduct:
"Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal
drugs, do not escape the law where they are committed at
home."
272
The use of possession offenses to extend police regimes into
the private sphere has a long tradition. Already the first English
Metropolitan Police Courts Act of 1839 included not only sev-
eral possession offenses, such as the possession of "instruments
for unlawfully procuringz and carrying away wine,"273 and of
loaded guns on ships,27 but also authorized police officers to
enter and search private homes "in case of information given
that there is reasonable cause for suspecting that any stolen
goods are concealed in a dwelling house."275 At about the same
time in the American South, white slave patrols were authorized
to rummage through the houses of blacks in search of illegally
possessed weapons.276 A few years later, American prohibition-
2
70 See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
2 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.1l (1969).
- 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. 557).
273An Act for regulating the Police Courts in the Metropolis, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c.
71, § 30 (Eng.).
SId. § 36.
"'Id. §§ 24, 25.
26 See infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
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ary legislation backed up its criminalization of the possession of
liquor by equipping local law enforcement officers with exten-
sive powers to search private homes and confiscate illegally pos-
sessed liquor.
277
In the contemporary United States, the irrelevance of pri-
vacy in the policing of possession as an incapacitation strategy
generally remains a hidden, and therefore all the more conven-
ient, feature of the war on crime. Occasionally, however, a legis-
lature makes it explicit. So, in the year 2000, a Connecticut law
authorized police to enter private homes to seize legally pos-
sessed guns based on a finding that the possessor might be
"dangerous" to himself or others. Searches and confiscations
under the law are not based on the commission of an offense of
any kind, but on other evidence of dangerousness. So, in one
recent case, a Connecticut man found his mother's home
searched and his legally possessed guns seized on the basis of al-
legations made by two of his neighbors "that they'd had disputes
with him and had observed him with a gun at his side.
'"278
2. Convenience and Permanence: The Velcro Offense
Possession offenses also are far more efficient than the
clunky toothless vagrancy statutes of old; they give law enforce-
ment officials much more bang for their buck. Penalties for va-
grancy paled in comparison to those for possession. Although
vagrants might be imprisoned for short terms, vagrancy laws
were most important in low level and continuous police harass-
ment of undesirables. Already in colonial Virginia, we learn
that:
[V]ery few cases appear in the County Court records of Virginia of per-
sons brought in solely for vagrancy .... But when a person was brought
before the County Court for some other offense-a petty theft, for ex-
ample-the fact that he was a vagabond might make the punishment a
little more severe; or it might serve as an excuse for administein a
whipping in case the other charge could not be completely proved.
27 See WnwiAm J. NovAy, THE PEoPLE's WFAR: LAW & REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERcIA 178-81 (1996) (discussing Maine's 1851 Act for the
Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops and its progeny).
278 Nancy Cohen, New Law in Connecticut Allows Police to Seize Guns from People They
Believe to Be Dangerous, Even Wen No Crime Has Been Committed, All Things Considered,
NAT'L PUB. RADio,Jan. 18, 2000.
279 Scorr, supra note 38, at 273-74.
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And Christopher Tiedeman colorfully described how vagrancy
laws were used in late nineteenth century America to harass,
and "warn out," the dangerous classes:
Avery large part of the duties of the police in all civilized countries is the
supervision and control of the criminal classes, even when there are no
specific charges of crime lodged against them. A suspicious character
appears in some city, and is discovered by the police detectives. He
bears upon his countenance the indelible stamp of criminal propensity,
and he is arrested. There is no charge of crime against him. He may
never have committed a crime, but he is arrested on the charge of va-
grancy, and since by the ordinary vagrant acts the burden is throwM
upon the defendant to disprove the accusation, it is not difficult in most
cases to fasten on him the offense of vagrancy, particularly as such char-
acters will usually prefer to plead guilty, in order to avoid, if possible, a
too critical examination into their mode of life. But to punish him for
vagrancy is not the object of his arrest. The police authorities had, with
an accuracy of judgment only to be acquired by a long experience with
the criminal classes, determined that he was a dangerous character, and
the magistrate, in order to rid the town of his presence, threatens to
send him to jail for vagrancy if he does not leave the place within twenty-
four hours. In most cases, the person thus summarily dealt with has
been already convicted of some crime, is known as a confirmed criminal,
and his photograph has a place in the "rogues' gallery." '
Equipped with an arsenal of possession offenses, today's law
enforcement official has no reason to confine himself to expel-
ling dangerous elements, knowing full well that they may soon
find their way back into town. Now he can incapacitate them
through substantial prison terms, after a summary process that
will take little more of his time. Today's possessor faces not the
choice between a short stay in jail and hitting the road. Instead
he finds himself choosing between pleading to a five year prison
term and taking the chance of spending the rest of his life be-
hind bars after a jury trial, where the deck is stacked in the
state's favor.
28 1
3. Impunity: The Teflon Offense
Most important, possession is far less susceptible to legal
challenges than vagrancy. Vagrancy had been the police sweep
offense of choice for centuries until vagrancy statutes began to
2
10 CHPISTOPHER G. TIEDF.MAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMlITATIONS OF POuCE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIvIL AND CRMINAL STAN'DPOINT § 49, at
124 (1886).
28' See supra notes 67-116 and accompanying text.
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run into constitutional trouble in the 1960s. Vagrancy statutes
were too explicit in their criminalization of status without any
particular criminal act and in their delegation of interpretive
discretion to frontline police officers. So courts began to strike
down vagrancy statutes targeting "disorderly persons," or even
"suspicious persons," which gave free reign to police officers
and their fellow "criminal administrators," sympathetic local
magistrates and justices of the peace, to cleanse their commu-
nity of undesirables, among whom one could find a dispropor-
tionate percentage of racial minorities, poor people, and other
outsiders.
Historically, twentieth century American vagrancy laws had
replaced even more obvious and oppressive attempts to dispose
of undesirables. While, according to a study by Eric Foner,
"most provisions" of the Black Codes passed by Southern legisla-
tures immediately following emancipation "were quickly voided
by the army or Freemen's Bureau, or invalidated by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866," the vagrancy statutes remained in force,
presumably because they were racially neutral, at least on their
face. Thus immunized from legal challenges, they could fulfill
their function of policing newly freed blacks in the field. As
Foner points out, "[w]hat is critical is the manner of their en-
forcement, and in the South of 1865 and 1866, with judicial and
police authority in the hands of the planter class and its friends,
impartial administration was an impossibility. Many southern
vagrancy laws, in fact, contained no reference to race. But as
John W. DuBose, the Alabama planter and Democratic politico
later remarked, "the vagrant contemplated was the plantation,,282
negro.
The vagrancy laws' immunity survived for another hundred
years, when they themselves fell prey to judges who were willing
to look behind the abstract letter of the law to its meaning on
the streets. Possession offenses represent the next generation of
general police measures. They make no reference to race or any
other suspect classification. In fact, they make no explicit refer-
ence to any sort of status. By contrast, vagrancy statutes
brimmed with descriptions of types, rather than of acts, which-
given the act requirement in criminal law-invited scrutiny.
Their objective was to define not vagrant acts, but vagrants.




Those who fit the definition were not convicted of vagrancy, but
"deemed vagrants." Take, for example, the Florida vagrancy
statute eventually invalidated by the Supreme Court in the 1972
case of Papachristou v. City ofJacksonviU
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawvful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pick-
pockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,
keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wan-
dering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful pur-
pose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting
all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of i fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants...283 g
A statute as broad and rambling as this, straining to capture
the image of disagreeable people, even looks like the sweep it is
obviously designed to facilitate. It bespeaks the very irrationality
and arbitrariness it attempts to justify.
It didn't help matters that the pedigree of these statutes was
fraught with arbitrary and thinly veiled oppression. This history
extended past the post-Civil War Black Codes through colonial
America and the complex English system of poor police of the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century and eventually
to the first English poor laws of the fourteenth century. The
new colonies took up the task of policing vagrants almost im-
mediately. The establishment and refinement of the vagrancy
regime in colonial Virginia may serve as an illustration:
In 1672 the Assembly found it necessary to order that the English laws
against vagrants should be strictly enforced. The chief of these laws was
the 39 Eliz., chapter 4 (1597), which permitted the erection of houses of
correction in any county, and directed that rogues and vagabonds were
to be whipped by order of ajustice, constable, or tithingman, and sent to
their own parishes, there to be put in the house of correction until em-
ployment was found for them, or until they were banished. The law of 1
James I, chapter 7 (1604), provided that incorrigible and dangerous
rogues might by order of the justices be branded in the shoulder with
the letter R ... The English statute 17 Geo. 1H, chapter 5, repealed the
earlier laws on vagrancy, and went on to provide for the punishment of
idle and disorderly persons, vagabonds, and incorrigible rogues. It was
mJACSONVnLE, FLa., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57, quoted in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.1 (1972).
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from this statute that the Assembly copied extensively in 1748 .... The
law defined vagabonds, and provided that they were to be taken by war-
rant before ajustice, who might order them whipped from constable to
constable like runaways, until they reached the parish in which their
families last resided. At that point the local justices were to take a bond
that the delinquents would find work. Failing 2tis, the next County
Court might bind such persons to work for a year.
Efforts to control this dangerous class continued uninter-
rupted and virtually unchanged through the nineteenth cen-
tury, and were by no means confined to the South, as an
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court upholding a vagrancy stat-
ute in the year 1900 makes very clear:
The act in question undertakes to define a tramp, or vagrant, by stating
what acts shall constitute such character. It is, in the main, the old
method of describing a vagrant, and vagrancy, time out of mind, has
been deemed a condition calling for special statutory provisions, i.e.,
such as may tend to suppress the mischief and protect society. These
provisions rest upon the economic truth that industry is necessary for
the preservation of society, and that he who, being able to work, and not
able otherwise to support himself, deliberately plans to e i t by the labor
of others, is an enemy to society and to the commonwealth.
Possession offenses not only avoid explicitly criminalizing
types, they also steer clear of criminalizing facially innocent
conduct, such as the "wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object," which drew such
derision from the Supreme Court in Papachristou.
2 s6
Compared to the bumbling vagrancy laws which, on their
face, looked as suspicious as the types they described, possession
offenses look very much like modem criminal statutes. On their
face, one finds no description of types and no reference to
status, no awkward definition of facially innocent conduct, and,
in fact, no definition of conduct of any kind.
So possession is, on the face of it, neither a status offense
nor a conduct offense. As a result, it is immune against all chal-
lenges. It is the phantom offense of modem American criminal
law, everywhere yet nowhere, an offense so flexible that it no
longer is an offense, but a scheme, a means of surreptitiously
expanding the reach of existing criminal prohibitions, of trans-
forming them into instruments of incapacitation. Neither fish
, 8 ScoTr, supra note 38, at 273-74.
25 State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (Ohio 1900) (emphasis added).
286 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
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nor foul, possession is sui generis, the general part of criminal
law as police control of undesirables, the paradigmatic modem
police offense.
To appreciate its function, and the complexity of its opera-
tion, one must scratch the surface of this apparently bland, yet
ubiquitous and potent offense. So far we have taken the first
step toward understanding possession by identifying it as a phe-
nomenon. Normally, the offense goes about its work unnoticed
as it disappears in its myriad particular manifestations. So, dis-
cussions of the "legalization" of drugs as a rule ignore the tech-
nique by which drugs are "criminalized." But the
criminalization of drugs means the criminalization of their pos-
session. Similarly, any debate about gun "control" always also is
a debate about possession offenses.
Once the teflon layer has been stripped away, possession
emerges as an offense that closely resembles its predecessor, va-
grancy, in substance, if not in form. Possession does what va-
grancy did, only better and behind a legitimate facade.
4. Behind the Fapade
Let us begin with the obvious. Possession is not a conduct
offense. As commentators have pointed out for centuries, pos-
session is not an act, it is a state of being, a status.287 To possess
something is to be in possession of it.
To dismiss possession simply on the ground that it violates
the so-called act requirement of Anglo-American criminal law,
however, would be premature. The act requirement, from the
outset, applied to common law offenses only, i.e., to offenses
that traced their origins back through a grand chain of common
law precedents, rather than to a specific statute that created a
new offense. Certainly the concept of common law offenses was
malleable, so that judges had some discretion in treating a par-
ticular offense as a common law or as a statutory offense. That's
not the point here, however. The point is that English judges
from very early on threw out possession indictments as violative
of the act requirement only if they alleged a common law offense
of possession, rather than invoked a statutory possession provi-
sion. Once it was settled that the possession indictment was
brought under one of the increasing number of possession stat-
2" E.g., Regina v. Dugdale, 1 El. & BI. 435, 439 (1853) (Coleridgej.).
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utes, the common law's act requirement was no longer an is-
sue.288 The act requirement was as irrelevant to statutory gos-
session as the mens rea requirement was to "statutory" rape.
The common law's act requirement, therefore, does not
stand in the way of modem possession statutes. And the thin
slice of the act requirement constitutionalized by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the (decidedly pre-crime war) 1962 case of
Robinson v. California90 also can do little, by itself, to challenge
possession offenses. The constitutional act requirement merely
prohibits the criminalization of addiction in particular, and of
sickness in general (or at least "having a common cold").291
Possession doesn't criminalize an illness, at least not directly.
The Supreme Court in Robinson went out of its way to reassure
legislatures that they remained free to "impose criminal sanc-
tions . . against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription,
sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics."
292
Then there is the general uneasiness regarding omission of-
fenses characteristic of American criminal law. Absent a clear
duty to act, the failure to act is not criminal. If possession isn't
an act, perhaps one should think of it as an omission, the omis-
sion to get rid of the item one possesses.293 But what is the duty
that compels me to drop the shiny new pistol that my friend has
just bought himself at the local gun store, or to toss out the bag-
gie of cocaine I noticed in the glove compartment of my rental
car? If one looked hard enough, perhaps one could find such a
duty nestled in the criminalization of a possession that is de-
fined as the failure to end it. But the point of requiring a spe-
cific duty for omission liability, the significance of the general
unwillingness to criminalize omission, is precisely to reject omis-
sion liability absent specific and unambiguous provisions to the
contrary. Still, by itself, the disfavored status of omissions does
not imply rejecting possession liability.
288 See, e.g., Rex v. Lennard, 1 Leach 90 (1772) (applying An Act for the better pre-
venting the counterfeiting the current coin of this kingdom, 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26
(Eng.)).
289 SeeRegina v. Prince, 2 L.R. Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
SRobinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
298 Id. at 667.
29 Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
293 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(2)
(McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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And the same could be said about the abandonment of an-
other ironclad principle of Anglo-American criminal law, mens
rea. Some possession offenses, after all, do away not only with
the-even ironcladder-requirement of an actus reus, but also
the requirement of criminal intent.294 If this absence of mens
rea alone would condemn possession offenses to illegitimacy,
the bulk of modem American criminal law would suffer the
same fate.
Finally, as discussed earlier on, one might try to domesticate
possession offenses by categorizing them as kinds of inchoate
offenses. To pick a familiar example, the simple possession of
certain large quantities of drugs can be seen as an attempt to
sell them. Possession in this case would be a kind of inchoate
inchoate offense, an attempted attempt, perhaps. Inchoate li-
ability, however, much like omission liability, is disfavored in
traditional Anglo-American law and therefore limited to cases
where the offender acted with the specific intent to bring about
the proscribed harm. But, by definition, that intent is missing
in a simple possession offense, as opposed to a compound pos-
session offense, which requires proof of an intent to use the ob-
ject possessed in one way or another. Punishing simple
possession as a quasi inchoate offense, therefore, would violate
the general rule that inchoate liability requires specific intent.
As nineteenth century cases emphasized again and again, in
terms reminiscent of the theory of attempt liability, it was the in-
tent to use the objects in a proscribed way that justified criminal-
izing compound possession, not the possession itself: "The
offense consists not in the possession of [adulterated] milk...
but in the intent to sell or exchange" it.2 95 Lacking this all-
important intent element, the prohibition of simple possession
obviously could not avail itself of this justification.
Now the point of this litany of difficulties is not to suggest
that any or each of them taken individually exposes the illegiti-
macy of possession offenses. Instead, we learn two things from
this quick diagnosis. First, we come to recognize that possession
is sui generis and therefore subject neither to traditional cate-
gories of criminal liability nor to traditional avenues of critique.
Second, and more important, we come to appreciate just how
anxious the modem state is to pursue its incapacitative mission,
29 See, e.g., State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1981).
2-' State v. Smyth, 14 R.L 100, 101 (1883).
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so eager in fact that it is willing to enlist the services of an of-
fense that runs afoul of most, if not all, of the fundamental ten-
ets of traditional American criminal law.
What's more, it is the very fact that possession ignores so
many of the basic rules, even bedrock principles, of traditional
American criminal law, which turns it into such an attractive
weapon in the war on crime. This is so because every substan-
tive principle has its procedural analogue. Without actus reus,
no act needs to be proved. Without mens rea, no evidence of
intent is required. Without omission, there's no need to estab-
lish a duty. Without inchoacy, the prosecutor can do without
proving specific intent. Possession is unclassifiable, it is every-
thing and nothing, an unspecifiable offense for a task best left
unspecified: the control of undesirables.
It is this control function of possession that is most trou-
bling, not its tensions with established principles of criminal law
doctrine. Possession offenses are wolves in sheep's skin, highly
efficient instruments of oppression and discrimination that have
been camouflaged as run-of-the-mill criminal offenses, and
thereby protected against legal challenges and shielded from
public scrutiny.
It is true that, on the surface, possession offenses don't
stand out among the offense definitions in the special part of
our modem criminal codes. They are professionally short and
to the point, in welcome contrast to vagrancy's amateurishly
rambling laundry lists of suspicious types. But, as soon as one
looks beyond the definition of a core possession offense like
"criminal possession of a weapon,"296 what does one see but long
lists, lists of types! These lists take one of two forms: they are ei-
ther lists of the policed 297 or lists of the police.298 The former
are modem versions of the lists of those "deemed to be va-
grants," the latter are lists of those who do the deeming. "Who-
ever" fits a type on the first list may not possess a gun.
"Whoever" fits a type on the second list is not only entitled to
possess a gun, but is exempt from the law criminalizing its pos-
session. The former cannot legally possess a gun, the latter
cannot illegally possess one.
296 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01, 265.20 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001); 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (1)-(11) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
21 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1)-(11) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
2- N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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It turns out that instead of replacing vagrancy's list of types,
a gun possession statute like the one in the New York Penal Law
simply removes the list from the definition of the offense to an-
other, subsidiary, part of the statute. This strategy of burying
the troubling aspect of a criminal statute in the fine print has
proved popular in the war on crime. So, legislatures have been
fond of classifying aggravating factors-including, as we saw ear-
lier, gun possession-as sentencing considerations, thereby in-
sulating these provisions from constitutional attack and, thanks
to the lower burden of proof at sentencing, simplifying their
application, all at once.
Two types appear again and again on the list of dangerous
characters prohibited categorically from possessing a gun: con-
victed felons 299 and aliens. 0 The justification for inclusion of
the former is explicitly based on dangerousness considerations:
Convicted felons are "persons who, by their actions, have dem-
onstrated that they are dangerous, or that they may become
dangerous. Stated simply, they may not be trusted to possess a
firearm without becoming a threat to society."301 Presumably,
aliens too are potential threats to society simply on account of
their outsider status.
"Convicted felons" and "aliens" thus resemble the targets of
vagrancy laws, who also were considered far too dangerous to
possess a gun.302 "The vagrant," as one commentator remarked
in 1886, "has been very appropriately described as the chrysalis
of every species of criminal." 3 Vagrants were members of a
permanent underclass who, by moving about the land without
attachment to a recognized unit of social control, such as a
household, an employer, a school, or a prison, were by their
very nature disobedient, disorderly, and therefore dangerous.
Congregating under bridges and in other hidden places, they
constituted a constant conspiracy against innocent and hard-
working citizens who knew their place in orderly society. They
were a breeding ground of criminality, a menace to society.
' Id. § 265.01 (4) (convicted of a felony or serious offense).
3
- Id. § 265.01(5).
3" 114 Cong. Rec. 14,773 (May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long).
31 State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572 (Ohio 1900) (applying Ohio law prohibiting any
"tramp" from "carrying a firearm, or other dangerous weapon").
313 TIeDaAN, supra note 280, at 124.
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Now the point is not simply that vagrants, like convicted fel-
ons and aliens today, were not allowed to possess guns. The
larger point is that members of these groups are considered by
their nature to be dangerous simply on account of that mem-
bership, without any need to assess their dangerousness indi-
vidually. The prohibition of gun possession is merely
symptomatic of this general classification by type. Those
deemed to be "felons," "aliens," or "vagrants" are inherently
dangerous, and therefore cannot be trusted to possess a gun
without putting it to harmful use. Once a felon, always a felon.
To prohibit not merely possession, but possession by a cer-
tain type of person, is to create a double status offense. To be in
possession is a status. And to be a felon, or alien, or youth, or in-
sane person, in possession is another status. So, a felon in pos-
session is punished for the status of being a "felon" and of being
"in possession." This makes "Felon in Possession of a Firearm..
. the prototypical status offense," as a federal court recently put
it.304
Lumping together felons and aliens in this way may seem
odd, but it is not unusual. Aliens and felons also share other
disqualifications, including the prohibition against voting,
30 5• 07 vot•ng," 0
holding elected office,3 0 6 and serving on juries,7 as judes, as
prosecutors, police officers, prison guards, or wardens. In
other words, since felons and aliens have no say in the making,
application, or enforcement of police regulations or the crimi-
nal law, they consistently find themselves among the policed,
rather than the police, among the objects, rather than the sub-
jects of police. They are, by their nature, excluded from the po-
litical community, outsiders by definition.
One way of thinking about the list of classes whose members
are bound to wreak havoc with a gun is to recognize it as estab-
314 United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. Mass. 1998).
301 N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 5-102, 5-106(2)-(5) (McKinney 1998). See PATRICIA ALLARD &
MARC MAUER, REGAINING THE VOTE, AN ASSESSMENT OF Acmvrr RELATING TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS (2000); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Cititenship,
Criminality and 'The Purity of the Ballot Box,' 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989).
31 SeeAmbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973).
107 N.Y.JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001); cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979).
30 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 513(3) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001) (citizen & good moral
character); seeFoley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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lishing an irrebuttable presumption that anyone matching the
type is not of "good character" and cannot give a "good account
of himself." From this perspective, two key characteristics of
possession offenses clearly emerge, each of which highlights the
similarities between possession- and vagrancy-based police re-
gimes: their incorporation into a comprehensive policing
scheme driven by the discretion of state officials and their heavy
reliance on presumptions of dangerousness, general and spe-
cific.
By the eighteenth century, English vagrancy laws belonged
to a complex scheme for the control of deviants, which began
with sureties and ended with whipping and imprisonment. Ac-
cording to Blackstone, sureties for keeping the peace or for
good behavior were "intended merely for prevention, without
any crime actually committed by the party, but arising only from
a probable suspicion, that some crime is intended or likely to
happen .... ,,30 Any justice of the peace could demand such a
guarantee on his own discretion or at the request of any person
upon "due cause."310 If the bound person violated the condi-
tions of his bond (to keep the peace or to show good behavior),
he forfeited to the king the amount posted. For our purposes,
what is most interesting is the recognizance for good behavior
"towards the king and his people" that applied to "all them that
be not of good fame." Just who fell into this category was up to
the individual justice of the peace. Here is Blackstone's attempt
to illustrate the scope of the limitless concept:
Under the general words of this expression, that be not of good
fame, it is holden that a man may be bound to his good behaviour for
causes of scandal, contra bonos mores, as well as contra pacem; as, for
haunting bawdy houses with women of bad fame; or of keeping such
women in his own house; or for words tending to scandalize the gov-
ernment; or in abuse of the officers ofjustice, especially in the execution
of their office. Thus also ajustice may bind over all night-walkers; eaves-
droppers; such as keep suspicious company, or are reported to be pilfer-
ers or robbers; such as sleep in the day, and wake on the night; common
drunkards; whoremasters; the putative father of bastards; cheats; idle
vagabonds; and other persons, whose misbehavioursmay reasonably
bring them within the general words of the statute ....
3BLACSTONE, supra note 8, at 249.
310 Id. at 250.
311 Id, at 253.
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There was, in other words, substantial overlap between
those subject to regulation by sureties and those in danger of
being classified as vagrants; "idle vagabonds" were explicitly
listed as in need of control through sureties of the peace. In
fact, the vagrancy laws can be seen as a fall-back option, should
the sureties prove unsuccessful. By the eighteenth century, va-
grancy laws grouped vagrants into three categories:3 12 "idle and
disorderly persons" (punished by one month's imprisonment),
"rogues and vagabonds" (whipping & imprisonment up to six
months); and "incorrigible rogues" (whipping & imprisonment
up to two years). The severity of the sanction increased as the
amenability to treatment decreased. While the least serious type
of vagrant retained the title of a "person" with the incidental
qualities of being "idle and disorderly," the more serious types
were defined exclusively by their deviant status: they were
"rogues and vagabonds," rather than persons. Any hope for a
reclassification as a person was lost in the case of the most ag-
gravated type of vagrant, the "incorrigible rogue."
All of these vagrants pose a threat simply through their exis-
tence. They are, in Blackstone's words, "offenders against the
good order, and blemishes in the government, of any king-
dom." 313 As blemishes, they must be removed. Removed they
can be through re-education, or, if they are inherently and unal-
terably deviant, through incapacitation.
The dangerous classes, then, were subject to a three-step po-
lice regime. First came the surety bond, designed to avert the
manifestation of the threat by tying it to conditional financial
loss. Next, for threats so substantial as not to be amenable to
such inducements for self-correction, came the forced correc-
tion through fines, whipping, infamous punishments, or im-
prisonment. And finally, for the incorrigible rogues beyond all
hope of reintegration, there was the prospect of incapacitation
through prolonged and repeated imprisonment. At each level,
a presumption of dangerousness attached upon an initial suspi-
cion of "being not of good fame" or of "being idle or disor-
derly," and could be rebutted by proof to a justice of the peace
who enjoys wide discretion, assuming of course that one's initial
attempt to remove the suspicion of the constable (or concerned
32 Id. at 169-70; Vagrancy Act, 1744, 17 Geo. 2, c. 5 (Eng.).
" BLAcxsroNE, supra note 8, at 170.
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citizen), who enjoyed even wider discretion, proved unsuccess-
ful.
In the case of gun possession offenses, a modem possession
police regime, like New York's, operates much like a full-fledged
vagrancy regime. The criminalization of possession essentially
sets up two presumptions of dangerousness, one rebuttable, the
other not. Gun possession is presumptively illegal.314 It is up to
the state, in its discretion, to grant licenses to those whom it
deems insufficiently dangerous in general, and insufficiently
likely to use a gun to harm others. The state is not required to
issue a gun license to anyone. Gun possession is not a matter of
right, but of grace. For this reason, an applicant for a gun li-
cense also is not entitled to an administrative hearing, though
the state may grant him one, again in its discretion. 16 The pre-
sumption of dangerousness becomes irrebuttable when the in-
dividual has revealed himself to be inherently dangerous, as in
the case of "felons."
But how can an applicant for a gun license remove the pre-
sumption of dangerousness? By convincing a "licensing officer,"
in large cities a member of the police department's license divi-
sion, that he is "of good moral character"!317  And as the Eng-
lish justice of the peace, the state licensing officer enjoys
virtually unlimited discretion in deciding whether the applicant
is or is not "of good fame."318 Felons are by definition not "of
good character;" that's what it means to be a felon. And so are
aliens who, also by definition, have not been found to be "per-
son[s] of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the
good order and happiness of the United States."
319
The use of presumptions, however, is not limited to gun
possession offenses. We already have discussed at some length
the specific evidentiary presumptions emanating from and
"1, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001) ("a person is guilty of
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when ... [h]e possesses any
firearm").
"I Shapiro v. New York City Police Dep't (License Division), 595 N.Y.S.2d 864
(Sup. Ct. 1993).
316 Id.
317 N.Y. PENALLAw § 400.00(1) (a) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
318 Shapiro, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
3 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (3) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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pointing toward possession. 32  The very concept of possession
liability is based on the presumption that the possession of cer-
tain items, by certain people, is inherently dangerous and there-
fore worthy of police investigation, if not of outright
interference by seizing the possessors and the item possessed for
incapacitative purposes. Ill-defined presumptions granting ill-
defined discretion to police officials have accompanied posses-
sion offenses at least since the late eighteenth century, when the
state began to tap the police potential of possession offenses.
For example, the English Frauds by Workmen Act of 1777 de-
fined the following new possession offense: "having in his or her
possession any materials suspected to be purloined or embez-
zled, and not producing the party or parties being duly intitled
[sic] to dispose of the same, of whom he or she bought or re-
ceived the same, nor piving a satisfactory account how he or she
came by the same."32 Similarly, the 1851 "Act for the better
Prevention of Offences" imposed a prison sentence of up to
three years on anyone "found by Night having in his Possession
without lawful Excuse (the Proof of which Excuse shall lie on such
Person) any Picklock Key, Crow, Jack, Bit, or other Implement
of Housebreaking."
322
Not even the licensing scheme is unique to gun possession
offenses. Drug possession offenses operate in much the same
way.323 Once again, the possession of certain "controlled" sub-
stances is presumptively illegal. A controlled substance is a sub-
stance subject to a license requirement. Possession is legal only
to the extent authorized by the state. That authorization, that
license, is granted to particular groups of persons.
Licensing is less important in the case of drug possession of-
fenses simply because so few licenses are granted. As a result,
drug possession is criminal for almost everyone. This means
that for all intents and purposes, the presumption of
dangerousness is irrebuttable in drug possession cases. Every-
one is presumed to be incapable of putting the inherently dan-
320 See supra notes 113-15, 262-69 and accompanying texts.
321 The Frauds by Workmen Act, 1777, 17 Geo. 3, c. 56, § 14 (Eng.) (emphasis
added).
"I An Act for the better Prevention of Offences, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 19, § 1
(Eng.) (emphasis added).




gerous drug to harmless use. Given the addictive potential of
drugs, their very dangerousness consists of their tendency to
overcome their possessor's ability to prevent them from unfold-
ing their dangerous potential. So strong is the power of drugs,
and so weak the power of resistance of almost everyone, that al-
ready their mere possession is so likely to result in not only use,
but harmful use, that we are presumptively ill-equipped to even
possess these noxious substances.
Possession offenses, particularly gun possession, therefore
are merely the punitive culmination of a policing process that
begins with a licensing requirement. And what a sophisticated
process it is! By requiring a license, the state kills several birds
with one stone. First of all, it deters anyone from applying for a
license who is not blessed with a "good moral character."
Moreover, the requirement of a license itself very probably has a
disproportionate effect on outsiders, who are far less likely to
apply for a gun license in the first place, precisely because they
do not identify with the state and its institutions. In fact, they
are unlikely to be inclined to comply with state licensing re-
quirements of any kind, be it for dogs, cars, or guns, perhaps
because they resent such obvious efforts to police them, perhaps
because they don't expect much of a chance of actually being
awarded a license, perhaps because their neighborhood is so
inundated with unlicensed guns that the license requirement
strikes them as entirely toothless-until of course they are
stopped by a police officer who subjects them to a Terry frisk.
Anyone who does submit an application for a gun license
thereby subjects himself and his character to the inquisitive eye
and virtually limitless discretion of a licensing officer. Here,
those not "of good moral character" who have the audacity to
apply can be weeded out. And, at yet another level of inquiry,
the ones that slip through the cracks can later be subjected to
license revocation proceedings, which in turn are backed up
with criminal penalties. Plus, an additional inquiry into fitness
and harmlessness will take place when the license comes up for
renewal, perhaps as often as every other year.
32 4
Of course, if a bad character doesn't apply for a license, and
most don't, then the possession offenses come into play. Obvi-
ously they apply to anyone who, such as "felons" and "aliens,"
has revealed himself to be not "of good moral character" with-
'4 NmvYoR, N.Y., ADMN. CODE § 10-131 (a) (1) (2001).
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out further inquiry by the licensing officer. Not so obviously,
possession offenses also capture those perfectly good characters
who possess a gun without a license. Possession without a li-
cense is possession without a license, no matter who does the
possessing.
This formal irrelevance of good moral character, of harm-
lessness, deserves emphasis. It suggests that the core of the pos-
session offense is not the prevention of harm, but the
chastisement of disobedience. In this light, the immediate and
very real victim of a possession offense is the state, as the origin
of the command not to possess guns without its specific authori-
zation. Licensing is a regulatory technique of the modern state
and assumes a state powerful and sophisticated enough to set
the background condition against which a licensing regime can
operate. That background condition is a universal presumption
of dangerousness, which the state in its discretion permits its
regulatory objects to rebut. Everyone is presumed dangerous,
unless the state declares it to be otherwise under conditions de-
fined and applied by the state.
Another way of looking at the possession licensing scheme is
to regard the state as the original owner of all objects it deems
dangerous. Having declared itself the owner of all contraband
(all "controlled substances"), it is within the state's discretion to
assign possession of this contraband to certain individuals. As
the rightful owner, the state can also retake these objects into its
possession anytime it pleases, and certainly anytime the condi-
tions of its grant have been violated or someone has boldly
taken possession of contraband without receiving permission
from the state. As Justice Murphy explained in his dissent in
Harris v. United States,325 "certain objects, the possession of which
is in some way illegal, may be seized on appropriate occasions
without a search warrant. Such objects include stolen goods,
property forfeited to the Government, property concealed to
avoid payment of duties, counterfeit coins, burglar tools, gam-
bling paraphernalia, illicit liquor and the like."
Under either view, and even without an explicit licensing
mechanism, possession offenses are the sign of a powerful state.
Possession is illegal, literally, because the state says so. Illegal
(or "unlawful" or "criminal," in some possession offenses)
means unauthorized, period. In the words of the New York
32 331 U.S. 145, 191 (1947).
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Court of Appeals, "a person either possesses a weapon lawfully
or he does not,"32 6 and the conditions of lawful possession are
exhaustively established by the state in the possession offense it-
self. Hence, there's no need to worry about such messy con-
cepts as self-defense or, even worse, justification, which claims
that a violation of a statute may be justified on the general
ground that, though facially criminal, it was not unlawful in the
grand scheme of things. 2 7 Possession offenses begin and end
with the state. This is what makes them so simple and so useful
to the state.
But this is also what makes them so troubling. To commit a
possession offense is to interfere with the state's effort to regu-
late, to control, the possession of certain dangerous items, in-
cluding not only certain guns and drugs, but also, say,
firecrackers. 328 In its heart of hearts, the illegal-i.e., unauthor-
ized-possession of guns or of drugs does not differ from the il-
legal-i.e., unauthorized-possession of firecrackers. The
essence of a possession offense is disobedience of state author-
ity.
5. Authoritarian States and Fatherly Monarchs
Despite the central role of the modem state in possession-
based policing, there are important structural similarities be-
tween the possession model and the original English vagrancy
model. It is no accident that the theory of original state owner-
ship of contraband generally resembles the theory of original
royal ownership of land, and in fact the entire system of delega-
tion which traced the origin of all legal authority and entitle-
ments to the king. Both models presume a strong central
authority of governance charged with maintaining the well-
being of the political community.
And both models spring from the police power of their re-
spective sovereigns. In a passage much quoted by nineteenth
century American writers on police power and regulation,
Blackstone explained in 1769 that the king, as the "father" of his
people, 329 and "paterfamilias of the nation,"330 was charged with:
115 People v. Almodovar, 464 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 1984).
32 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
323 N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 405 (McKinney 2000).
3'9 BLAcySrONE, supra note 8, at 176.
'
3
3 Id. at 127.
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the public police and oeconomy[, i.e.,] the due regulation and domestic
order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members
of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior
to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners: and
to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
33'
In the United States, the paternal (or parental, as John
Locke insisted 33 ) "police power" of the king eventually was
taken over by the state as parens patriae, which-but ultimately of
course also who-regulated the commonwealth, and later on
defined and protected the interests of the community as such.
It was this same quasi-paternal police power, proceeding
from a quasi-familial hierarchy of policer and policed, of subject
and object, that gave rise to the string of American vagrancy
laws that began in the early days of colonial America-when the
parens patriae was still the English king-and continued for over
three centuries, through the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The American revolution and the Civil War might have
wrought fundamental changes in American law. They had no
effect on vagrancy police, which was considered a necessary
weapon in the arsenal of any government that took its task of
preserving public order and welfare seriously. Only the civil
rights era brought the downfall of this convenient police
mechanism, as judges began to identify with the objects of this
police regime, rather than only with its subjects.
333
Still, something does distinguish the possession scheme
from the tried, but true, and ultimately dismantled vagrancy po-
lice regime. Here, I don't mean the many ways in which posses-
sion offenses are preferable to vagrancy statutes as instruments
of social control, in particular their insulation against legal at-
tack, at least on their face and in the abstract. I mean, instead,
precisely the flipside of that process of abstraction which ren-
dered possession police facially unassailable.
The fundamental difference between a vagrancy statute and
a possession statute is that one is open about its discriminatory
purpose, and the other isn't. In other words, vagrancy statutes
apply only to vagrants, possession statutes apply to everyone.
31 Id. at 162.
11
2 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATSE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIvIL GOVERNMENT § 52 (1690)
"I See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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Vagrancy laws were clearly a way, and clearly understood as
a way, of policing the boundaries of a political community,
which was neatly defined along socio-economic and, not only in
the South and not only immediately after the Civil War, espe-
cially along racial lines,?34 The same cannot be said for posses-
sion offenses; and that's why they make the NRA so nervous.
When we marvel at the antiseptic, and apparently unassail-
able, neutrality of sleek modem possession offenses, it's good to
remember that they weren't always so. They wore their now
hidden connection to vagrancy laws right on their sleeves.
Through the nineteenth century, the suppression of gun posses-
sion among blacks, and other undesirable sources of threats to
the governing roup, was a common, and very explicit, strategy
of governance. Before the Civil War, Slave Codes regularly
prohibited free blacks and slaves from possessing guns. Legis-
latures also already made full use of the intrusive potential of
possession offenses. In 1825, Florida authorized slave patrols to
"enter into all negro houses and suspected places, and search
for arms and other offensive or improper weapons, and... law-
fully seize and take away all such arms, weapons, and ammuni-
tion ..... 337 Eight years later, Florida reaffirmed the patrols'
31 For an interpretation of American slave law as "boundary law" and police meas-
ure, see Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave
Law, 5YALJ.L. & HUM AN. 417 (1993).
315 See Robert Cottrol & Raymond Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. Lj. 331 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Se-
curity, Personal Liberty, and 'The Constitutional Right to Bear Arns". Visions of the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. I. 341 (1995).
336 See, e.g., An act for preventing Negroes [sic] Insurrections, 1680, 2 Va. Stat. 481
(William Waller Hening ed., 1810) ("it shall not be lawfull for any negroe or other
slave to carry or arme himselfe with any club, staffe, gunn, sword or any other weapon
of defence or offence"); An Act for the better ordering and governing of Negroes and
Slaves, 1712, 7 S.C. Stat. 352, 353 (DavidJ. McCord ed., 1840) ("negro houses to be
searched diligently and effectually, once every fourteen days, for fugitive and runaway
slaves, guns, swords, clubs, and any other mischievous weapons"); Black Code, ch. 33,
§ 19, 1806 La. Acts 150, 160 (1807) ("no slave shall by day or by night, carry any visi-
ble or hidden arms, not even with a permission for so doing"); An Act to provide for
the more effectual performance of Patrol Duty, 1819 S.C. Acts 29, 31 ("it shall not be
lawful for any slave, except in the company and presence of some white person, to
carry or make use of any fire arms, or other offensive weapon, unless such slave shall
have a ticket or license in writing from his owner or overseer, or be employed to hunt
... , or shall be a watchman"); N.C. REV. CODE OF 1854, ch. 107, § 26 ("[n]o slave
shall go armed with gun, sword, or other weapon, or shall keep any such weapon, or
shall hunt or range with a gun in the woods").
"' An Act to Govern Patrols, § 8, 1825 Fla. Acts 52, 55.
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broad search authority and went on to provide that blacks un-
able to "give a plain and satisfactory account of the manner...
they came possessed of" weapons found in their possession were
to be "severally," and summarily, punished-"by moderate
whipping on the bare back, not exceeding thirty-nine lashes."338
After the Civil War, Black Codes continued the general
prohibition of gun possession by blacks, until the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.339 Thereafter, openly discriminatory
gun possession statutes disappeared from the statute books.
That didn't mean that gun possession statutes in general
were a thing of the past. On the contrary. As in the case of va-
grancy statutes, the goal of racial oppression simply migrated
underground, from the face of the statute into its increasingly
unspoken intent. As in the case of now race neutral vagrancy
statutes, the race neutral gun possession statutes applied only to
blacks, and everybody knew it. Here is what ajudge on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, in 1941, had to say about the racist point of
that state's race neutral gun possession law:
I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act
of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in
this State drawn here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lum-
ber camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in
1901 and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro la-
borers .... The statute was never intended to be au~lied to the white
population and in practice has never been so applied. 0
Possession offenses and vagrancy statutes thus followed a
similar trajectory from explicit to implicit oppression. What dis-
tinguishes possession from vagrancy is the subtlety with which
possession discharged its oppressive function. Vagrancy stat-
3 ' An Act concerning Patrols, ch. 671, §§ 15, 17, 1833 Fla. Acts 26, 29-30.
139 See, e.g., An Act to punish certain offences [sic] therein named, and for other
purposes, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 165 (approved Nov. 29, 1865) ("no freedman, free ne-
gro or mulatto, not in the military service of the United States Government, and not
licensed so to do by the board of police of his or her county, shall keep or carry fire-
arms of any kind, or any ammunition, dirk or bowie knife"). In legislative debate,
proponents of the Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), cited racist gun possession stat-
utes as evidence that federal intervention was necessary. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 474 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also
Freedmen's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) (guaranteeing "full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security.... including
the constitutional right to bear arms"); see generally Halbrook, supra note 335 (discuss-
ing legislative history).
340 Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford,J., concurring).
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utes, even after their forced neutralization in the wake of the
Civil War, never managed to shed their oppressive origins. Pos-
session offenses did. Modem possession offenses on their face
apply to anyone and everyone who possesses some object with-
out the authorization required by the state. They apply, as
modem criminal statutes do generally, to "whoever." By con-
trast, vagrancy statutes by their very nature singled out rogues,
vagabonds, dissolute persons, common gamblers, jugglers,
gamblers, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves,
pilferers, pickpockets, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,
common railers and brawlers, habitual loafers, disorderly per-
sons, and even "persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose or object."s' Sin-
gling out undesirable types, i.e., vagrants, remained the explicit
point of vagrancy statutes, while possession offenses managed to
transform themselves into quasi-conduct offenses that could be
committed by all types.
There is a list of types even in possession offenses, as we
have seen, but that list is much shorter: felons and aliens.
Other distinctions are irrelevant, except for one, and this is the
crucial distinction for possession as a pure state obedience of-
fense: the fundamental distinction between the state and every-
one else. The state commands, everyone else obeys.
In this particular case, the state commands that anyone who
wants to possess must apply for a license. This is so because eve-
ryone, not just those "deemed vagrants," is presumed to be dan-
gerous and therefore incapable of possessing a gun without
putting it to harmful use. The presumption of dangerousness
has been expanded from vagrants to everyone. To rebut it, eve-
ryone must convince a state license officer of his "good charac-
ter."
Anyone who fails to comply with these commands, and
thereby to acknowledge the state's authority, is guilty of a weap-
ons offense, no matter how good his character. And this is the
problem, and the distinctive feature of possession offenses: the
lines separating the policer and the policed are no longer
clearly drawn. Those middle class whites who could be certain
to escape classification as vagrants cannot rest assured that they
" JAcSONVnlL, FLA., ORDMANCE CODE § 26-57, quoted in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.1 (1972).
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may not find themselves on the wrong side of the law of posses-
sion.
The anxiety about gun control, i.e., the regulation of gun
possession, arises from this tension, this uncertainty among
those who once clearly identified themselves with the policers in
their effort to control undesirables. Privileged members of the
political community are appalled to find themselves treated by
the law, if not necessarily by its enforcers, as presumptively dan-
gerous, and therefore as vagrants, felons, aliens, and "negroes."
Pointing to the Second Amendment, they challenge the state's
claim to original ownership of guns as dangerous instruments,
with possession to be delegated to those deemed worthy. Men
of "good moral character" balk at the requirement that they
demonstrate their moral fitness to a state official.
They are, in short, experiencing the very sense of power-
lessness so familiar to the traditional objects of police control.
Now, they too are the outsiders who find themselves confronted
with the arbitrary discretion of a superior power, the state. And
this sense of alienation only grows when these state-defined
sources of danger realize that state officials are exempt from the
general prohibition of possession.
This then is the second list of types one finds in modern
possession offenses, to go along with the list of inherently dan-
gerous characters like felons and aliens: the list of types who are
inherently harmless and therefore subject to an irrebuttable
presumption of fitness to possess a weapon, without further in-
quiry into their moral character. What follows is a short excerpt
from the New York exemption provision:
Section 265.20 Exemptions
a. Sections 265.01, 265.02, 265.03, 265.04, 265.05, 265.10, 265.11,
265.12, 265.13, 265.15 and 270.05 [weapons offenses] shall not apply to:
1. Possession of any of the weapons, instruments, appliances or sub-
stances ... by the following:
(a) Persons in the military service of the state of New York ....
(b) Police officers ....
(c) Peace officers ....
(d) Persons in the military or other service of the United States ....
(e) Persons employed in fulfilling defense contracts with the gov-
ernment of the United States ....
2. Possession of a machine-gun, firearm, switchblade knife, gravity
knife, pilum ballistic knife, billy or blackjack by a warden, superinten-
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dent, headkeeper or deputy of a state prison, penitentiary, workhouse,
countyjail or other institution for the detention of persons ....
11. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a police officer or sworn
peace officer of another state while conducting official business within
the state of New York.
15 .....
b. Section 265.01 shall not apply to possession of that type of billy
commonly known as a "police baton" which is twenty-four to twenty-six
inches in length and no more than one and one-%uarter inches in thick-
ness by members of an auxiliary police force ....
But how is this reverse presumption possible? Because the
only relevant victim in modem criminal law (or rather admini-
stration) is the state, and state officials by definition cannot pose
a threat to the state, no matter how dangerous the instruments
they possess, and no matter how prone to violence they are or
how bad their character is. 343  Only harm against the state
counts; harm against anyone or anything else does not.
State officials are qualitatively different from the rest of us.
They can do no relevant harm. They cannot illegally possess
guns. And the communal boundary they police is that between
the state and everyone else. They, and only they, do the polic-
ing. They, and only they, are the subjects of police. Everyone
else is reduced to its object.
Or so it is in principle, if not in fact. In fact, the white mid-
dle class still has little to fear, the NRA's constant warnings not-
withstanding. In fact, possession police draws the same socio-
economic lines familiar from the days of vagrancy, only more
deeply, thanks to its vastly greater punitive potential. The devas-
tating impact that the war on drug possession has had on poor
blacks is well known. Poor blacks also are disproportionately
represented among unlicensed gun possessor? and, more im-
' N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
3 Cf WAs-I. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.08.080 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (police dogs
exempted from prohibition of possession of unregistered dangerous dog).




portant, among "felons in possession." Weapons arrest rates are
five times higher for blacks than for whites.
And yet possession police is so much more than a hyper-
charged vagrancy police. For in principle, if not in fact, the in-
group that protects itself against 'outside threats is the state
itself, rather than this or that social, ethnic, or economic group
or class. The ultimate victim in a regime of possession police is
the state, and the ultimate offender is the community at large,
rather than a mere subset of it.
So far possession police merely functions as a more sophis-
ticated cover for the hidden oppression of those social groups
that have always been oppressed in the open. The ever increas-
ing facial neutrality of police measures has done little more
than to insulate long-standing practices from legal attack. But
the removal of distinguishing features from the definitions of
state norms, for the purpose of eliminating open discrimina-
tion, not only has driven the same discrimination underground.
It also has dramatically expanded the group of potential police
objects from the well recognized outsiders persecuted by old-
style police measures like vagrancy statutes to everyone (and
everything) whom (or that) the state, or rather a particular state
official, perceives as a threat to his authority and therefore to
the authority of the grand institution he represents, serves, and
protects.
IV. STATE NUISANCE CONTROL: DEPERSONALIZING CRIMINAL LAW
By reducing everyone to a potential threat to the state, pos-
session offenses are symptomatic of an apersonal regime of
criminal administration in which persons have a role only as
sources of inconvenience, as nuisances to be abated, as objects
of regulation. This police regime is apersonal in three senses:
First, it does without personal offenders. Second, it does with-
out personal victims. And, third, its only victim is apersonal,
namely the state itself considered as an abstraction, rather than
as a group of persons.
In the end, everything and everyone is reduced to a nui-
sance, an inconvenience to state officials who know best. Con-
traband is a nuisance; dogs are a nuisance; offenders are a
11 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Weapons Offenses and Offenders 2 (Nov. 1995, NCJ 155284), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/woofccj.pdf.
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nuisance; victims are a nuisance; and so is the cumbersome ap-
paratus of traditional criminal law. So, offenders are abated,
victims rendered irrelevant or used as cover, and the principles
of criminal law ignored or openly abandoned as anachronistic
remnants of a time when the regulatory nature of criminal law
had not revealed itself, and when the criminal law was about
personal rights, rather than social interests.
A. OFFENDERLESS CRIMES
The irrelevance of the offender's personhood is obvious.
We already have noted, prior to our exploration of the place of
possession offenses in an apersonal police regime, that the
"public welfare" takes "offense" as soon as it is threatened by,
literally disturbed by, anyone and anything. Hence, the preven-
tive measures of social control put in place for its protection will
attach themselves to any threat, whether it emanates from a per-
son or not. Hence, there is no need to worry about that pecu-
liarly human question of "guilt." Likewise, the reluctance to
criminalize the failure to act (something of which plants are ca-
pable) evaporates, status (namely that of being dangerous,
again a familiar attribute of dogs, objects, and natural phenom-
ena) is freely punished in open defiance of the venerable actus
reus principle, mere presence (also something well within the
capacity of inanimate objects) is enough for penal intervention,
infancy and insanity defenses are irrelevant, and so on and so
on.
We have seen how possession has been adapted to assist the
state in its identification and then eradication of human sources
of danger. Possession has proved very useful because it bears
the form of a traditional offense while it is in substance merely
an instrument of nuisance control. Its form therefore is the
only concession to the personhood of its objects. The state
generally does not find it necessary to pour measures for the
control of threats emanating from animals, inanimate objects,
or natural phenomena into the mold of a criminal statute,
which at least on its face is addressed not only to state officials





Perhaps less obvious, this system of nuisance control also
has no room for persons as victims. Once again, possession rec-
ommends itself as a useful tool, this time not because it's of-
fenderless, but because it's victimless. Take gun possession, for
instance. Possessing a gun harms no one. Using it may, but
we're not talking here about the many statutes that criminalize
improper gun use, say, to kill someone. We're talking about
simply possessing, not using, not abusing,346 not even owning, a
gun. Conviction of a possession offense does not require the
prosecution to show that the gun was used to harm anyone, or
anything for that matter. Again, this doesn't mean that the gun
might not in fact also have been used to cause some harm. This
simply means that, even if it was, that result is not required for a
conviction of possessing the gun. That's why possession works
both individually and in conjunction with other charges. De-
pending on the case, a prosecutor can either go after the pos-
session alone or can use the possession charge as a fall back in
case the more serious offense-which involved the use, but not
the possession of the gun--does not stick for one reason or an-
other. Possession is the universal velcro offense.
The absence of a victim is convenient in two ways. First, it
lightens the prosecution's burden of proof. It's always easier to
prove possession than it is to prove its use against a particular
victim in a particular way at a particular time. Why? Because
use includes possession so that every use is also a possession, but
not every possession a use. Plus, we already saw how easy it is to
prove possession.
Second, and most important, victims are a nuisance. They
slow down the process. They forget things, lose evidence,
misremember facts, change their stories. They miss appoint-
ments. They try to drop charges. They want harsher penalties,
they want lower penalties. Theyjust want their money back, or
their hospital bills paid for. They require attention, even hand-
holding. They may be annoying, greedy, poor. In fact, victims
' On the distinction between use and abuse in the context of possession, see
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 401, 419-20 (1855).
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tend to resemble offenders in every socio-economic category,
including race, income, residence, gender, and even age.
4 7
Victims are in the way. They are a hindrance to the efficient
disposal of dangers, which is what the war on crime, ostensibly
fought on their behalf, is all about. And the recent creation of
victims' rights to give victims more say in more aspects of the
criminal process only makes things harder on the prosecutor
who is just trying to do her part in the state's grand scheme of
incapacitation.
4W
How much cleaner, faster, and more convenient is a victim-
less crime like possession, with no victim to deal with? No victim
to notify about court hearings, trial dates, or negotiations with
defense counsel. No victim to be consulted about charges,
about plea arrangements, about trial strategy, about sentencing,
about everything.
As a victimless regulatory offense, possession is a perfect
creation of the state. Who is offended, whose interests violated,
by possessing a gun? No one in particular, except the state.
The only clear violation of a personal interest, and a heavily
guarded personal interest at that, occurs not in the commission
of a possession offense, but in its punishment.
1. Property! What. Property?
To put it more succinctly, the only personal victim of a pos-
session offense is the person doing the possessing, or being the
possessor. The punishment of possession directly interferes
with the possessory interest of the person in possession of the
thing in question. And traditionally, that possessory interest has
enjoyed extensive protection in American law. Interference
with someone's possession gives rises to criminal liability (in the
form of the crime of larceny) and civil liability (in the form of
the tort of trespass).
In fact, courts have from early on enforced the possessory
interest even of wrongful possessors. Since the crime of larceny
protects possession per se, the thief can be the victim of another
thief. This age old doctrine has been interpreted as an attempt
"7 Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of lictim Assessment on Prosecutors' Screenrg De-
cisions: The Case of the New York County's Disrit Attorney's Office, 16 1 & Soch" R '. 225
(1981); see also TOWARDS A CRITICAL VICMIMOLOGY (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1992).
' See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Ilictim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overmew,
3 Buir. CGli. L. REv. 3 (1999).
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to deter the use of self-help, which in medieval English law was
treated as contempt of the king, who claimed the monopoly of
violence. 349 To engage in self-help, for example by using vio-
lence to retake stolen goods or land illegally possessed, drew
into question the king's ability to maintain the peace of his
realm by punishing the illegal possessor. At the same time, the
universal prohibition of interference with possession also re-
flected the central significance assigned to the possessory inter-
est itself. The violent retaking of stolen goods was prohibited
for the same reason that the initial larceny was prohibited-it
interfered with the current possessor's interest in the objects,
even though the original possessor's ownership remained undis-
turbed.350 It was larceny, since larceny was the interference with
possession, period.
So close is the connection between larceny and possession
that the history of the law of larceny is largely the history of the
concept of possession. In this context, the concept of posses-
sion already displayed the considerable malleability that would
allow it to play such an important role in the use of possession
offenses as flexible policing tools. Interestingly, the judicial use
of possession to expand the borders of larceny already had ob-
vious policing overtones. This manipulation of larceny with the
help of the invention of the concept of "constructive possession"
occurred against the background of master-servant law, with the
effect of dramatically expanding the servant's liability vis-a-vis
the property of his lord. Originally, servants could not steal ob-
jects entrusted to them by their lord for the simple reason that
they had legally acquired possession of them. What they already
possessed they couldn't steal, since larceny was the interference
with someone else's possession. This loophole was eventually
closed to better protect the lord's property against disloyal-but
not yet thieving-servants. So the courts invented the concept
of constructive possession. The servant, it was decided in the
eighteenth century, had only "custody" of the objects handed to
him by his lord, while possession, constructive possession, re-
mained with the master. Hence, when the servant ran away, or
1
4 9 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 115, at 54.
350 Id. at 42.
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otherwise misappropriated the objects constructively possessed
by his lord, he committed larceny.
That the possession of the object has been prohibited by the
state makes no difference-it can still be stolen. Even the pos-
sessory interest in contraband is protected against interference
by another. Again and again, the courts have upheld convic-
tions for larceny of contraband, including intoxicating liquor35 2
and gambling devices.
3 5 3
Yet, it is an entirely different story when the state rather than
another person interferes with the otherwise so strictly guarded
possessory interest. A full discussion of this topic would take us
too far afield since it would require an investigation of the rela-
tionship between the power of eminent domain and the regula-
tion of real property under the police power. A brief look at the
state's authority to interfere with personal property, or chattel,
will suffice for our purposes, especially since the privileged posi-
tion of the state will come through loud and clear even in this
limited context. This limitation also makes sense because lar-
ceny originally was limited to personal, as opposed to real,
property and the possession offenses that concern us here all
prohibit the possession of personal, not real, property.
State officials enjoy very wide authority to commit acts that
would constitute larceny if committed by a private person. Any
seizure of property by a police officer, as opposed to a brief in-
spection, is, technically speaking, a theft-it permanently inter-
feres with the possessory interest of a person. Notice that this
theft occurs long before the state action that tends to receive
the lion share of attention, forfeiture. The disposal of forfeited
property presumes a prior theft and constitutes an additional
offense: destruction of property or criminal mischief.354 Simi-
larly, an arrest is on the face of it an assault 355 and false or un-
", See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRMNAL. LAw 704 (2d ed.
1986).
35 Commonwealth v. Crow, 154 A. 283 (Pa. 1931); People v. Otis, 139 N.E. 562
(N.Y. 1923); Ellis v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W. 368 (Ky. 1920); State v. May, 20 Iowa
305 (1866).
33 Smith v. State, 118 N.E. 954 (Ind. 1918).
's Damaging property of another person. &e, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LW § 145.00
(McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001); MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (1985).
"' Inflicting minor or serious physical harm on another person. See, e.g., N.Y.




lawful imprisonment;356 the mere entrance into a house to exe-
cute a search warrant a trespass;357 imprisonment is, once again,
false or unlawful imprisonment; and execution is prima facie
murder.3 5 8 In each case, what distinguishes one from the other
is that one is justified and the other isn't.
But what provides this justification? The answer is, in a
state-centered system of criminal law, the status of the actor as a
state official. In fact, and increasingly also in law, the inquiry
begins and ends with the question whether the putative thief
was a police officer or not. So entrenched is the notion that
status alone justifies the actions in these situations that the very
need to inquire into ajustification is dismissed as preposterous.
This was not always the case. In nineteenth century America,
trespass actions against police officers who entered private resi-
dences were not uncommon and not always unsuccessful.359
The point is not that no justifications would be available. In
fact, larceny and each of the offenses listed above-with the ex-
ception of assault and murder-often have justifications built
into their very definition ("having no right to do so nor any rea-
sonable ground to believe that he has such right,"3 60 "not li-
censed or privileged, 3 6 1 "unlawful,3 6 2 "false 6 3 ). The point is
instead that these justifications are irrelevant, that no state offi-
cial needs to avail himself of them. State officials are by their
nature implicitly exempt; it is as though every criminal offense,
no matter how serious, contained the following silent clause:
"except if it is committed by a state official." A criminal code lit-
tered with this clause would drive home the point that the offi-
cial (non-civilian) makers, appliers, and enforcers of penal
norms lie beyond their reach.
This tacit exemption for state officials is rarely made ex-
plicit. This is why the lengthy and detailed list of "exemptions"
"' Restraining another person so as to interfere substantially with his liberty. See,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.05 (McKinney 2000); MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (1985).
... Entering any building without permission. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05
(McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001); MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (1985).
35I Intentionally causing the death of another person. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985).
"" See, e.g., Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816).
360 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.00 (criminal mischief) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
361 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (criminal trespass) (1985).
31 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.05 (unlawful imprisonment) (McKinney 2000).
361 MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (false imprisonment) (1985).
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from gun possession laws, which we encountered earlier on, is
so remarkable. Imagine if every provision in every criminal
code, in fact every criminal provision anywhere, were followed
by an exemption provision like this:
The prohibition of [insert name of crime here] shall not apply to:
(a) Persons in the military service of the state,
(b) Police officers,
(c) Peace officers,
(d) Persons in the military or other service of the United States,
(e) Wardens,
(f) Prison guards,
(g) Members of any auxiliary police force.
An exemption differs from a defense. While a defense ex-
culpates someone who has engaged in facially criminal conduct,
an exemption removes the conduct from the realm of crime.
To defend oneself against an allegation of criminal behavior is
to provide reasons for that behavior or to plead for mercy. To
claim an exemption, by contrast, is to do just that. It is to deny
the need for a defense, an explanation, a plea for mercy. It is
instead to claim that the general criminal laws do not apply to
oneself for one reason or another.
3 64
Status-based exemptions thus shield state officials from
criminal liability under the laws they generate, apply, or en-
force. They turn on a fundamental distinction between the sub-
ject and the object of governance. Laws are made for others,
applied against others, and enforced on others. The legislator,
the judge, the police officer never imagines herself as the ob-
ject, but rather always only as the subject of governance, i.e., the
one doing the governing, rather than the one being governed.
Exemptions join the under-the-table immunity of state offi-
cials from criminal liability as testimony to the power of the state
to protect its own. 365 As every state official knows, he is virtually
3
1 Analogously, in tax law, to claim an exemption is differcnt from claiming a de-
duction. A deduction reduces tax liability, an exemption denies it altogether. To
claim an exemption is not to explain one's failure to pay taxes, but to assert that one
had no obligation to pay any in the first place.
It goes without saying that state officials today also enjoy all manner of broad
and explicit immunity, qualified and absolute from all manner of civil liability, even
for constitutional violations. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see
also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (prosecutors entitled to absolute




immune against the sort of police measures the state uses to
keep the rest of us under control. Few, if any, police officers,
prosecutors, judges, and legislators will receive a speeding
ticket. Police officers especially, who are so identified with the
task of policing as to bear its name, are effectively exempted
from the rules they apply.
Viewed in this light, the radical distinction between private
and state interference with a person's possessory interest in per-
sonal property merely exemplifies a fundamental distinction be-
tween private and state action typical of contemporary criminal
law. The contrast is nonetheless startling in its starkness, given
that Anglo-American law so long has been so unyielding in its
protection of possessory interests against private interference.
At a time when the distinction between state and private larceny
was not yet obvious to all, courts occasionally found themselves
in the uncomfortable position of having to immunize the state
while at the same punishing the person for the same act.
Take, for example, the 1923 case of People v. Otis from New
York. Here, Mr. Otis argued against his larceny conviction for
stealing whiskey on the perfectly reasonable-though by now
hopeless-ground that he couldn't be convicted of taking pos-
session of something from someone who had no right to possess
it. Unfortunately for the New York Court of Appeals, it couldn't
dismiss this argument, as many other courts had done before it
and have done since, simply by referring to the old common law
that saw stealing from someone who had no right to possess the
item stolen, and perhaps had stolen it himself, as still stealing.
(Any other conclusion, so the argument went, would mean "to
discourage unlawful acquisition but encourage larceny," to
quote a much trotted out phrase.366) Otis's case was different
because the New York legislature had, in its prohibitionary zeal,
declared that "'no property rights shall exist' in liquor illegally
possessed.
3 67
But, the court went on, since "[t] here can be no larceny of
property not subject to ownership .. . [h]ow then, it is asked,
" See, e.g, Smith v. State, 118 N.E. 954, 955 (Ind. 1918) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Rourke, 10 Mass. (1 Cush.) 397, 399 (1852)).
367 People v. Otis, 139 N.E. 562, 562 (N.Y. 1923). For an analogous provision in
current law, see 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (drug-related forfeiture;
"[t]he following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them").
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may there be larceny of such liquor?"3 68 The answer was, simply,
that the state was different. The purpose of the New York legis-
lature's broad declaration was not to immunize private persons
from larceny liability for dispossessing private persons of ille-
gally possessed whiskey. No, the purpose was to immunize the
state from criminal and, more important, tort liability for doing
the exact same thing. There was some cause for concern since
every wave of prohibitionary legislation in the nineteenth and
twentieth century had brought with it a slew of tort suits and
constitutional challenges by liquor owners who saw their inven-
tory turn into contraband, and their often substantial invest-
ment into a (criminal) liability, from one day to the next. And
unlike the courts in most other states, with the notable excep-
tion of Indiana, the New York courts had once proven receptive
to these complaints.369 The state, in short, meant to immunize
itself, not anyone else. And since Otis was anyone else, he was
out of luck.
It was in the nineteenth century challenges to liquor prohi-
bition, i.e., the prohibition of the simple possession of liquor,
that American courts took their hardest-and so far only-look
at the oppressive potential of possession offenses. The prohibi-
tion of liquor possession was a harbinger of things to come, also
because it fit into a comprehensive police regime that began
with a general licensing requirement. At the outset, nineteenth
century liquor regulation looked much like it does today--and,
as we'll see, generally resembled the regulation of guns. To sell
liquor, one needed a license. Selling liquor without a license
was a crime. According to William Novak, these penal provi-
sions were "a constant feature of local law enforcement," at least
in Plymouth County, Massachusetts.37 A 1787 Massachusetts
law provided that liquor licenses were to be granted by town se-
lectmen only to applicants whom they found to be "person [s] of
sober life and conversation."
371
This license system was simple, but it was not strict enough
for temperance enthusiasts. By the 1830s, outright prohibitions
368 Otis, 139 N.E. at 562-63.
"' Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (applying Act for the prevention of
intemperance, pauperism and crime, of Apr. 9, 1855); see also Beebe v. State, 6 Ind.
401, 419-20 (1855).




of liquor began to appear, culminating in a much copied Maine
liquor law of 1851. Under this new regime, licenses were still
granted, but they were restricted to "special municipal agents
for medicinal and mechanical purposes."372 Now, for the first
time, the possession of liquor was criminalized. Liquor pos-
sessed in violation of these laws was subject to confiscation and
summary abatement as a public nuisance, without compensa-
tion.
Much of the litigation and commentary triggered by these
new laws focused on their procedural aspect. So, for example,
Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw was inspired to write
an eloquent opinion on the demands of "due process," even in
the case of the forfeiture and destruction of contraband liq-
uor.373 There was also much handwringing about the retroac-
tive effect of the sudden condemnation of once valuable
property held by businessmen, who at one time or another were
at least reputable enough to have passed the character test of a
liquor licensing officer, perhaps more than once.
These musings, though often extensive, are of little interest
to us, expect perhaps to point out, once again, the tendency of
American jurists to evade difficult substantive questions by delv-
ing into detailed, but secondary, procedural ones. Far more in-
teresting are two-now celebrated-cases in which courts
addressed the substantive question of whether the state may in-
terfere with the property rights of liquor owners through stat-
utes that prohibited, among other things, the possession of
liquor.
In Beebe v. State,374 the Indiana Supreme Court struck down,
as an unjustified interference with the right to property, an 1855
Indiana law providing that "no person shall manufacture, keep
for sale, or sell" liquor. Violations of the law were punished with
confiscation and destruction of the liquor and fine. Beebe had
refused to pay the fine and landed in prison. Technically, the
case arose out of his habeas corpus petition to win release from
confinement. In essence, the court concluded that the statute's
radical interference with a person's right to property could not
be justified because the property in question was not inherently
dangerous, or, in the court's words, because "the manufacture
'n Id. at 179.
'n Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) (1854).
37" Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 401 (1855).
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and sale and use of liquors are not necessarily hurtful. y7 5 The
criminalization of public drunkenness was another question, for
"[i]t is the abuse, and not the use, of all these beverages that is
hurtful"
376
One year later, the New York Court of Appeals followed suit,
but on broader grounds. In Wynehamer v. People, the court in-
validated the "Act for the Prevention of Intemperance, Pauper-
ism and Crime," also passed in 1855, which prohibited the sale
of liquor, as well as itsvpossession with intent to sell, along with
its simple possession. In the court's view, the statute con-
fronted liquor possessors with an intolerable dilemma:
Property is lost before the police are in motion, and, I may add, crime is
committed without an act or even an intention. On the day the law took
effect, it was criminal to be in possession of intoxicating liquors, however
innocently acquired the day before. It was criminal to sell them, and un-
der the law, therefore_8 no alternative was left to the owner but their in-
mediate destruction.
The New York court based its decision on the simple, and
sweeping, proposition that the legislature was not justified in
summarily destroying liquor because liquor was private prop-
erty, period. What was at stake was nothing less than "a vindica-
tion of the sanctity of private property."3s 9 Unlike their Indiana
colleagues, the New York judges saw no need to investigate the
dangers of alcohol. Since "all property is alike in the character-
istic of inviolability," the only thing that mattered was that liquor
was indeed property.mo "If the legislature has no power to con-
fiscate and destroy property in general," which it clearly had
not, "it has no such power over any particular species."s' In the
face of such categorical principles, a detailed analysis of the
dangers of a particular type of property was not only unneces-
sary, but positively dangerous:
It may be said, it is true, that intoxicating drinks are a species of
property which performs no beneficent part in the political, moral or
social economy of the world. It may even be urged, and, I will admit,
375 Id. at 416.
376 Id. at 415.
1 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).






demonstrated with reasonable certainty, that the abuses to which it is li-
able are so great, that the people of this state can dispense with its very
existence, not only without injury to their aggregate interests, but with
absolute benefit. The same can be said, although, perhaps, upon less
palpable grounds, of other descriptions of property. Intoxicating bever-
ages are by no means the only article of admitted property and of lawful
commerce in this state against which arguments of this sort may be di-
rected. But if such arguments can be allowed to subvert the fundamen-
tal idea of property, then there is no private right entirely safe, because
there is no limitation upon the absolute discretion of the legislature, and
the guarantees of the constitution are a mere waste of words.
382
Although the Indiana statute prohibited possession with in-
tent to sell and the New York statute prohibited possession with
intent to sell as well as mere possession, neither court focused
on that aspect of their respective statutes. Beebe was convicted
of manufacturing and selling liquor, Wynehamer of selling, and
Toynbee, the other defendant in the New York case, of posses-
sion with intent to sell. The possession question didn't come up
simply because the courts found that the prohibition of manu-
facture and sale alone constituted an unjustified interference
with the right of property. Their discussion applies with even
greater force to the prohibition of possession which of course is
even more intrusive than prohibiting the creation and aliena-
tion of the item possessed.
If the prohibition of possession was insignificant, so was the
distinction between different kinds of possession, namely simple
possession and possession with intent to sell. That distinction,
however, played a crucial role in several later decisions review-
ing liquor statutes containing possession clauses and other pos-
session offenses. The prohibition of simple possession was
struck down, and the prohibition with intent to sell was upheld,
on the general ground that mere possession "neither produces
nor threatens any harm to the public."383 For example, an 1889
Michigan case invalidated the 1887 amendment to the state liq-
uor law which made it a crime to "keep [liquor] in his posses-
sion for another" on the ground that:
[T] he keeping of liquors in his possession by a person, whether for him-
self or for another, unless he does so for the illegal sale of it, or for some
other improper purpose, can by no possibility injure or affect the health,
morals, or safety of the public; and, therefore, the statute prohibiting
382 Id. at 384-85.
3813 TIEDEMAN, supra note 280, at 499-500.
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such ky4ing in possession is not a legitimate exertion of the police
power.
We have already encountered the Rhode Island case, which, in
upholding an 1882 statute making it a crime to "have in his pos-
session adulterated milk, to wit, milk which contained more
than eighty eight per cent. of watery fluids, and less than twelve
per cent. of milk solids, .., with intent then and there to sell the
same," stressed that "[t ]he offence consists not in the possession
of [adulterated] milk ... but in the intent to sell or exchange
such milk, 38 5 implying that there would have been trouble had
it prohibited mere possession.
Now, as we saw, the distinction between simple and com-
pound possession has lost much of its significance because of
implicit and explicit presumptions that, emanating backward
and forward in time, could quickly generate upon prosecutorial
demand not only the intent to sell, but all manner of illegal ac-
quisitions and alienations of the object simply possessed. The
significance of these nineteenth century cases, however, does
not lie in their recognition of the distinction between different
types of possession, but in their deep respect for the property
rights of the possessor. Fine doctrinal distinctions, such as that
between simple and compound possession, were carefully drawn
precisely because the courts knew that they were entering a sen-
sitive area when they were reviewing statutes massively interfer-
ing with property rights, even to the point of prohibiting not
merely the acquisition and sale, but even the mere possession of
certain items of property, or as the Wynehamer court put it, the
existence of the thing itself.
38 6
Today, this concern about the policing of contraband prop-
erty has completely disappeared. Today's legislatures and
courts don't think twice about the legitimacy of criminalizing
not only the manufacture and sale (along with virtually every
imaginable means of acquisition and alienation), but also the
possession of certain items. In fact, contemporary criminal law
not only punishes the possession with intent to sell, but simple
possession. And it not only punishes simple possession, but
simple possession with no mens rea requirement of any kind.
Today the legitimacy of possession offenses is so far beyond the
"' State v. Gilman, 10 S.E. 283, 284 (W. Va. 1889).
3 State v. Smyth, 14 RI. 100, 100-01 (1883).
3M Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 415.
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shadow of a doubt that we punish simple possession with life
imprisonment without parole, which is a far cry from the mod-
est fines imposed by the statutes that so incensed the Beebe and
Wynehamer courts. So oblivious are we to the otherwise so heav-
ily guarded property rights at stake in possession offenses that
we completely ignore that aspect of the property police that
drew the harshest criticism from nineteenth century courts: the
automatic confiscation and destruction of contraband, supple-
mented by the widespread "forfeiture" (i.e., confiscation and
disposal) of any property, real and personal, somehow con-
nected to some criminal activity or other, which more often
than not consisted precisely in the possession of contraband,
specifically drugs.
2. Opium, Chinese Immigrants, and the War on Crime
How did we get from there to here? The answer is danger-
ous drugs, dangerous outsiders, and a depersonalized criminal
law as danger disposal, or, more simply, opium, Chinese immi-
grants, and the war on crime.
Possession offenses are a fairly recent invention in Anglo-
American criminal law. We know already that the common law
did not recognize any possession offenses, simple or compound,
because "the bare possession is not an act."8 To punish pos-
sessing "indecent, lewd, filthy, bawdy and obscene prints" with
intent to publish, stamps which could impress the scepter on
coin with intent to utter sixpences for half guineas, or counter-
feit coin with intent to utter would amount to punishing a mens
rea without an actus reus, "an intent without an act."388 No one
would have dreamed of punishing simple possession, without
any intent, since then both mens rea and actus reus would be
missing.
English statutory law had no similar compunction about
criminalizing possession, and for that matter simple possession,
directly. The crown was not shy about enlisting the extraordi-
nary preventive potential of suppressing the possession even be-
fore the use. A good, and early, example is the treason statute 8
& 9 Will. 3 c. 26, which provided:
311 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW
SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 111 (1892).
31' Regina v. Dugdale, 1 El. & BI. 435, 439 (1853) (Coleridge,J.).
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That whoever (other than the persons employed in the Mint) shall
make or mend, or assist in the making or mending, &c. any puncheon,
counter-puncheon, matrix, stamp, die, pattern or mould, of any materi-
als whatsoever, in or upon which there shall be, or be made or im-
pressed, or which will make or impress the figure, stamp, resemblance,
or similitude, of both or either of the sides or flats of any gold or silver
coin current within this kingdom... or shall have in their houses, custody,
or possession, any such puncheon, counter-puncheon, matrix stamp, die, or okr
tool or instrument before-mentioned, shall be adjudged guilty of High Treason.
After early attempts to use gun possession to police blacks,
the punishment of simple possession in American criminal law
began in earnest when the western states, and Oregon in par-
ticular, decided it was high time to police two new serious
threats to the well-being of the community, one an inherently
dangerous object, opium, and the other an inherently danger-
ous race, the Chinese. The 1887 Oregon "Act to regulate the
sale and gift of opium, morphine, eng-she or cooked opium,
hydrate of chloral, or cocaine" provided that "[n ] o person shall
have in his or her possession or offer for sale" any of the drugs
enumerated in the title "who has not previously obtained a li-
cense from the county clerk of the county in which he or she re-
sides or does business."
390
In Ex parte Mon Luck, a Chinese man, who had been impris-
oned under this new law, filed a habeas corpus petition to re-
gain his freedom, pointing out that courts had struck down
statutes prohibiting the simple possession of liquor as unjusti-
fied uses of the police power. In response, the court explained
that opium, unlike alcohol, was dangerous per se and its use,
therefore, necessarily constituted abuse. It was "admitted by all
to be an insidious and demoralizing vice, ijurious alike to the
health, morals, and welfare of the public."
391
But not only was opium qualitatively different-and more
dangerous--than alcohol, that traditional American beverage of
choice. At least as important, the people who possessed it were
likewise qualitatively different-and more dangerous-than
Americans. As the court explained, opium, again unlike alco-
hol, "has no place in the common experience or habits of the
319 An Act for the better preventing the counterfeiting the current coin of this
kingdom, 1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26 (Eng.), quoted in Rex v. Lennard, 1 Leach 90
(1772).
3 Ex parte Mon Luck, 29 Ore. 421 (1896).
391 Id. at 428.
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people of this country."392 The "public's" well-being was threat-
ened by aliens, the Chinese, through their very presence, but in
particular through their possession of an alien substance which,
due to its inherent and mysterious dangerousness, was certain to
drive "the weak and unwary... to their own physical and mental
ruin."
393
In other words, the dangerous Chinese must be prevented
at all costs from using the dangerous opium to ruin the Ameri-
can-alcohol drinking-community. Given the vital impor-
tance of this campaign of preventive communal self-protection
for the very existence of the community, the legislature could
not afford to detain itself with legal niceties. Quick and decisive
action was called for. There simply was no time for luxuries
such as qualms about the unconstitutionality of destroying
property rights in an object by prohibiting its sale, and if not its
sale, then certainly its possession with intent to sell, and if not its
possession with intent to sell, then certainly its simple posses-
sion.
Such worries were entirely misplaced not only because the
situation was so desperate and the threat to the American com-
munity so serious. They were also simply inappropriate given
the object of the necessary police action: threats. It made no
difference whether these threats emanated from the possessor
or the item possessed, or, for that matter, the interplay of the
two. Possessor and possessed were relevant only as threats, and
threats don't have constitutional rights.
In the end, the possessor and the possessed, and the respec-
tive threats they embodied, were indistinguishable. The per-
ceived dangerousness of opium derived in large part from the
perceived dangerousness of those who possessed it, particularly
in the absence of scientific research into the constitution and ef-
fect of opium. In the end, however, it mattered little whose
dangerousness infected the other. This identification of pos-
sessor and possessed emerges clearly from a remarkably-and
unusually-honest federal court opinion upholding the consti-
tutionality of a predecessor to the statute at issue in Mon 
Luck. 394
The 1885 statute at issue in Ex parte YungJon, "An act to regulate
the sale of opium, and to suppress opium dens," prohibited the
392 Id.
311 Id. at 427.
39 Ex parteYungJon, 28 F. 308 (D. Ore. 1886).
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sale, and not yet the possession, of opium. In rejecting Yung
Jon's habeas corpus petition, the court conceded that opium
use was "now chiefly confined to the Chinese," and even that, in
direct contradiction to the reasoning of the Oregon court in
Mon Luck ten years later, "[s]moking opium is not a vice. " s4 But
more important, even stunning, was its conclusion: "therefore it
may be that this legislation proceeds more from a desire to vex
and annoy the 'Heathen Chinee' in this respect, than to protect
the people [!] from the evil habit."396 Perhaps even more re-
markable, however, was that the court, having just let the cat out
of the bag, squeezed it right back in, on the ground of no less
sweeping a principle of constitutional adjudication than that
"the motives of legislators cannot be the subject of judicial in-
vestig3ation for the purpose of affecting the validity of their
acts."397
Whether "to vex and annoy the 'Heathen Chinee'" or "to
protect the people from the evil habit" of opium smoking, or
both at the same time, Oregon's opium statute amounted to an
all out war on the Chinese and opium, with the goal of extin-
guishing them as potential sources of threats to "the people,"
before they had a chance to manifest their inherent noxious po-
tential. The opium possession statute thus must be seen as part
of a comprehensive, two-pronged, effort to eliminate the Chi-
nese threat: by keeping them out, by expelling them from the
body politic, and, if this proved impossible for some reason, by
subjecting them to intensive police control through simple pos-
session offenses. The possession offenses proved useful police
tools for the now familiar reasons, including easy detection and
proof, followed by incapacitation. In addition, conviction could
result in the preferred means of policing: expulsion through
deportation.
Although this police campaign emanated from the western
states, it soon engulfed the entire nation. Federal interference
was necessary, prohibiting Chinese immigration. And a new
administrative agency, the Immigration and Nationalization
Service, was needed to police the influx of Chinese. This is not
3's Id. at 312.
3% Id..
3' Ex parte YungJon, 28 F. 308, 312 (D. Ore. 1886). For an extended exploration
of this question, a century later, see John Hart Ely, Legislalive and Administrative Moti-
vation in Constitutional Law, 79 YA E LJ. 1205 (1970).
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the place for a detailed recounting of the history of the growth
of American immigration law as an anti-Chinese police measure,
especially since this story has been told recently and with great
success. 398 This discriminatory purpose also requires no great
interpretative unearthing because it appears brazenly on the
surface, for the entire world to see. The Chinese were so far be-
yond the pale, and everyone knew that they were, that a camou-
flage for racism was unnecessary. As the first Justice Harlan put
it matter of factly in 1896, the same year the Oregon Supreme
Court decided Mon Luck, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, now
celebrated as a plea for the constitutional enforcement of racial
equality: "There is a race so different from our own that we do
not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the
United States. Persons belonging to it a re, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race." 399  Harlan's point? The criminal prohibition against
blacks riding in white-only railroad cars was patently irrational
since the same prohibition did not apply to the Chinese who, as
was common knowledge, were inferior to and even more de-
spised than blacks.
A federal case from the same period-1892 to be exact, and
thus falling between Mon Luck and YunJong--made the connec-
tion between containing the dangerous Chinese and their dan-
gerous opium as police measures explicit. The question in this
case out of Louisiana was whether the court had criminal juris-
diction over an illegal Chinese immigrant, Hing Quong Chow,
who had been "found" in the United States in violation of a fed-
eral statute providing that "any Chinese person or person of
Chinese descent ... shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within
the United States, unless such person shall establish by affirma-
tive proof, to the satisfaction of such justice, judge, or commis-
sioner, his lawful right to remain in the United States."400
The court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the
case involved a matter of preventive police, not of retrospective
punishment. As such, it was something for an immigration
39 LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF
THE MODERN IMMIGRATION LAWS (1995).
3- 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan.J., dissenting).




commissioner, not ajudge. Along the way, the judge gave a tell-
ing reading of the statute which, he explained:
... [d]eals with the coming in of Chinese as a police matter, and is the
re-enacting and continuing what might be termed a 'quarantine against
Chinese.' They are treated as would be infected merchandise, and the
imprisonment is not a punishment for a crime, but a means of keeping a
damaging individual safely till he can be sent away. In a summary man-
ner, and as a political matter, this coming in is to be prevented.
This being a police matter, then, rather than a punishment
matter, the principles of substantive and procedural criminal
law were suspended. As an object of police, rather than of pun-
ishment, as a danger to be eliminated, rather than as a person
guilty of a criminal act, Hing Quong Chow was a threat carrier,
a nuisance, and thus depersonalized enjoyed the same individ-
ual rights as "infected merchandise." There was no mens rea
requirement, no actus reus, no inquiry into guilt, no conviction,
no trial, no judge, no jury, no presumption of innocence, no
burden of proof on the state, and, of course, no punishment:
The matter is dealt with as political, and not criminal. The words used
are those which are ordinarily found in criminal statutes; but the intent
of congress is... unmistakable. What is termed "being convicted and
adjudged" means "found," "decided" by the commissioner, representing
not the criminal law, but the political department of the government.
A reversal of the presumption of conduct or presence being lawful might
be introduced into procedures which were political in character, and as-
similated to those relating to quarantine .... The whole proceeding of
keeping out of the country a class of persons deemed by the sovereign to
be injurious to the state, to be effective of its object, must be summary in
its methods and political in its character.
40
2
The mere fact that the statute provided for one year's im-
prisonment at hard labor didn't mean that it was a criminal law
rather than a police measure any more than did its employment
of terms "ordinarily found in criminal statutes." No, the impris-
onment also was a matter of quarantine: "(H]e must keep from
entering the community of the people of the United States, and
therefore is to be imprisoned. To prevent expense to the gov-









Of course, the racist immigration policies against the Chi-
nese fit into a comprehensive, local and national effort in the
nineteenth century to exclude, and if that proved unsuccessful,
to police all immigrants. Like vagrants and tramps, immigrants
as a group posed a dual threat to the "public welfare" as poten-
tial criminals or potential public charges. The constitutionality
of this police regime was never seriously questioned. So in New
York v. Miln, the Supreme Court in 1837 upheld a New York
statute requiring ship captains to post bond for each passenger
to cover any expenses the port city might incur in poor relief as
"a mere regulation of internal police":
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vaga-
bonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pesti-
lence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported,
or from4 4ship, the crew of which may be labouring under an infectious
disease.
Still, in their open racism and harshness, the anti-Chinese
policies stood apart from this general discrimination against ali-
ens in the name of social hygiene. Unlike other, particularly
European, immigrants, the Chinese were not simply presump-
tively dangerous, they were dangerous per se. And so was opium,
making it the paradigmatic Chinese drug. Unlike liquor, the in-
toxicant of choice among Americans and European immigrants
alike, opium was inherently dangerous, so dangerous that only
complete prohibition, even of its possession, would stand any
chance of containing its noxious nature.
Eventually, the instrument of police through possession
spread from opium to other dangerous drugs, and from the
Chinese to other dangerous classes, and, ultimately, with the de-
velopment of a state centered criminal law, to the entire "pub-
lic" as a giant dangerous class. In the end, the very public whose
welfare originally was protected against outside threats thus
finds itself transformed into an outside threat, this time to the
interests of the state, all of course ostensibly in the interest of its
own welfare. Through the use of facially neutral, abstract, po-
lice offenses like possession, camouflaged as traditional criminal
statutes, the public ends up being policed by the state for its
protection from itself.
' New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837).
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In the area of drug police, the analogue to the general pro-
hibition of gun possession without a state issued license that on
its face applies to the very people of "good morals" whom it is
designed to protect, is the prohibition of marijuana possession.
Designed in the early decades of the twentieth century along
the lines of the earlier Chinese opium model as a campaign to
police another class of dangerous aliens, Mexican immigrants,
this prohibition fulfilled its regulatory function admirably, at
least at first. It was an added benefit when marijuana use, and
therefore the scope of its police through possession offenses,
spread in the 1920s to another troublesome outgroup, urban
blacks and black jazz musicians in particular. It didn't hurt ei-
ther that "'degenerate' bohemian subcultures" soon took up the
drug as well .3°
The facially unlimited scope of marijuana possession of-
fenses did not become apparent until the 1960s, when the
chickens came home to roost. Having entrusted itself with the
power to punish marijuana possession, period, the state began
to apply that power against members of the very community
whose integrity, whose order, these laws were, in practice
though not on paper, designed to protect. Suddenly the "sons
and daughters of the middle class"406 found themselves the ob-
jects of police, demoted to the status of a dangerous outgroup.
And thus the enormous police potential of possession revealed
itself to those who had always thought of themselves as the
policers, rather than the policed. As Richard Bonnie and Char-
les Whitebread pointed out in 1970, "[s]ince marijuana use has
become so common, there are certain student and hippie
communities in which the police could arrest nearly everyone.
Here the problem of selective enforcement necessarily arises-
the police arrest those they dislike for other reasons . ...
407
Substitute "gun or drug possession" for "marijuana use" and
"urban blacks" for "certain student and hippie communities"
and the statement captures an important aspect of the war on
crime today.
To recapitulate, the right to property of possessors of con-
traband today is as irrelevant as their other personal rights sim-
' Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 263, at 1035.
4 Id. at 1096.




ply because they are considered not as persons, but as threats.
Threats cannot have rights. They also can't be victims. The dif-
ference between the nineteenth century cases carefully review-
ing, and in some cases overturning, statutes interfering with the
right to property in liquor and contemporary cases upholding
statutes prohibiting simple possession of drugs without any
proof of mens rea, including negligence, is the difference be-
tween respectable white Americans who enjoy their occasional
drink or who run a liquor related business and opium smoking
Chinese immigrants or their contemporary analogue, the inner
city "drug fiend." Over time, the formally abstract but substan-
tively discriminatory system of possession police showed its po-
tential as a convenient means of state oppression, not only of
recognized outgroups, but of those who fancied themselves
members of the ingroup.
3. The State as Victim
With the irrelevance of the possessor himself, all potential
personal victims of possession offenses have been eliminated.
Only the state remains. And the state is defined precisely in
contradistinction to a community of persons. The state is aper-
sonal because it ostensibly, and simply, manifests the interests of
the community it governs. It is a bureaucratic institution with
no identity, and no function, except the maintenance of "public
welfare" through the protection of "social interests." It is that
which stands above the particular groups that constitute the
mass of people under its governance, (civil) society or the
community at large.
Left without personal victims, the essence of a possession of-
fense is reduced to disobedience of state authority. At bottom,
the function of possession offenses is to control dangerous per-
sons and things, i.e., to eliminate or at least to minimize threats.
Threats to what? To the "public's" "welfare," the fundamental
"social interest." The state defines both "public" and "welfare,"
"social" and "interest." Most often, the public is simply the
dominant group in society, the ingroup. The state, however,
may also come to identify itself with the public and confuse the
public's welfare with the state's. The first case results in intraso-
cial conflict, the second in consternation among members of
the (normally) dominant social group who saw the state as the
extension of their community. Oppression occurs in both cases,
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either of outsiders by the dominant social group (via the state)
or of the community at large by the state directly.
Both aspects of a state-centered criminal law, or rather po-
lice regime, are important. Not only is the state the only victim,
but the state, as an abstraction, is an entirely apersonal victim.
The first move eliminates all personal victims, the second move
insulates the first from critique.
Once again, the notion of the state as the only victim is
nothing new to modem American criminal law. Since the mid-
dle ages, English criminal law has been conceived of as a system
of enforcing the king's peace. And the king's peace in turn was
nothing other than the peace attached to every householder, his
gi6 or mund.4 °8 Since the king's household eventually covered
the entire realm, rather than his court, any attack within the
realm against one of his subjects (an odd, but all too common,
oxymoron) also disturbed his peace. In Pollock and Maitland's
words, "[b]reach of the king's peace was an act of personal dis-
obedience," a personal affront, daring him to exercise his power
to keep his house in order.
4 0 9
And yet again, the modem American state makes for an en-
tirely different victim than did the English king, much as it
makes for a different kind of pater patiae. The significant dif-
ference here lies in the fact that a breach of the king's peace
amounted to a personal challenge to the king, as a person and
not merely as an institution. Every man within the king's mund
was beholden to him personally by an oath of fealty, as every
man to his lord, ever since William the Conqueror "decree [d]
that every freeman shall affirm by oath and compact that he will
be loyal to king William both within and without England, that
he will preserve with him his lands and honor with all fidelity
and defend him against his enemies."
410
The state, unlike the king, has no personal identity. As a to-
tal institution, not merely an abstraction but an abstraction pre-
cisely from particular persons and their conflicting interests, the
state has only an institutional identity. So, counterfeiting is not
an offense against the king, but "a contempt of and misde-
meanor against the United States."
411
43POLLOCK & MAMlTAND, supra note 115, at 463.
4 Id. at 45.
410 LAWS OFWILLIAM THE CONQUEROR § 3.
411 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792).
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Or so "it" would have us believe. In practice, though not in
theory, the state, of course, is constituted by certain persons
called officials, officers, ministers, judges, and senators. Al-
though a violation of state commands constitutes, technically
speaking, an act of abstract disobedience against the state, as
opposed to one of personal disobedience against the king, it is
always also an act of disobedience against the officials constitut-
ing the state and one of personal disobedience against the par-
ticular official issuing the command or enforcing it. The
modern American system of governance thus turns out to be
just like the historical English one, except it has no head, or
rather its head is not a person, but a deliberately apersonal ab-
straction. In the United States today, an act of disobedience
against the state is an act of disobedience against a particular
state official. In England, threats to judicial authority were al-
ways also threats to royal authority because all judges derived
their power from a commission issued on the king's prerogative.
As a 'judicial officer," a judge represented royal authority to
non-officials. As a "ministerial" officer, however, he was a link in
the chain of command moving from the king through superior
to inferior courts.41 - Unlike in England, the indignity of defi-
ance or contempt in the United States does not travel up the
ladder to the king, but remains with the state official experienc-
ing it first hand, since there is nothing at the top except a great
abstraction called "the state."
So, we find that the modern American state takes great
pains to protect the authority, dignity, safety, and well-being in
the broadest sense, of "its" officials. Acts, even hints, of disobe-
dience are punished severely, and acts of obedience rewarded.
Any interference with the well-being of a state official, physical
or otherwise, is likewise threatened with punishment. In gen-
eral, the line between the state and everyone else, between the
policers and the police, is guarded with great vigilance. So any
behavior by the policed that is inconsistent with their inferior
status, including the egregious attempt to assume the superior
status of the state official on the other side of the line, is taken
as a challenge to the line separating the state from the rest and
therefore represents a welcome opportunity to reinforce that
all-important line by putting the disorderly and contumacious in
their proper place.
412 BLACysrONE, supra note 8, at 284.
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The protection of state officials is achieved through a variety
of status-based provisions, sprinkled throughout modem
American criminal codes. For example, in the New York Penal
Law one finds not only a special "assault on a peace officer, po-
lice officer, fireman or emergency medical services profes-
sional,"413 along with a special "aggravated assault on a police
officer of peace officer,"14 but also a special "assault against a
peace office, police officer, fireman, paramedic, or emergency
medical technician ... by means including releasing or failing
to control an animal."4 15 As in all modem American death pen-
alty statutes, first degree murder is elevated to capital murder if
the victim is a police officer, peace officer, or employee of a cor-
rectional institution.416 Even "killing or injuring a police ani-
mat' is covered in a special provision.
At the same time, the authority and dignity of state officials
is ensured by punishing disobedience and rewarding obedience.
Most obvious are offenses that explicitly criminalize acts of dis-
obedience, including-in the New York Penal Law--disorderly
"conduct" by "congregat[ing] with other persons in a public
place and refus [ing] to comply with a lawful order of the police
to disperse"418 (a watered down version of the infamous English
Riot Act, which criminalized disobedience of the order to dis-
perse communicated by reading the Act
4 19), resisting arrest,420
refusing to aid a peace or police officer,42' failing to respond to
an appearance ticket,4 22 and refusing to yield to a party line.
423
Plus, there are extensive and comprehensive prohibitions of all
manners of contempt, including criminal contempt in the first
and second degree, 24 which reaches "[d]isorderly, contemptu-
ous, or insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of a
court, in its immediate view and presence and directly tending
413 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.08 (McKinney 2000).
414 Id. § 120.11.
415 Id. § 120.05(3).
416 Id. § 125.27(1) (a) (i), (ii), (iii).
" Id. § 195.06 (emphasis added).
418 Id. § 240.20(6).
419 Riot Act, 1714, 1 Geo., c. 5 (Eng.).
420 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
421 Id. § 195.10.
4- Id. § 215.58.
4
- Id. § 270.15.
424 Id. §§ 215.50-.51.
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to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its
authority,"425 "intentional disobedience or resistance to the law-
ful process or other mandate of a court except in cases involving
or growing out of labor disputes,"426 "[c]ontumacious and un-
lawful refusal to be sworn as a witness in any court proceeding
or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interroga-
tory,, 427 "[i]ntentional failure to obey any mandate, process or
notice, issued pursuant to .. the judiciary law, or to rules
adopted pursuant to any such statute or to any special statute es-
tablishing commissioners of jurors and prescribing their duties
or who refuses to be sworn as provided therein,"428 "contuma-
ciously and unlawfully refus [ing] to be sworn as a witness before
a grand jury, or, when after having been sworn as a witness be-
fore a grandjury, [refusing] to answer any legal and proper in-
terrogatory," 9 and "in violation of a duly served order of
protection... intentionally or recklessly damag[ing] the prop-
erty of a person for whose protection such order was issued in
an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars."
430
Then, for good measure, the criminal law throws in provi-
sions punishing disobedience of other state officials, beyond
judges, police officers, and peace officers, who might issue par-
ticular directions, such as subpoenas. Hence, one finds crimes
of criminal contempt of the legislature, 431 and even criminal
:432contempt of a temporary state commission and of the state
commission on judicial conduct.
433
For our purposes, most interesting is the offense of criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, which criminalizes
"refus [ing] to yield possession of such rifle or shotgun upon the
demand of a police officer" by a "person who has been certified
not suitable to possess a rifle or shotgun."434 As a possession of-
fense that explicitly punishes disobedience of a state official's
demand to surrender the object possessed by persons deemed
4
- Id. § 215.50(3).
426 Id. § 215.50(3).
427 Id. § 215.50(4).
42
8 Id. § 215.50(6).
429 Id. § 215.51 (a).
430 Id. § 215.51(d).
431 Id. § 215.60.
432 Id. § 215.65.
433 Id. § 215.66.
41 Id. § 265.01 (6).
960 [Vol. 91
POIJCING POSSESSION
"not suitable to possess" it, this offense is the paradigmatic pos-
session police offense in the guise of an ordinary criminal stat-
ute.
The flipside of this disobedience possession offense is an
obedience possession defense. So a "person voluntarily surren-
dering" a weapon illegally possessed to the proper police
authority thereby joins the select ranks of state officials exempt
from criminal possession statutes.
435
Supplementing offenses that explicitly criminalize disobedi-
ence against the state, or rather state officials, are impersona-
436tion offenses. These statutes preserve the state's monopoly
on oppression not by punishing disobedients, but by exposing
impostors. The criminal impersonator attempts to obtain for
himself the respect that is due only to state officials. He is a dis-
orderly person of the worst kind, an object of police who tries to
pass as its subject. He is a personal self-counterfeiter who boldly
appropriates the external indicia of insider status, be it in the
form of the king's seal or a police officer's uniform. The inter-
esting feature of impersonation offenses is that the impersona-
tion by itself does no damage to the authority of the state. To
the contrary, it relies on the very fact that the external indicia of
statehood suffice to command obedience from outsiders. In-
stead, impersonation offenses are offenses against the state be-
cause they represent an attempt to circumvent the strict
requirements for entry into statehood. The impersonator
threatens the very distinction between police and policed, be-
tween state and other, by challenging that fundamental distinc-
tion itself. The impersonator pretends as though anyone could
become a state official worthy of respect and unquestioning
obedience, simply by donning a uniform or displaying a badge.
Apart from criminalizing disobedience to state officials at all
levels of government, the criminal law also punishes disobedi-
ence in more subtle ways that extend far beyond specific dis-
obedience offenses. The law of sentencing, for example,
provides for various contumacy premiums. Most obvious and
most Draconian are the sentencing enhancements for recidi-
437vists, which have been a central weapon in the war on crime.These laws permit, and in many case require, the judge to in-
43S Id. § 265.20(1) (f).
4
3 Id. §§ 190.25-.26.
437 See Dubber, supra note 6.
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crease the sentence based exclusively on prior convictions.
They target those offenders who have revealed themselves as
particularly dangerous or particularly disobedient, or both. The
period of carceral incapacitation for these "recidivists" is ex-
tended, in an increasing number of cases until their death.
They have proved themselves impervious to previous threats of
punishment, and as undeterrable must be incapacitated. In
most cases, they also have thumbed their noses not merely at
the threat of punishment, but even at the actual imposition and
infliction of punishment. Their repeat offense therefore re-
flects multiple acts of disobedience against the state and a disre-
gard for its superior power. Recidivists personify contempt of
state authority and, for that reason alone, must be put in their
place. That place is either prison or, in particularly outrageous
cases, the grave, for recidivism is also a symptom of deathwor-
thiness in the American law of capital punishment.
438
Disobedience is penalized, and obedience rewarded, in
other aspects of the sentencing process as well. As anyone who
has ever encountered a police officer-or for that matter a DMV
official-knows, state officials do not appreciate inconvenience.
To state officials, ordinary people represent potential nuisances.
Interactions between members of each group therefore are de-
signed, from the perspective of the former, to abate nuisances.
Any additional inconvenience is not appreciated, no matter
what form it might take. Least appreciated is any behavior that
might be interpreted as a manifestation of disobedience. Sanc-
tions for non-cooperation, i.e., additional inconvenience, de-
pend on the nature of the interaction and the power of the state
official. If we stick with police officers, that sanction may range
from formal measures (including further investigation, ranging
from frisks to full-fledged searches of the person, objects, and
places, or the initiation of proceedings, which may be accompa-
nied by an arrest) to their informal, and far more expedient,
analogues (harassment and "police violence," which conven-
iently compress the imposition and infliction phases of the
criminal processes into one act of discipline, as a sort of sum-
mary nuisance abatement, including permanent abatement
through destruction by the use of "lethal force").
But police officers are not the only state officials in the
criminal justice system who do not appreciate recalcitrance.
411 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1) (a) (9) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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Once a nuisance has been passed on to the prosecutor-which
means that the police officer has chosen a formal sanction for
disobedience, perhaps as a supplement to informal sanctions
imposed and inflicted at the time of the original encounter be-
tween state and nuisance-the "suspect" is well advised to dis-
play a properly respectful demeanor to prevent his
reclassification as a "defendant." Should that reclassification
nonetheless have occurred, and a formal charge of one kind or
another have been filed, the now-defendant should do every-
thing in his power to minimize any further inconvenience to the
prosecutor, and of course to the judge, the next state official
whose valuable time might be occupied with the abatement of
the defendant-nuisance. Luckily, the modem American crimi-
nal process has developed the perfect procedure for this pur-
pose: plea bargaining.
A plea bargain is often nothing more than the exchange of
a reduction in punishment for a reduction in prosecutorial and
judicial inconvenience. It is a form of personal summary self-
abatement. Through an act of submission to state authority, the
defendant relieves the state officials in question of the time-
consuming task of beating him into submission.
That is not to say, of course, that the superior may not de-
cide to go through with this ceremony of humiliation nonethe-
less. It simply means that the inferior is well advised to assume a
submissive position-to humiliate himself-in order to maxi-
mize his chances of averting the impending attack. This discre-
tion to insist on official humiliation in the face of self-
humiliation helps to account for a startling phenomenon in
American criminal law, the imposition of the death penalty on
defendants who have entered a guilty plea.439 Entering a guilty
plea simply means to throw oneself upon the mercy of the state
official in charge, thus acknowledging his superior power.
There is, of course, another model of the plea bargain,
which focuses on the fact that it is a bargain, rather than a plea.
And bargaining is said to presume some basic equality among
bargainers. As a theoretical matter, this is entirely correct. And
as a participatory model of the imposition of punishment, plea
439 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Agan v. Singletary, 12
F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1994); see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PEN LTY IN THE




bargaining is attractive.4 0 Nonetheless, the reality of American
plea bargaining reflects a fundamental inequality of power be-
tween defendant and state officials inconsistent with this model,
no matter how attractive. That is not to say that plea bargaining
must always be more of a plea than a bargain, but merely that it
is.
From the perspective of a state official, any resistance to
punishment by "defendants" is considered a cumbersome com-
plication of their nuisance abatement, which only aggravates the
original nuisance and therefore calls for more radical and per-
manent abatement. So, neither prosecutors nor judges appre-
ciate a defendant who prolongs the abatement proceedings by
filing motions, by demanding a trial, perhaps even by having a
trial before a jury, then raising evidentiary objections at trial,
and filing post-trial motions or even an appeal, not to mention
collateral motions, such as a habeas corpus petition.
Defendants who do behave themselves so as to accelerate
their own abatement can expect certain benefits, again within
the discretion of the relevant state official. A defendant with
the proper attitude may receive sentence discounts for "accep-
tance of responsibility."'44 1 Or, he may receive more lenient
treatment in exchange for "substantial assistance to [the]
authorities,"442 much like a dangerous weapon, which can es-
cape complete and permanent incapacitation upon a state offi-
cial's "certificate that the non-destruction thereof is necessary or
proper to serve the ends ofjustice.
"443
The same pattern continues, in ever more drastic form, as
the person is transformed from "suspect" to "defendant" to
"convict" to "inmate," and even continues when he becomes
"parolee." In prison, guards constantly struggle to extract from
inmates the respect owed a state official. Prison guards are
particularly anxious to separate themselves from the objects of
their (and the state's) power because they occupy a particularly
low position in the status hierarchy among state officials. Un-
440 KLAUS LODERSSEN, Strafrecht als schwarzer Mann, in ABSCHAFFEN DES STRAFENS? 17,
18 (1995); Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Cri-
sis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 604 (1997).
44 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2000).
Id. § 5K1.1.
"'N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(3) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
4 See CONOVER, supra note 250.
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like their fellow frontline officials (who are police officers),
prison guards also do not enjoy most of the accoutrements of
state power that help them gain and, if necessary, enforce re-
spect. Their training is perfunctory, their uniforms unimpres-
sive, they have no patrol cars with special police engines and
ever more advanced communications equipment, and most im-
portant they do not have at their disposal the ever increasing ar-
senal of the modem police officer, except for its least
intimidating and least effective component, the baton.
The most blatant evidence of the state's claim to victimhood
in modem American criminal law comes not in the form of
punishments for disobedience or rewards for obedience. One
finds it where one would least expect it: in the campaign for
victims' rights. So a federal appellate court determined that the
federal government, and in particular the Internal Revenue
Service, is a victim of the federal Victim and Witness Protection
Act, and therefore entitled to compensation as a crime 
victim.4 5
Likewise, the California Penal Code provides, without the aid of
judicial interpretation, that "'victim' shall include . . . the im-
mediate surviving family of the actual victim" as well as "any...
government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality ...
when that entity is a direct victim of a crime.""6
The irony of this move must be savored. Here is the state
fighting a campaign on behalf of persons who have been twice
victimized, once by the perpetrator of a crime and then by the
state itself, whose officials treat the victim like a nuisance rather
than a person. And now that state, which already occupies the
positions of both violator and vindicator of victims' rights, classi-
fies itself as the victim for whose benefit it is fighting the war on
crime. In the end, then, we have the state violating and vindi-
cating itself.
Small wonder that the war on crime and the campaign for
victims' rights has been so tremendously successful. It involves
the state and only the state, as offender and as victim.
By including itself among the victims it is protecting from it-
self, the state does not deny the existence of personal victims al-
"' United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1091 (1992). For a more detailed exploration of the place of victims' rights in the
war on crime, see MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: TiE USE AND
AiUSE OFVICrIMS' RIGHTS (forthcoming 2002).
"6 CA. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(k) (2) ('West 2001) (emphasis added).
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together. Yet the state is more than just another victim. It is the
paradigmatic victim of modern criminal law. As apersonal, it is
qualitatively different than all other victims, including commu-
nal organizations like corporations and other societal entities.
The state is not simply a bigger corporation, a wider commu-
nity, a broader society. It is an abstraction and, as such, without
any connection to persons. It is the pursuit of societal interests
itself and, as such, without rights and without interests. Any in-
terference with the state is an interference with the interests it
protects. It is selfless in both senses of the word.
C. FROM CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE WAR ON CRIME
The war on crime represents the most advanced and com-
prehensive manifestation of this type of apersonal criminal ad-
ministration, which begins and ends with the state, reducing all
persons to objects of hazard police along the way. But modern
criminal administration has roots that extend far beyond Rich-
ard Nixon's anti-crime campaign. At the very height of the civil
rights era and the Warren Court, American criminal law was
ripe for the incapacitationist turn of the war on crime.
The beginnings of rehabilitationism during the first quarter
of the twentieth century were also the beginnings of the inca-
pacitationism that was to shape American criminal law during
the last quarter of the century. By the time the Model Penal
Code was completed, in 1962, the person had already been re-
moved from the heart of criminal law to its periphery.
In the end, the enduring legacy of the Warren Court-in
procedural criminal law-and the Model Penal Code-in sub-
stantive criminal law-turned out to be the endorsement of
threat minimization as a, if not the, central function of the
criminal law. And the target of the threats to be minimized was
the state, directly and indirectly. The preventive-
communitarian-authoritarian model of modern criminal ad-
ministration was in place long before the war on crime per-
fected and implemented it on a broad scale.
1. The Pound-Sayre Model
Already Pound and Sayre explained that modem criminal
law was about social interests, not about individuals.447 The state
417 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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was merely the abstract representation of these interests. The
state and the interests of society were identical. So, to protect
the state was to protect social interests and to protect social in-
terests was to protect the state.
In modem criminal law, personal victims and the vindica-
tion of their rights play at best a supporting role. In fact, one
may view the elaborate system of so-called traditional criminal
law, with its discoveries of bodies, investigations, arrests, trials,
juries, verdicts, victim impact statements, and sentencing hear-
ings, as a convenient cover for the protection of the one aper-
sonal victim that matters in the end: the state. The state thus
buys its comprehensive control of society as a whole through the
dramatic vindication of the individual rights of some of society's
members. In the end, even the protection of individual rights
serves the protection of the state's.
In its role as cover, the individual victim appears not as an
object of respect, endowed with the dignity of personhood.
Whether as the policing of public nuisances (in regulatory of-
fenses) or the unconsidered manifestation of reflexive impulses
(in "true crimes"), contemporary punishment respects neither
offenders nor victims as persons. The first, administrative,
model simply views both victim and offender as expendable.
The "victim" is the public (as in "public" nuisances) or perhaps
even the state itself (as in pure disobedience offenses). Under
the second, traditional, model the victim emerges as consumed
by a rage as confused as it is uncontrollable, and the offender as
an alien threat to the survival of the herd. Overcome with the
grief and sense of powerlessness often associated with victimiza-
tion, the sobbing victim begs the all-powerful state to apply "a
salve to help heal those whose rights and dignity have been vio-
lated ... ." And the state is all too happy to oblige.
In fairness to Sayre it must be said that he saw not only the
promise of a state-based criminal law, he also recognized some
of its dangers. He did not fully appreciate the general tendency
of modem criminal administration to bend, if not to abandon,
principles of criminal law. Instead he focused, somewhat ex-
cessively, on the dilution of a single principle, that of mens rea.
By making mens rea the defining characteristic of police of-
fenses, he even can be said to have unwittingly facilitated the
People v. Robinson, 699 N.E.2d 1086, 1093 (IIl. App. CL 1998), vacated, 719
N.E.2d 662 (Il1. 1999).
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radical extension of Draconian police offenses that paid hom-
age to mens rea, but abandoned other principles, while circum-
venting mens rea through presumptions. Still, with respect to
this particular means of rendering the state's job of nuisance
control less inconvenient, Sayre clearly saw the potential for
state oppression:
The modem rapid growth of a large body of offenses punishable
without proof of a guilty intent is marked with real danger. Courts are
familiarized with the pathway to easy convictions by relaxing the ortho-
dox requirement of a mens rea. The danger is that in the case of true
crimes where the penalty is severe and the need for ordinary criminal
law safeguards is strong, courts following the false analogy of the public
welfare offenses may now and again similarly relax the mens rea require-
ment, particularly in the case of unpopular crimes, as the easiest way to
secure desired convictions.
449
Sayre even captured much of the essence of the modern po-
lice regime, which renders it such a formidable machine for the
discretionary suppression of state defined nuisances: "conven-
ience in the interest of effective administration depending in
part upon the vagueness of its limits.
450
What's more, Sayre noticed a particular manifestation of
this potential for oppression in his own days, which was to play a
key role in the blossoming of criminal administration into the
war on crime some fifty years later: drug criminal law. As Sayre
reminds us, the Supreme Court's cavalier treatment of the mens
rea requirement began with a case involving an early federal
drug statute, the Narcotic Act of 1914. The defendants in that
case, United States v. Balint,451 had been convicted of the tax of-
fense of "unlawfully selling to another a certain amount of a de-
rivative of opium and a certain amount of a derivative of coca
leaves, not in pursuance of any written order on a form issued in
blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue." 452 They protested that they weren't charged with knowing
that the drugs were "inhibited," so that it wouldn't make a dif-
ference if they mistakenly thought otherwise. The trial court
agreed and threw out the indictment. In a very short opinion,
449 Sayre, supra note 59, at 79.
450 Id. at 79 n.87.
451 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
452 Id. at 251.
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the Supreme Court unanimously reinstated the indictment on
the basis of the following observation:
[I]n the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the State may in
the maintenance of a public policy provide "that he who shall do them
shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good
faith or ignorance." Many instances of this are to be found in regulatory
measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the
emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social bet-
terment rather than the punishment of the crimes ....
Sayre's analysis of the Balint opinion is appropriately blunt
and eerily foretelling: "The decision goes far; it can be justified
only on the ground of the extreme popular disapproval of the
sale of narcotics." 454 Balint, in other words, was not only the be-
ginning of the end of the mens rea requirement, as contempo-
rary accounts of American criminal law would have it-it was a
harbinger of the hate driven war on drugs, which by the end of
the century would claim many more casualties among the hal-
lowed principles of criminal law. In fact, the Supreme Court
had sent the mens rea requirement packing more than a decade
before Balint, in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, a little known
case involving an offense that would go on to play a distinctly
minor role in the development of modem American criminal
law: "cutting or assisting to cut timber upon the lands of the
state."
4 55
In the end, however, Sayre saw only the danger, but not its
source. To a progressive reformer like Sayre the solution to the
problem of state oppression lay, paradoxically, with the state.
The problem was not the state itself, but its administration. If
only one could place state discretion into the hands of selfless
experts, the discretionary state would fulfill the abstract state's
potential for good, not evil, and the essential selflessness of the
state would manifest itself. If those wielding discretion were
good, so was the state. Or, in the words ofJustice Frankfurter in
an opinion applying Balint some twenty years later: "In such
matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial
judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted,"456
45 Id. at 252 (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 69, 70
(1910)).
4' Sayre, supra note 59, at 80.
-5 218 U. S. 57 (1910).
456 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
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in exactly that order of significance, we might add, with a sharp
decline from the prosecutor to the jury, since so very few cases
ever make it past the prosecutor to any sort of fact finder, never
mind ajury.
The police regime of the war on crime, by implementing
and developing Sayre's model of a modem administrative sys-
tem that polices dangers to social interests, rather than punish
violators of individual rights, points up Sayre's blind spot, one
he shared with Pound and every social engineer of his time and
since: the failure to distinguish state from community, and the
resulting failure to perceive the dangers of an authoritarian
state which, acting in the name of the community, in fact ad-
vances its very own interests. The concept of society (or "the so-
cial") is sufficiently ambiguous to refer either to the community
or to the state, or to both at the same time. Yet in the end it is
the state, and not the community, that determines which "social
interests" deserve its penal protection. It is the state, and not
the community, that decides how to protect the "social interests"
it deems worthy of protection. And it is the state, and not the
community, that actually inflicts pain on persons to make these
"social interests" stick.
This scenario is troubling only to those who have lost their
faith-assuming they ever had it-in the ideal of an apersonal
state composed entirely of selfless bureaucratic experts using
their discretion in the interests, not of any individual (including
themselves), but of the community or "the social." Along with
so many of their contemporaries, Sayre and Pound were intoxi-
cated by this ideal. So was an entire generation of American
writers on law in general, and criminal law in particular. This
trust in the benevolence of the bureaucratic state lies at the
heart of the Legal Process School, so many adherents of which
cut their teeth during the New Deal and the control economy of
World War II. And it forms the foundation of the entire artifice
of modern American criminal law, which was constructed by
one of the key exponents of this sweeping movement, the great
Herbert Wechsler.
2. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code was a characteristically ambitious at-
tempt to bureaucratize American criminal law in the Legal Pro-
cess vein. Sponsored by the American Law Institute, a blue
ribbon society of concerned jurists, and drafted by Wechsler
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with the assistance of a group of penological experts drawn
from criminal law and other related disciplines like criminology
and psychiatry, the Model Code placed all discretion in the
making and application of criminal law in the hands of experts.
The very need for the Model Code arose from the inability of
amateur legislatures to appreciate the administrative complexi-
ties of a truly scientific system of penal treatment. Stuck on ata-
vistic, even barbarian, common sense notions of punishment
according to desert, unreflecting legislators were in desperate
need of scientific assistance, which Wechsler and his collabora-
tors were anxious to provide.
4 5
Once the rules of criminal administration were defined ac-
cording to the Model Code's expert blueprint, their actual ad-
ministration had to be controlled.4s In particular, judicial
discretion had to be eliminated as much as possible by a de-
tailed set of interpretative guidelines. While the judge retained
discretion in sentencing, that discretion was curtailed by a set of
sentencing guidelines based on a fairly elaborate hierarchy of
offense grades. These limitations may appear modest from to-
day's standpoint, after decades upon decades of ever more spe-
cific constraints on judicial sentencinS discretion, culminating
in the federal sentencing guidelines. At the time, however,
the Model Code's sentencing provisions represented a signifi-
cant departure from the "law" of sentencing, which then was lit-
tle more than a set of local customs varying from courtroom to
courtroom, and from judge to judge. Moreover, the judge's
sentencing decision was subject to review by the head penologi-
cal bureaucrat, the commissioner of correction, within the first
year of penal treatment, who could petition the court to resen-
tence the offender, if he was "satisfied that the sentence of the
Court may have been based upon a misapprehension as to the
history, character or physical or mental condition of the of-
fender."460 Finally, the nature and, most important, the dura-
tion of penal treatment, lay largely within the discretion of the
penological experts in correctional facilities. Under the Model
4S See Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Afodel Penal Code,
4 Btrw. CRmi. L. REv. 53 (2000).
4S9 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.02(3), 1.13(9)-(10), 2.20(3)-(5) (interpretive
guidelines) (1985).
411 See Gerard E. Lynch, Toward a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of
the Special Part; 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 297 (2000).
46 MODELPENAL CODE § 7.08 (1985).
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Code scheme, judges merely set the general time frame for
"correctional treatment "461 in the form of indeterminate sen-
tences which might range, in the case of a first-degree felony,
from anywhere between one to ten years and one year to life in
a "correctional institution.
"462
The problem of criminal codification to Wechsler and his
collaborators was a problem of criminal administration. As
such, it was primarily a staffing problem. The criminal admini-
stration was as good as its administrators. And the best adminis-
trators were those best versed in the science of criminal
administration, penology. The system thus had to be designed
so as to shift discretion into the hands of the penologists, at least
to the extent of their scientific expertise. Traditional actors re-
tained discretion for two reasons: to maximize the Model
Code's chances of adoption in American legislatures by mini-
mizing the appearance of reform and to retain functions that
for the moment lay beyond the current state of penology. To il-
lustrate the second point, Wechsler eventually realized that the
penologists could not generate a truly scientific insanity test.
4 63
So, instead of turning the insanity inquiry entirely over to the
psychiatrists, he merely revised the traditional common law in-
sanity test, but gave psychiatric experts a far greater procedural
role in its application. So, the Code provided that the court ap-
point a psychiatrist as a matter of course, who was to make de-
tailed findings regarding the defendant's mental condition, that
the defendant could have himself examined by a psychiatrist of
his own choice, and that the court hold a pre-trial hearing on
the insanity question, where the expert or experts would be sub-
ject to direct and cross-examination. The experts would take
the stand once again at the subsequent trial, should the judge
permit the defendant to raise the insanity defense on the basis
of the pre-trial hearing. They may then get to testify a third
time at the post-trial civil commitment hearing, should the in-
sanity defense have succeeded at trial, resulting in a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity. There, they would address the
question of whether the ex-defendant, having just escaped the
46! See, e.g., id. § 303.1 (1) (a).
462 See, e.g., id. § 303.6(1).
" See id. §§ 3.01-5.07 cmt., at 186-201 (1985).
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custody of the Commissioner of Corrections, would now be en-
trusted to the care of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. 4
Having recognized the limits of penological science on the
insanity question, Wechsler thus had the psychiatrists guide the
discretion of the judge and, if necessary, the jury, rather than
settle the issue themselves. This arrangement had the addi-
tional advantage of outwardly maintaining the status quo, while
at the same time strengthening the influence of penological ex-
perts in fact.
Now, the significance of shifting discretion on the insanity
issue from experts to lay people, in particular jurors, should not
be overestimated for the simple reason that the insanity defense
is rarely invoked and, if invoked, is even less likely to make it
past a pre-trial hearing and before a jury. Still, the role of the
jury in the Model Penal Code's bureaucratic scheme deserves
some attention. A body of lay judges is an odd fit for a system
built on the notion of expert efficiency. Whatever a jury trial
may be, it is neither efficient nor particularly scientific. In fact,
it would not be an overstatement to say that the jury trial is spe-
cifically designed to be cumbersome and unscientific.
What then is the jury doing in the Model Penal Code-
other than keeping the Code on the good side of the Sixth
Amendment? It is not the critical voice of the community
checking the otherwise boundless power of the state. The jury
instead fulfills two other functions. First, it enables convenient
solutions to drafting problems inherent in an attempt to define
away discretion in the administration of criminal law. The
Model Code drafters repeatedly rely on the law of evidence to
solve tricky problems in criminal law, in particular by varying
and shifting the burden of proof through affirmative defenses
and presumptions.465 The details of these drafting techniques
aren't important here; what matters is that none of them would
have been available without the jury. The American law of
evidence represents a single sustained attempt to guide the
discretion of jurors, who are considered to be unreliable and
impressionable fact finders, in contrast to professional judges,
whose expert judgments deserve greater respect-though they
too are in considerable need of guidance, in the opinion of the
4MODELPENAL CODE § 4.08 (1985).
"'See Markus Dirk Dubber, Reforming American Penal Law, 90 J. Cmt. L &
C R iNOLOcY49, 73-74 (1999).
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erable need of guidance, in the opinion of the Model Code
drafters.
Furthermore, and for our purposes more important, the
jury plays a role in the identification of deviants who are in need
of penal treatment in institutions for the correction of the
criminally abnormal. Repeatedly, the Model Code drafters
stress that the jury should determine whether certain behavior
crosses the line between normal and abnormal, between the
reasonable and the unreasonable. Especially in borderline
cases, it's up to the jury to decide whether the defendant should
be marked as deviant, and whether he "deserves" the stigma of
being labeled a criminal, a felon, a murderer, and so on.
Here, one might find the making of a communal corrective
of state oppression. Whether the jury actually performs that
function, however, depends crucially on the community it is
meant to represent. If the jury represents the community of in-
siders which more or less openly conspires with the state to po-
lice outsiders, the jury becomes a terrible instrument of
oppression, which contributes to oppression by wrapping it in
the mantle of legitimacy. The jury can only fulfill its critical
function, by giving the community a voice in the machinery of
state power exercised in its name, if the community it represents
is that of the object of state power. In the trial against a black
slave defendant, a jury of white slave owners oppresses, a jury of
black slaves legitimates.
467
The Model Penal Code doesn't show much interest in this
function of the jury, nor in the all-important question of repre-
sentativeness. Although the Code has a great deal to say about
other procedural matters (including, for instance, the elaborate
procedures for the participation of experts in insanity cases),
that omission by itself is perhaps not significant. Still, by inte-
grating the jury into the comprehensive administrative process
of deviance diagnosis, the Model Code in characteristically
pragmatic fashion manages to retain a traditional institution of
the criminal law while reinterpreting its function. The fact re-
mains that the jury is fundamentally inconsistent with the Model
Code's general bureaucratic approach. The penologist at the
466 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.01-2.03 cmt., 240-41 (negligence), 262 (causa-
tion) (1985).
" See Christopher Waldrep, Due Process for Slaves in Mississippi (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author.
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heart of the Code's model of criminal administration through
the diagnosis and treatment of deviants has about as much need
for a lay jury as does a brain surgeon.
At the very least, the Model Penal Code's treatment of the
jury does nothing to prevent the jury's subsequent development
into that silent instrument of outsider police which it can be-
come if one disregards its function as communal critique of
state oppression. The jury of the war on crime represents the
insider community of potential and actual victims, bound to-
gether through identification with the particular victim's expe-
rience. It does not represent the outsider community of
offenders. As a result, it merely reinforces the communal ha-
tred captured by the state's accusation, labeling, and eventual
disposal of the outside threat to the community of victims. The
jury is eager to do its part by aligning itself with the victim in a
united front against external evil.
As slave owner juries once sat in judgment over their fellow
slave owner, rather than his accused slave, so contemporary
American juries more often than not sit in judgment over their
fellow victim, rather than his accused victimizer. Only now the
object of their attention and identification stands to lose noth-
ing from the humiliation and disposal of the ostensible focus of
the trial. Unlike the slave owner, whose proprietary interests
were at stake in the trial of his human capital, the victim today is
seen as benefiting from the punishment of "his" offender. The
transition from identification to condemnation, therefore, is so
quick and easy as to become indistinguishable: to identify with
the victim is to condemn the offender and vice versa. Anything
less than an act of communal hatred against the offender would
bespeak a failure to identify with the victim. And not to identify
with the victim implies identifying with the offender, and there-
fore excluding oneself from the in-group, or rather revealing
oneself as already having been deviant to begin with.
The jury in this form facilitates, rather than checks, state
oppression. It facilitates state oppression of a particular kind,
namely the state assisted oppression by a societal in-group with
access to state power. So,juries have done little to prevent, and
much to aid, race based oppression throughout the United
States, and not only because so very few cases are disposed of af-




Juries can play the same role in direct state oppression, i.e.,
oppression of anyone and anything outside the state understood
as the ultimate in-group. The infamous German Volksgericht-
shof (People's Court), which handed out scores of death sen-
tences under the Nazis, featured several lay judges, who lacked
the formal independence of jurors and therefore provided a
thinner veneer of legitimacy. These lay judges made no differ-
ence whatsoever to the operation of the court, apart from what-
ever little legitimacy they could contribute.
468
The People's Court lay judges were hand-picked by the Na-
zis for their commitment to stamping out enemies of the state,
which Hitler long ago had identified-along with the Nazi party
and, of course, himself-as the ultimate manifestation of the
German community (the Volk) thanks to his claimed ability to
identify "its" social interests. These enemies of the state, it bears
emphasis, appeared to the naked eye to be members of the
German community. The Volksgerichtshof is most famous for
its disposal of actual and suspected participants in the failed July
20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler. The defendants who
were humiliated in various ways before the tribunal (for exam-
ple, by removing the belts from their loose fitting pants) and
then hanged on meat hooks included high ranking officers of
the German army and public officials, all of whom had acted in
pursuit of the well-being of the German community by ridding it
of the state in its personification as Adolf Hitler.
In the total National Socialist state we therefore find both
the identification of community and state, and the use of the
jury (or, more precisely, lay judges) as representatives of the
community to enforce the interests of the state against those of
the community. The People's Court manifested the interests of
the ultimate state ingroup, Hitler and his associates, against an
attack from the community, whose interests the state ostensibly
protected. The entire community had become the object of po-
lice, rather than its subject.
Given the experience of Nazi terror, the result of which
Wechsler saw first-hand at Nuremberg, it is surprising that the
Pound-Sayre model of state-centered criminal administration
survived World War II intact and managed to exert such influ-
ence on the Model Penal Code. The jury question here is only
468 See Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic
Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM.J. COMP. L. 227, 263-67 (1995).
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symptomatic of a general phenomenon. Wechsler's faith in the
benevolent bureaucratic state and the concomitant failure to
recognize the distinction between the community and its state-
or the public and its public servants-never wavered. In this
fundamental respect, nothing distinguishes Wechsler's 1952
plan for the Model Penal Code 469 from his 1937 blueprint for
American criminal law reform ("A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide") .470 The 1937 piece itself is a prolonged attempt to
work out the implications of the Pound-Sayre model for the
doctrine of criminal law in general, and the law of homicide in
particular.
Wechsler, in this seminal article, both implemented the bu-
reaucratic model of criminal law and, by expanding it to the
heartland of criminal law, illustrated its weakness. Like Sayre,
Wechsler's Model Code recognizes the need for strict liability
offenses, while limiting this device of prosecutorial convenience
to minor offenses. Sayre had gone so far as to define his public
welfare offenses, which could be sanctioned without proof of in-
tent, as minor offenses. For that reason, he had no room for se-
rious strict liability offenses, such as bigamy, statutory rape,
adultery, and drug offenses. 1 These were, Sayre explained,
"wholly unlike public welfare offenses, and although often cited
among the cases of the latter, are subject to altogether different
considerations,"472 whatever these considerations might be.
(Sayre didn't say.)
Not only that, but the way the Model Code retained strict li-
ability offenses also deserves attention. The Code simply de-
clared that strict liability offenses were not crimes, but an
altogether different kind of animal, a sui generis category of
civil, not criminal, offenses dubbed "violaions."473 Moreover,
the Code drafters punted on the difficult issue of Sayre's public
welfare-and strict liability-offenses by restricting the scope of
their project to traditional criminal law. In an appendix, the
drafters remarked simply that "a State enacting a new Penal
49 Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Mode! Penal Code, 65 HARV. L REV. 1097
(1952).
'Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicde I & ff. 37
COLUM. L. REv. 701, 1261 (1937).
471 Sayre, supra note 59, at 75, 79.
4
72Id. at 75.
473 MODEL. PENAL CODE §§ 1.04(5), 2.05 (1985).
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Code may insert additional Articles dealing with special topics
such as narcotics, alcoholic beverages, gambling and offenses
against tax and trade laws."
474
In this way, the Code could have its cake and eat it too. It
could declare its categorical rejection of strict criminal liability,
yet retain strict liability for any offense deemed civil, rather than
criminal. And what was a violation? Whatever the legislature
declared it to be. Only in the absence of a legislative classifica-
tion did the Code place any limits on what might be considered
a violation, and therefore punished without criminal intent: a
violation could not be punished by imprisonment, though no
limits applied to other punishments, including fines and forfei-
ture, which the legislature remained free to, set at whatever level
it pleased.475 Even these timid limitations were frequently ig-
nored by state legislatures that picked up the Model Code's
general endorsement of strict liability offenses without its limita-
tion to "violations" and defined violations more generously to
include offenses threatened with short term imprisonment.
4 76
As we saw earlier, one of the weaknesses in Sayre's concep-
tion of public welfare offenses was his obsession with mens rea.
He mistook strict liability for the essence of modem criminal
administration, rather than as a mere symptom. Modem crimi-
nal administration is by nature apersonal and state-centered.
The abandonment of mens rea is merely a symptom of the gen-
eral irrelevance of personhood and the primacy of convenience
in the state's enforcement of its commands. This also means,
conversely, that the absence, or even the emphatic rejection, of
strict liability does not imply the absence of modem criminal
administration. The distinction between "true crimes" and
"public welfare offenses" does not survive simply by retaining
mens rea for the former.477
As Wechsler made clear, modem criminal administration
can swallow traditional criminal law while at the same time pro-
claim its strict adherence to the principle of mens rea. Wech-
sler expanded the administration model from the least serious
and most modem to the most serious and least modem of of-
fenses, from Sayre's public welfare offense to first-degree mur-
474 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
471 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.04(5), 6.03(6) (1985).
476 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2001).
4n Sayre, supra note 59, at 79.
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der. With the expansion of offenses came an expansion of sanc-
tions. Where Sayre had to contend only with fines, Wechsler's
account of criminal administration covered the entire range of
penal measures, all the way to capital punishment.
Sayre sketched a model of modem criminal law as bureau-
cratic risk management. Wechsler expanded that model to
cover the entirety of criminal law, including the societal re-
sponse to those "true crimes" which Sayre was so anxious to
leave untouched. In such an apersonal and state-based system
of criminal law, the retention of mens rea is of no significance,
other than as a camouflage. The system of danger control ap-
plies equally to a strict liability offense like the sale of adulter-
ated milk, and to a mens rea offense like premeditated murder.
In both cases, the perpetrator appears as a threat to societal in-
terests that requires suppression.
Wechsler's-and therefore the Model Penal Code's-re-
gime of criminal administration is apersonal with respect to
both offenders and victims. It treats offenders as nonpersons
insofar as it regards them as criminal deviants "disposed to
commit crimes" who pose a threat to "individual or public in-
terests." It treats victims as nonpersons insofar as it subordi-
nates the protection of "individual" to that of "public interests,"
and penalizes interference with the latter without any connec-
tion to the former.
a) apersonal offenders
The Model Penal Code did not break new ground in crimi-
nal law theory. It merely implemented a long-standing consen-
sus about the objective of penal law-"the prevention of
offenses"47 -where offenses were defined, vaguely, as "conduct
that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substan-
tial harm to individual or public interests."479 Offenses were to
be prevented by extinguishing threats, either through deter-
rence or, if that failed, through treatment. Treatment, in turn,
came in two basic forms: rehabilitative and incapacitative, in-
cluding the "extreme affliction sanction" of death. °
And whatever treatment turned out to be, everyone agreed
what it was not and could never be in a rational regime of
4n MODEL PENAL. CODE § 1.02 note, at 3 (1985).
1 Id. § 1.02(1) (a).
4
W Wechsler, supra note 463, at 1123.
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criminal administration: punishment. Like every other enlight-
ened writer on criminal law since at least the 1930s, the Model
Code drafters studiously avoided the term "punishment."
48 1
Punishment was pass6, treatment very much en vogue.
482
So eager was the Code to extinguish threats, rather than to
punish crimes, that its goal was not merely to prevent the inflic-
tion of harm, but already the mere threat of that infliction.
483
Preventing the infliction of harm was too close for comfort.
The Code preferred to intervene earlier on, when the threat
had not yet appeared, never mind manifested itself, in the form
of actual harm suffered. Potential threats were to be extin-
guished, before they could blossom into full-fledged threats.
The objective of criminal law was to prevent not threats, but
threats of threats.
If the criminal law-through its criminal code-didn't suc-
ceed in extinguishing the threat personified by a particular po-
tential offender, then it was time for penological treatment. In
the words of the Code, the time had come "to subject to public
control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed
to commit crimes."484 That "public control," of course, had
nothing to do with the "public," except if the public was syn-
onymous with the state. State control would take whatever
form, and last however long, the "correction" of the offender's
particular criminal deviance required. Once that treatment was
complete, the offender-now cured of his "disposition to com-
mit crimes"-could reenter the community of normals, except
of course if he turned out to have been incorrigible, in which
case some extreme affliction sanction or another would be indi-
cated. The corrigible deviants were treated through rehabilita-
tion, the incorrigible ones through incapacitation, but treated
they all were, one way or the other.
The Model Penal Code was but the first half of the Model
"Penal and Correctional Code," as it is properly called.485 The
general and special parts of the Penal Code, dedicated to the
481 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS.
401, 425 (1958).
482 See Dubber, supra note 451, at 117-20.
483 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 note, at 3 (1985) ("[t]he major goal is to for-
bid and prevent conduct that threatens substantial harm to individual or public in-
terests").
49 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (a) (1985).
485 Id. § 1.01 (1).
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general principles of criminal liability and the definition of spe-
cific offenses, respectively, guided the penological diagnosis that
determined the appropriate correctional treatment. As the
Code drafters saw it, "[i]t ought to be the objective of the crimi-
nal law to describe the character deficiencies of those subjected
to it in accord with the propensities that they... manifest. 
4s 6
And these character deficiencies, and with them the offender's
abnormal disposition to commit crimes along with his extraor-
dinary dangerousness, were ironed out according to the scheme
laid out in the Code's second half, the Correctional Code,
which encompassed parts IlI & IV of the Penal and Correctional
Code, entitled "treatment and correction" and "organization of
correction," respectively.
This diagnosis of criminal deviance with the help of the Pe-
nal Code's categories of liability (general part) and offenses
(special part), however, not only aided the penologists' pre-
scription of the proper, rehabilitative or incapacitative, treat-
ment. Before the deviant could be treated, he first had to be
identified.
The Code, therefore, places tremendous emphasis on the
detection of abnormally dangerous individuals and of excep-
tional criminal threats. The criminal law should interfere early
and often. There's no reason to wait for the infliction of harm,
because the infliction of harm is of no significance, other than
as the concrete manifestation of a particular individual's crimi-
nal deviance. Other indicia of abnormal dangerousness are far
preferable. As a threat radar, the Code consistently errs on the
side of early intervention, often long before the threat has trans-
formed itself into harm.
So, the Code explicitly criminalizes the creation of danger.
It devotes a substantial portion of its special part to defining "of-
fenses involving danger to the person."48 7 There, we find of-
fenses that do so much more than those that "involve danger to
the person," including murder, manslaughter, negligent homi-
cide, and rape. The drafters presumably were less worried
about the oddness of characterizing a homicide as a type of dan-
ger to a person than they were eager to indicate what they con-
4'6 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMNTARIES (OFcaAL DRant AND REVIsED
CoMMENTs) §§ 220.1-230.5, at 157 n.99 (1980).
4S7 MODELPENAL CODE arts. 210-213 (1985).
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sidered to be their progressive focus on threats, rather than
harm.
This threat-based category made room for a new offense,
"recklessly endangering another person,"488 which codified the
general principle of threat neutralization the Code drafters de-
tected behind "antecedent statutes addressed only to ad hoc
situations, such as reckless driving or a motor vehicle or reckless
use of firearms."489 Once again, it authorized penal interven-
tion already on the basis of potential, and not merely actual,
threats. It subjected to state control anyone who "recklessly en-
gages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury."
490
Another advantage of the new crime of reckless endanger-
ment was that it conveniently supplemented the law of attempt,
by authorizing state control of dangerous individuals who lack
the proper mens rea-purpose-for an attempt conviction, at
least in cases "involving" serious "danger to the person," to wit,
death or serious bodily injury. In the Code's view of criminal
law as threat elimination, "[t]he primary purpose of punishing
attempts is to neutralize dangerous individuals."491 This had
Draconian consequences. First, the Code expanded the con-
cept of attempt to reach any conduct "strongly corroborative of
the actor's criminal purpose."492 What mattered, in the Code
drafters' eyes, was not whether some abstract line separating
preparation from attempt had been crossed, but whether the of-
fender had revealed that level of dangerousness, that abnormal
criminal disposition, which indicated the need for penal treat-
ment.
Second, the Code rejected the impossibility defense. Once
again, the focus was on the offender's abnormal dangerousness,
not the likelihood--or even the impossibility-of the actual in-
fliction of criminal harm. In other words, the offender's crimi-
nal disposition-the threat he posed as a criminal deviant-
required state intervention even if his particular conduct posed
no threat to anyone or anything.
... Id. § 211.2.
489 Id. art. 211, at 125 note.
4'o Id. § 211.2 (emphasis added).
49 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (OFFICIAL DRAFT AND REVISED
COMMENTS) §§ 3.01-5.07, at 323 (1985); see also id. at 325.
492 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (2) (1985).
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Third, it punished attempt much more harshly than before,
namely as harshly as its consummation. This must be so because
someone who goes through the trouble of attempting a crime is
just as dangerous, and suffers from the same general disposition
to commit crimes, as the person who succeeds in attaining his
criminal goal. "To the extent that sentencing depends upon
the antisocial disposition of the actor and the demonstrated
need for corrective sanction, there is likely to be little difference
in the gravity of the required measures depending on the con-
summation or the failure of the plan."493
Consistent with its treatment-or rather its neutralization-
of attempters as threats, the Model Code did not hesitate to
criminalize possession as an inchoate inchoate offense. Posses-
sion, like attempt, demanded correctional interference because
it indicated that the possessor was "disposed to commit crimes,"
the assumption being that possessing a particular object wasn't a
crime, while using it could be. Still, since the Code sought to
prevent crimes, rather than to punish them, merely posing a
threat of a crime could be treated as a crime in and of itself. In
the Code, possession is simply another endangerment offense.
In addition to several possession offenses among the Code's
special part, part II, which contains the definitions of specific of-
fenses, one finds two crucial and broad-sweeping possession of-
fenses in its general part, part I, containing the general
principles of criminal liability that apply to all offenses in the
special part: possession of instruments of crime, including fire-
arms and other weapons, and possession of offensive weap-
ons.494  These two provisions appear, appropriately, in the
article on inchoate crimes, following the Code's expansive defi-
nitions of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy, each of which
criminalizes the propensity to commit some crime or another.
The first, and more general, possession provision makes it a
crime for anyone to "possess[] any instrument of crime with
purpose to employ it criminally," with instrument of crime de-
fined loosely as "anything specially made or specially adapted
for criminal use" or "anything commonly used for criminal pur-
poses and possessed by the actor under circumstances which do
not negative unlawful purpose.
493 Id.
"Id. §§ 5.06-.07.
" Id. § 5.06.
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This general possession offense is not so much an offense as
a theory of criminal liability, or rather a diagnosis of
dangerousness, that no longer has anything to do with punish-
ment for harmful conduct. In the process, it stretches the al-
ready broad traditional offense of possessing burglar's tools
(such as the 19th century English statute prohibiting being
"found by Night having in his Possession without lawful Excuse
(the Proof of which Excuse shall lie on such Person) any Pick-
lock Key, Crow, Jack, Bit, or other Implement of Housebreak-
ing"4 96) beyond recognizability. It punishes the possession pure
and simple, rather than the possession with an intent to commit
a particular crime. No such intent need be proved; the posses-
sion of "anything commonly used for criminal purposes" of some
form or another, will do. It's punishment not merely for an
intent to commit a particular crime, but for an intent to commit
some crime. In other words, it's punishment for a criminal dis-
position.
In its search for indicia of dangerousness, the Model Code
pays particular attention to one class of objects, weapons. It
goes without saying that weapons are included among the in-
struments of crime, possession of which is criminalized. Weap-
ons are also conveniently defined to include not only firearms,
but "anything readily capable of lethal use and possessed under
circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses which
it may have."498 Even "firearm" is defined generously to include
"a firearm which is not loaded or lacks a clip or other compo-
nent to render it immediately operable, and components which
can readily be assembled into a weapon."499  What's more,
weapons unlike other instruments of crime are presumptively
possessed "with purpose to employ [them] criminally." And
that's not all: even the possession itself is presumed, if the
weapon is found in a car.? ° And so, mere presence turns into
possession turns into possession with intent to use it "crimi-
nally." If we put it all together, the Model Code criminalizes
being in the presence of "anything readily capable of lethal
96 An Act for the better Prevention of Offences, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 19, § 1
(Eng.) (emphasis added).
117 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 (1985).
Id- § 5.06(2).
49 Id.
5- Id. § 5.06(3).
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use." Why? Because that presence alone is a symptom of a "dis-
pos[ition] to commit crimes."
This theory of criminal liability, of course, flies in the face of
the Code's very own act requirement. As the Code announced
in its general part: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless
his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act
or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically ca-
pable."501 Even in its most explicit endorsement of incapacita-
tion, the Code insists that one of its "general purposes" is "to
subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that
they are disposed to commit crimes."
50 2
The Code resolves this difficulty with characteristic simplic-
ity: through legislative (or codificatory) fiat. Possession is an act
because the Code says it is. Right after the announcement of
the categorical act requirement, we learn that "[p]ossession is
an act... if the possessor knowingly procured or received the
thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a suffi-
cient period to have been able to terminate his possession."
50 3
Possession is criminalized as a symptom of criminal deviance.
Since only acts may be criminalized, possession is declared an
act.
The personhood of the possessor is as irrelevant as the per-
sonhood of the criminal deviant. Possession is convenient for
the diagnosis of abnormal dangerousness, as opposed to the
punishment of persons for wrongful acts, precisely because it is
a state, and as such can be experienced by any living creature,
persons and nonpersons alike. Animals, in other words, can
possess, but they cannot act. Likewise, animals can possess, but
cannot own; and they can behave, but cannot act.
The suspension of the act requirement, whether it is
through the criminalization of possession or of omissions (i.e.,
failures to act), expands the criminal law beyond the realm of
persons. Personhood, then, is no longer a prerequisite for pun-
ishment, or rather treatment. Any living creature can possess;
anyone, even anything, can fail to act.
And any living creature, along with a host of inanimate ob-
jects and natural phenomena, can pose a threat. In a view of
criminal law as singularly concerned with the extermination of
5o Id. § 2.01(1).
Id. § 1.02(1) (b) (emphasis added).
5 ' Id. § 2.01(4).
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potential threats as those underlying the Model Code, the of-
fender is of interest only as a threat personified. As a result,
criminal law is radically depersonalized. There is nothing nec-
essarily personal about a threat. Threats can emanate from any-
thing and anybody. And the proper way of dealing with threats
is their elimination, without any reference to guilt or other
uniquely personal considerations.
This is not to say that remnants of the personal offender
can't still be found in the Model Penal Code, at least on the sur-
face. So, the Code insists on proof of some sort of mens rea for
all crimes (as we noted above) and provides for various justifica-
tion and excuse defenses that shield even offenders acting with
the required mens rea from criminal liability. But neither the
consideration of the offender's mental state nor the availability
of defenses implies that the offender is punished as a person.
Instead, the Code's mens rea scheme and the grading of of-
fenses on its basis can be seen as classifying offenders by
dangerousness. The mental state simply reveals the level of
criminal disposition, once the general presence of the "dis-
pos [ition] to commit crimes" has been diagnosed. The inquiry
into mental states thus allows for a fine tuning of the general di-
agnosis of criminal deviance, with an eye toward prescribing the
appropriate mode and length of the peno-correctional regimen.
Defenses have a similar function. Causing a threat to rele-
vant interests triggers the penal response. The presence of
mens rea indicates a deviant disposition to commit crimes. The
levels of mens rea indicate the level and nature of that disposi-
tion. The initial diagnosis of deviance based on a finding of
mens rea, however, can be adjusted in the exceptional cases
where mens rea does not imply deviance. These exceptional
cases are captured by the defenses of justification and excuse.
For example, according to the Model Penal Code commentar-
ies, the defense of claim of right (where the offender acts under
the belief, however mistaken, that the property he stole be-
longed to him) is needed because "[p]ersons who take only
property to which they believe themselves entitled constitute no
signiicant threat to the ,Perty system and manifest no character trait
worse than ignorance."50
'" MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (OFFIcIAL DRAFT AND REVISED
COMMENTS) §§ 220.1-230.5, at 157 (1980) (emphasis added).
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The availability of defenses thus doesn't mean that their
beneficiaries are persons. They also are not inconsistent with an
apersonal regime of hazard control. As we've seen, the New
York dog control statute includes a full panoply of justification
defenses. What's more, the statute refers to the dog's "con-
duct," another concept that one might have thought had no
application outside the sphere of persons. Here too, there is a
remarkable similarity to the Model Code. Like the Code, the
dangerous dog law doesn't focus on conduct for its own sake.
Conduct is only relevant as an indication of dangerousness.
What matters in the end is whether the dog is dangerous, i.e.,
whether it "poses a serious and unjustified imminent threat of
harm to one or more persons."505 That's why the dog isn't pun-
ished for having done something, namely inflicted harm, but
for being something, namely dangerous. The only difference be-
tween the Code and the dangerous dog law is that the latter
doesn't bother with prevention. In the end, both are about the
identification and disposal of threats, one personal, the other
not.
b) apersonal victims
Having transformed the offender into an apersonal deviant
threat, the Model Code also largely depersonalizes the victim.
Recall that the Code defines crime as "conduct that unjustifiably
and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to indi-
vidual or public interests."50 6 The "individual or public inter-
ests" protected by offenses defined in the Code include, in that
order, "the existence or stability of the state," "the person,"
"property," "the family," "public administration," and "public
order and decency."50 7 As we saw earlier, the Code also recog-
"N.Y. AGRIC. & Mxrs. LAW § 108(24) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
50 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (a) (1985). Section 1.02(1) (a) originally referred
to "individual and public interests." See Model Penal Code § 1.02(1) (a) (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1955) (emphasis added). The crucial change from "and" to "or" .as
made shortly before the completion of the Model Code to "eliminate an ambiguity"
mentioned in the proceedings of a 1960 conference on "law and electronics." See
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (OFFICLAL DRAnt AND REVISED COWM.sS) §
1.02 n.3 (1985) (citing Layman E. Allen, Logic and Law, in LAW AND ELECrRO.cS: THE
CHALLENGE OF A NEv ERA-A PIONEER ANALUIS OF THE IMLICATIONS OF THE NEw
COMPUTER TECHOLOGY FOR THE IMPROVENMr OF THE ADUNIATION OFJUSC 187-
98 (Edgar A.JonesJr. ed., 1962)).
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 241 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE
pt. ii (Definition of Specific Crimes) (1985).
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nizes the state's authority "to insert additional Articles dealing
with special topics such as narcotics, alcoholic beverages, gam-
bling and offenses against tax and trade laws."
50 8
In other words, the vast bulk of the Code's criminal law
concerns not individual interests, but communal interests, rang-
ing from the protection of the "family" (1) to that of the "corpo-
ration" or "unincorporated association," then to the "public,"
and ultimately the "state." The primacy of public interests, and
particularly the interests of the state as such, is easily over-
looked, even if the bulk of the Code is dedicated to offenses
protecting communal interests of one kind or another. To con-
clude that the Code restricts the scope of criminal law to the
vindication of personal rights against personal interference is to
misunderstand the Code's scope, and thereby to mistake the
Code for the entirety of criminal law. That misunderstanding,
unfortunately, is fostered by the Code drafters themselves. So,
the final version of the Code contains no reference to the "vic-
timless" police offenses. The above quoted appendix appeared
in the Proposed Official Draft, not in the Final Draft. Similarly,
the Final Draft makes no mention of the very first category of
offenses, namely those against the existence or stability of the
state. Again, only a note in the Proposed Official Draft as much
as hints that the Code drafters recognized the existence, never
mind the central importance, of this category-and, for that
matter, of the state itself:
This category of offenses, including treason, sedition, espionage
and like crimes, was excluded from the scope of the Model Penal Code.
These offenses are peculiarly the concern of the federal government....
Also, the definition of offenses against the stability of the state is inevita-
bly affected by special political considerations. These factors militated
against the use of the Institute's limited resources to attempt to draft
"model" provisions in this area. However we provide at this point in the
Plan of the Model Penal Code for an Article 200, where definitions of of-
fenses against the existence or stability of the state may be incorpo-
rated.50 9
Without this note, the final version of the Code creates the
mistaken impression that the first interest to be protected by the
criminal law is the paradigmatic individual interest in the exis-
tence of the person (in article 210 (criminal homicide)). In-




stead, the firstness of the first interest to be protected belongs to
the paradigmatic public interest in the existence and stability of
the state.
The Model Penal Code did not altogether eliminate the vic-
tim as person. If we include the categories of state and police
offenses, the second of the seven offense categories, after all, is
explicitly dedicated to the protection of "the person." Charac-
teristically, this category deals with offenses "involving danger"
to the person, and thereby combines the vagueness typical of a
police regime ("involving") with its focus on threats, rather than
harm ("danger").
The Code defines "person" broadly to include not only "any
natural person," but also "a corporation or an unincorporated
association." 510 The drafters, however, here appear to have
thought of offenders, not victims, and we've already seen that
the offender as person had no place in the Code's model of
criminal administration through danger control. The Code
does not define "victim."
The "person" protected in the category of "offenses involv-
ing danger to the person" is the individual, or "natural," person
who is the victim of a homicide, an assault, a kidnapping, or a
rape. The same could be said for offenses in the next category,
"offenses against property," though here already the Code turns
its attention from the person to an interest, property, which may
be either individual or public. It is the interest that the Code
seeks to protect, not the person holding it. Only one of the of-
fenses against "the property system," 511 robbery, presumes an in-
dividual victim because it presumes an "offense involving
danger to the person," assault: robbery is theft (an offense
against property) plus assault (an offense involving danger to
the person). The ultimate, or true, victim of a robbery, how-
ever, is apersonal since the core of robbery is theft, and not as-
sault. It is, after all, theft plus assault, and not the other way
around. That is why robbery appears among the property of-
fenses, and not the person offenses.
Still, the victim of a property offense may, though it need
not, be a person. The next offense category, offenses against
the family, is the first one explicitly to protect not an individual,
SI0 MODELPENALCODE § 1.13(8) (1985).
5" MODEL PENAL CODE AND COWENTARIES (OFFICIAL DRAlr AND RmSED
ComENTs) §§ 220.1-230.5, at 157 (1980).
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but a community. Whereas the third offense category protects
an interest (property), which may be held by individual or
communities, and is in this sense apersonal, the fourth offense
category protects not an interest, but a community, the family.
By definition (or rather by categorization) offenses against the
family are not offenses against persons, at least not directly.
They may be construed as offenses against persons only indi-
rectly, by conceiving of these persons as members of a family.
So, bigamy, incest, and child neglect obviously (and abortion
not so obviously) affect individuals, but they also victimize the
family, at least according to the Model Code.
The remaining three categories bear an even more remote
relation to individual persons. Offense categories five and six
concern the "public" (as in "public administration" and "public
order and decency"), whereas the seventh, and last, category,
that of police offenses, once again protects the state, and
thereby closes the circle originating with the first category, of
"offenses against the existence and stability of the state."
In the end, the victim as person plays a subordinated role in
the Model Code. It finds itself sandwiched between apersonal
victims, beginning (and ending) with the state, but also includ-
ing the family and the public, as well as an abstract interest,
property. The Code begins with the state and ends with the
state. Along the way, it touches upon the person, in the second
category ("offenses involving danger to the person") but then
immediately proceeds to remove the person, by reducing it,
first, to incidental significance (as potential holder of a property
interest), next, to indirect significance (as members of the fam-
ily and the public), and, eventually, to insignificance (as object
of state police).
The relative insignificance of personal victims in the Model
Code raises the more general question of the significance of so-
called traditional, or "true," crimes in modem criminal admini-
stration. The Model Code goes a long way toward shifting the
core of criminal law from interpersonal crime-of persons
against persons-to apersonal offense-of threats against inter-
ests, communities, and ultimately the state, a shift first described
(and applauded) by Pound and Sayre. This new model of
criminal law behind the new model of a criminal code remained
unchallenged even during the liberal constitutional challenges
against criminal statutes of the 1960s and early 1970s. It found
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its fullest and most comprehensive implementation in the war
on crime of the decades since then.
3. The War on Crime
In the war on crime, the traditional criminal law-with its
central ceremony, the jury trial-is not only pushed into the pe-
riphery, but also is relegated to a mere means to the end of fa-
cilitating the enforcement of the new core of criminal law. As a
cover for the efficient and silent administration of the bulk of
offenses, the entire elaborate system of traditional criminal law
serves a fuiction not unlike the mens rea and actus reus princi-
ples in the Model Penal Code: its retention-with the requisite
exhortations of its crucial significance-serves to hide its irrele-
vance. In this way, the remnants of traditional criminal law
serve to legitimate modem criminal administration. Needless to
say, the legitimacy of traditional criminal law itself is beyond
question. Theories of punishment are useless not only because
punishment is passe, but also because there's no need to justify
anything.
It's not clear to what extent the war on crime merely spelled
out the administrative program of the Model Penal Code, or de-
viated from that program in some significant way. The Model
Code, as we saw, obscured its underlying program of criminal
administration as state-focused danger control both through the
explicit retention of principles of traditional criminal law and
through the exclusion of state and police offenses from its
scope. Yet, all of the weapons of the crime war can be found in
the Code, even if they are not apparent to the naked eye. On
the surface, we find the heavy use and expansive definition of
inchoate offenses, the full arsenal of possession offenses sup-
plemented by presumptions, and, in general, a system of crimi-
nal law geared toward the identification and disposal of criminal
deviants. Even without the excluded categories of state and po-
lice offenses, the Code assigns the protection of victims as per-
sons a minor, supporting, role.
If one looks closely, one can even make out the ultimate
weapon of the crime war: permanent disposal and complete in-
capacitation through capital punishment. The entire, and ex-
tensive, Code section dealing with this "extreme affliction
sanction" appears in brackets, expressing the drafters' inability
to reach a consensus on its legitimacy. Despite its non-
committal brackets, this section provided the blueprint for the
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revival of capital punishment in the United States. 12  And last
but not least, there is the Code's off-hand suggestion that legis-
latures might wish to insert into their criminal codes "additional
Articles dealing with special topics such as narcotics, alcoholic
beverages, gambling and offenses against tax and trade laws,"
'51 3
a suggestion that legislatures were only too happy to take up in
the war on drugs, though surely with an enthusiasm and conse-
quences that the Code drafters didn't anticipate.
In the end, the war on crime took the general system of
modem criminal administration as threat elimination, sketched
by Pound, Sayre, and their contemporaries and, belatedly, codi-
fied by Wechsler, and then put it to radically different use. A
shift from a presumption of corrigibility to one of incorrigibility
produced a concomitant shift from rehabilitation to incapacita-
tion. Eventually, extreme affliction sanctions became the norm,
and correctional measures the exception. Prisons were trans-
formed from correctional institutions run by penologists into
warehouses supervised by inventory managers. Treatment still
was the name of the game, but the realities of treatment, as well
as its function, had changed in ways unimaginable to the naively
progressive champions of treatmentism.
In the war on crime, the Model Code's mechanisms for the
early detection and diagnosis of correctional needs became a
vast net of mass incapacitation. The attempter was still placed
under state control as soon as his abnormal dangerousness had
revealed itself, with no regard for traditional worries about the
line between preparation and attempt or the impossibility de-
fense. And having been identified as exceptionally dangerous,
he was still subjected to the same treatment as the offender who
had succeeded in putting his criminal plan into action. But
now, that treatment was no longer designed to cure, but merely
to quarantine, and to quarantine for as long as possible, given
that the offender's criminal tendencies were presumed to be
inherent and permanent.
So, possession offenses were transformed from opportuni-
ties for early correctional intervention into opportunities for
lengthy, perhaps permanent, incapacitation. Strict liability
12 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (1985); see, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1009 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 190-91, 194 (1976); Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971).
-"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 241 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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crimes flourished, no longer constrained by the Model Code's
artificial limitation to "violations," and even extending to serious
felonies punished with mandatory life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. In fact, parole was entirely abandoned,
rendering supervision and continued diagnosis of inmates un-
necessary and maximizing the incapacitative potential of every
conviction. Most dramatically, the death penalty, that most ex-
treme of extreme affliction sanctions, which had found only an
awkward place in the Model Code, re-emerged as the most per-
manent of permanent incapacitation sanctions.
But the Model Code, and the progressive approach to
criminal law it represented, was not alone in unwittingly laying
the groundwork for the war on crime. As an emergency meas-
ure designed to abate a national crisis, the war on crime was not
choosy when it came to selecting the tools that helped it accom-
plish its crime extermination mission. There simply was no time
to revamp American criminal law in its entirety. Nor was there
any need to do so. The war on crime instead used the princi-
ples and practices at its disposal and molded them into tools,
turning progressive reforms into Draconian incapacitation
measures.
The Warren Court suffered the same fate in criminal pro-
cedure as the Model Code did in substantive criminal law. In
the war on crime, not only the Model Penal Code, but also the
Warren Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence became a
blueprint for policing threats through early incapacitative inter-
vention. Much as the Model Penal Code's greatest influence on
substantive criminal law was not its elaborate system of correc-
tional treatment (codified in its parts III & IV, long since forgot-
ten) but its model death penalty statute, so the Warren Court
today lives on in millions upon millions of Terry stop-and-frisks.
Terry today does not survive as an attempt to bring low level
police intervention within the realm of, albeit scaled down, con-
stitutional scrutiny. Terry instead stands for the explicit en-
dorsement of police intervention as threat management, and
more specifically-and troubling-as management of threats
against the state by the state, or rather against state officials by
those same officials.
Terry turns entirely on the safety of state officials. Terry held
that a police officer is entitled to "frisk" a suspect he has
"stopped" for the purpose of protecting himself. Evidence dis-
covered during such a safety frisk, like Terry's gun, is an unan-
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ticipated benefit, not a justification for the frisk. The Supreme
Court, after Terry, spent a lot of time stressing the exclusively
protective justification of the frisk, without recognizing the dan-
ger of authorizing state intervention on the basis of threats to an
official of the state as perceived by that official. These percep-
tions were not only unreviewable; in the war on crime, they were
also unreviewed. In the crisis of crime that triggered the war on
crime, police officers in the trenches had good reason to fear
for their safety. What appellate court, comfortably removed
from the realities of hand-to-hand combat, would dare chal-
lenge the apprehension experienced by an officer in the field
who comes face to face with the enemy, a criminal suspect?
The result has been that Terry today justifies "protective
sweeps" of buildings following arrests, car frisks incident to traf-
fic stops, and ever more elaborate connections between ever
more innocuous items seized by ever more frightened police of-
ficers during protective sweeps and frisks of persons reasonably
suspected of criminal conduct. And with the help of presump-
tion enhanced possession offenses, modeled on the Model Pe-
nal Code, these Terry searches and seizures play an important
role in the war on crime. Teny thus establishes a convenient
link between a state official's perception of a person as a threat
and the threat's elimination through the person's incapacita-
tion. And that, in a nutshell, is what the war on crime is all
about.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, the war on crime has transformed
American criminal law into a system of threat elimination and
minimization that has no room for persons, as offenders or as
victims. Today criminal justice policy begins and ends with in-
capacitation. And that incapacitation is achieved by any means
necessary.
Faced with a crisis of crime in the 1960s, as real as it was po-
litical, the much celebrated artifice of Anglo-American criminal
law simply collapsed. The traditional common law, unthink-
ingly imported from England centuries ago, put up no resis-
tance to the state's attempt to turn criminal justice into a system
for the identification and disposal of dangerous elements. The
two fundamental principles of this much celebrated body of law,
actus reus and mens rea, proved so malleable and ungrounded
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in anything other than common law tradition that they were eas-
ily accommodated to the new demands of emergency manage-
ment. The mens rea requirement either simply disappeared, or
was easily circumvented through evidentiary presumptions. The
actus reus requirement likewise went quietly, as the concept of
act proved flexible enough to provide at least the sheen of le-
gitimacy to the paradigmatic offense of the war on crime, pos-
session. It made no difference that English courts centuries ago
had expelled this status offense from the realm of the common
law.
The treatmentist orthodoxy of the time similarly did noth-
ing to halt the triumph of incapacitation as the core function of
the criminal law. On the contrary, it facilitated the emergence
of the war on crime in various ways. It was treatmentism that
rendered mens rea and actus reus expendable. It was treatmen-
tism that had softened up these once iron-clad principles of
criminal law, giving them the sort of flexibility that proved so
useful to the state's efforts to retain the facade of normalcy for
the emergency measures of the war on crime.
Having transformed punishment into treatment, the pro-
gressive treatmentists paved the way for the war on crime's shift
of emphasis from enlightened rehabilitation to the other,
darker and danker, end of the treatment spectrum, incapacita-
tion. Having successfully debunked what they perceived as the
anachronistic orthodoxy of retributivist punishment, the reha-
bilitationists found themselves ill-equipped to restrain the ara-
tional urge to exterminate the evil of crime, personified by an
identifiable subgroup called "criminals." All treatmentists are
out to "subject to public control persons whose conduct indi-
cates that they are disposed to commit crimes.""' The only dif-
ference between rehabilitationists and incapacitationists is what
sort of treatment they prescribe to the abnormally dangerous.
The rehabilitationist is a treatmentist who thinks all criminals
are at bottom good, and therefore curable. The incapacitation-
ist is a treatmentist who thinks they're all bad, and incurably so.
An incapacitationist is a rehabilitationist who has been mugged.
There is something rotten in a system of law that abandons
all principles at a time of crisis. What good are principles of
constitutional law that buckle under the pressure of crisis-and
the excitement of wartime xenophobia-to justify the mass in-
51, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (b) (1985).
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ternment of enemy minorities? 15 Similarly, what good are the
time honored principles of Anglo-American criminal law if they
can so easily be pressed into service in a war on crime, resulting
once again in the mass internment of enemy minorities, this
time on an even larger scale? And what good are enlightened
principles of correctional treatment if they can so easily flip over
into a blueprint for eliminatory treatment? They are all good
for one thing, and for one thing only: wrapping the unprinci-
pled exercise of state power in the mantle of legitimacy.
The war on crime has done American criminal law a favor.
It has exposed the weakness of its foundation. In particular, it
has demonstrated the impossibility of building a system of law
grounded only in tradition, rather than in firm principles.
More specifically, the war on crime has shown once and for all
that the only way to guarantee the legitimacy of state govern-
ance is to ground it in the concept of the person. The progres-
sive treatmentists had removed the person from criminal law,
and replaced it with the concept of threat, transforming person
punishment into threat neutralization, and criminal law into
criminal administration. It was this apersonal concept of crimi-
nal law that paved the way for the war on crime, which replaced
rehabilitation with incapacitation as the threat neutralization
method of choice.
The problem with the war on crime, then, was not that it
employed incapacitative treatment, but that it employed treat-
ment of any kind, as opposed to meting out just punishment.
The problem was not that it policed only innocents, but that it
policed everyone, regardless of guilt or innocence.
To overcome the war on crime, and to guard against the
collapse of legality in the face of future crises, we need to put
the person back into American criminal law. We need a per-
sonal egalitarian account of criminal law, centered around the
victim and offender as equal persons. We need a system of
criminal law that finally and completely abandons the apersonal
authoritarian orthodoxy that has shaped American criminal law
since the beginning of the twentieth century, and culminated in
the war on crime.
"' Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
230 U.S. 81 (1943).
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